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Abstract

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES:
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND COST IN
COLLECTIVE AND NON-COLLCTIVE BARGAINING WORKFORCES
By Joseph P. Casey

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy at the Wilder School, Virginia Commonwealth University

Virginia Commonwealth University, November 2013

Director: Blue Wooldridge, D.P.A., Associate Professor, Public Policy and
Administration at the Wilder School

High performance organizations desire to provide services in an effective and efficient
manner with positive outcomes; therefore measures of performance and cost can be
utilized to gauge such success. Through comparative research and analysis of local
governments that have and do not have collective bargaining for law enforcement,
findings and results can determine if there is any correlation between employee
workforce classification (in collective or non-collective bargaining workplaces), high
performance traits, costs and high performance return on costs (HPRC) for law
enforcement. A HPRC composite measure was developed and utilized to compare and
viii

contrast all of the local governments to determine relationships between performance
and costs. Based upon the research, the following findings were discovered for the null
hypothesis which compared two forms of collective bargaining - arbitration and
mediation - separately to non-collective bargaining localities: 1) Correlation between
workforce classification and high performance attributes – mediation (negative –
perform at a lower performance level); 2) Correlation between workforce classification
and law enforcement costs - arbitration (negative – costs are at a lower level); and 3)
No correlation between workforce classification and HPRC. In the preceding three
areas, only the model on high performance attributes had a high r square and low
variance with adjusted r square; both indicators of a parsimonious model. While
correlations arose, further research in this area is warranted in developing a more
enhanced and publicly accepted comparable metric of performance, costs and HPRC
for law enforcement. In addition, certain control variables illustrated a correlation with
the dependent variables as follows: 1) Performance - High median household incomes,
density, age, survey quality of life, and city; 2) Law Enforcement Costs per Capita Non-right-to-work state and county; and 3) HPRC - Median household income and
county. A rational choice theory was utilized as the lens of framework in assessing an
employee’s motivational behavior in a collective and non-collective bargaining work
environment that could contribute to differentials in performance.
Keywords: collective bargaining, high performance organization, law enforcement,
police, union, rational choice theory, local government, return on investment, city,
county, town, crime rate, survey, accreditation, mediation, arbitration, expenditures,
budget
ix

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement
As local governments continue to seek pathways towards high performance,
variances amongst them can be analyzed to determine which traits may yield a more
favorable and higher performing organization. The inherent pursuit of any business or
public sector organization towards a high performance organization (HPO) should be a
fundamental and common goal shared by all; employer, employee and customer.
Therefore, the understanding of the key variables and the degree of differentiation that
exists between HPOs and those with lower performance outputs and outcomes can
enable focused strategies on how to maximize the more results-based variables for
HPO success.
There are many services provided by local government; each of which may be
governed by national, state and local regulations and standards. Law enforcement
services are one of the more common services provided amongst local governments.
Because of its broad scope and the vested interest of citizens, businesses and
politicians in ensuring that such service is performed well in providing for a safe and
secure community, this service has been researched in many facets. The scope of law
enforcement is the individuals and organizations responsible for enforcing laws and
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maintaining public order and public safety through the prevention, detection, and
investigation of crime and the apprehension and detention of individuals suspected of
law violation (Bureau of Justice, 2012).
One variance between organizations is the ability of employees to access and
use collective bargaining in negotiated contracts for salaries, benefits and workplace
conditions. These employees are generally represented by an empowered union to act
on behalf of the employees. The International Labour Organization defines collective
bargaining as a process whereby trade unions, representing workers, and employers,
through their representatives, reach a collective agreement with provisions reflecting
terms and conditions of employment of the workers, and conferring to them their rights,
privileges and responsibilities (International Labour Organization, 2012). Because of the
inherent emotion of assigning or not assigning rights to workers in defining their
relationship with management, advocacies for and against collective bargaining may
arise. These similar advocacies may also be segmented into whether or not such rights
should be assigned to just private sector workers in their competition with one another
of private goods and services or also to include public sector workers with their more
natural monopolistic public services. An example of these emotional debates was noted
in 2011 newspaper story about Nevada public sector unions that summarized the
debates conclusion with “in the end, only acrimony prevailed” (Doughman, 2011, p. 1).
Local governments are governed through their respective state laws to either
avail or not avail collective bargaining rights to certain classes of workers amongst its
local government workforce; including law enforcement employees (Salerno, 1981). For
2

those local government law enforcement workers with collective bargaining rights, there
may be variation in the scope and leverage through which the employees or their union
representatives can negotiate favorable outcomes from the employee’s perspective.
Nevertheless the rights afforded to these workers, regardless of their ability to maximize
such rights, are still greater rights and influences than those employees without such
rights.
As there are many variables that can exist between local governments, the focus
herein is on the correlation, if any, between collective bargaining and the HPO for a
specific local government service – law enforcement. In formulating the problem
statement, there appears to be prior, but separate, research on HPOs, law enforcement
organizations, cost of services and collective bargaining. There appears to be little
research conducted on linking these four variables together. In focusing on the
independent variable of collective bargaining amongst law enforcement operations
across the United States, dependent variable correlations can possibly be derived in
HPO relationships.
Because of dependent variable variances that may exist in a local government’s
investment in law enforcement or the control variable of demographic (including socioeconomic) factors of the locality, the ability to equalize for service costs and
demographics can possibly better focus the results on more comparative collective
bargaining and HPO traits. This would better attempt to remove non-comparable HPO
result outcomes that may be influenced by higher (or lower) investment in a service or
favorable (or unfavorable) demographic traits rather than on determining the ability of
3

the employee’s performance or aggregate law enforcement organization workforce’s
performance.
As the problem statement is the first step in the research process, it is also
critical that the problem to be investigated is defined appropriately and accurately. In
attempting to formulate a problem statement for this research, efforts were made to
initially review and assess the environment for a topic that is suitable, yet unique, for
research. In addition, the ability to derive a hypothesis from the problem statement,
utilize a theoretical framework to help give perspective and basis for analysis, and
develop analytical methods were also considered. Based upon these factors, the
following problem statement has been formulated:


Local government law enforcement collective bargaining practices
appear to create advocacy groups in support and against such
practices; however, these emotional debates seem to focus on just
salary and benefit costs and not on any high performance law
enforcement organization factors; especially when total law
enforcement costs and demographic factors are considered in
determining high performance return on costs.

Importance of this Issue and Purpose of this Study
The importance of this issue and purpose of this study will be addressed through:
research question; general problem to be addressed; major dimensions or variables of
the problem; specific aspect of the problem being addressed; and answering the
question “why is this a problem in public policy and administration?."
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Research Question
As the problem statement illustrates the basis for which further research should
be conducted on this topic, the next step to help best frame the research to be
conducted is formulating a research question. Understanding what, if any, relationship
exists between collective bargaining and HPO can help address the problem. The
research can be designed to remove the emotional and advocacy-related elements that
are often associated with collective bargaining with emphasis on theoretical inspired
data analysis. In order to not be too broad, the focused local government service
subject to this question is law enforcement. Accounting for the costs amongst the
various local government law enforcement organizations is important to the research
question’s focus on the relationship between collective bargaining and HPO. Based
upon these research goals, the following research question is formulated:


Is there a relationship between a local government law enforcement
collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining workforce and a high
performance law enforcement organization when cost and demographic
factors are considered in determining high performance return on
costs?

General Problem Being Addressed
There is a long history of employee versus employer in the working environment
(Salerno, 1981). This history has segments of certain industries focused upon more and
advocated on behalf of or against more than others. This history is also highlighted by
advocacy groups with scenes of oppressed workers in unsafe working environments
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making little wages being reduced to indentured servants with little ability for the worker
or their succeeding generations from ever emerging to higher prosperity. Opposing
advocacy groups have shown the ramifications of union strikes that hinder goods and
services to be provided to customers and workers who leverage employers with threat
of strikes in return for guarantees of above market compensated and benefited jobs;
regardless of whether the employer is making a profit or loss. In addition, this history
and related advocacies can also be segmented between public and private sector
workers. To further illustrate variances between initially like-minded advocacy groups,
some of these advocacies groups are in favor of private collective bargaining subject to
market competitiveness for eventual success, but do not advocate on behalf of public
sector collective bargaining with far less market driven factors. As an example and
discussed further in Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature is the private sector union of
American Federation of Labor’s (AFL) reaction to the 1919 Boston Police social club
strikes which were not supported by the AFL in the chaos that ensued after the strikes.
The right of employees for collective bargaining (and through empowered unions)
is one variance that exists amongst local governments. Collective bargaining’s history is
rooted in enabling defined and protected rights of salaries and benefits to certain
workers. In addition, it is through collective bargaining that workplace environment
conditions can be defined and provide pathways for any employee grievances to be
resolved. Workforce and workplace advocacy organizations often lobby on behalf of
collective bargaining whereas opposing viewpoints often arise from employer
perspectives.
6

The importance of this issue is justified from the perspective that public sector
collective bargaining is a topic that continues to be raised as to what the return on
taxpayer investment (performance) accrues for the benefits bestowed on protected
employees. As local governments are becoming further scrutinized by taxpayers to
have an appropriate array of high performing services in both effective and efficient
manners, collective bargaining can be isolated as an independent variable to determine
if it has any impacts or effect upon high performing results. In addition, while
effectiveness measures (output, outcome) of performance are one attribute of
correlation to performance, the comparison and contrast to the relative cost (efficiency
measures) is another key attribute of performance. Together these effectiveness and
efficiency measures need to both excel for a HPO.
If there is a way in which law enforcement employees are best motivated to
perform quality services at the lowest cost needed to meet quality objectives, then
continued efforts would need to focus on whether collective bargaining is a trait that
helps local governments attain and then maintain HPO status. Conversely, if it appears
that collective bargaining constrains a local government’s ability in becoming a HPO or
challenges its sustainability as a HPO, then further analysis may warrant actions to
reduce collective bargaining opportunities. It is this proper manner of organizational
design which contributes to HPO as this design is a “series of activities aimed at
aligning all the elements” which can result in a HPO (Stanford, 2007, p. 19).
However, it is prudent that the scope of this research be further qualified from the
employer and customer’s perspective as employee perspectives are not fully
7

represented. The research question scope does not address what merits exist or don’t
exist from an employee’s perspective (e.g., salary, benefits, qualitative factors) via
employee survey in assessing whether the law enforcement employee is getting their
rightful or fair wage, benefit and recognition. This also does not address how the
employee feels about their job or co-workers in what may contribute to them in
performing at a higher (or lower) level. Nor are the employer’s or customer’s viewpoints
gauged via survey on their beliefs and perceptions of the merits of collective bargaining
beyond the statistical data subjected to the analysis. If there exists employee and
customer consensus for wages and benefits via collective bargaining, then collective
bargaining may be a higher priority goal; regardless of its impacts on HPO goals.

Major Dimensions or Variables of the Problem
The dimensions and variables of this problem have been narrowed with the focus
limited to local government law enforcement services. If this research was on all of local
government services, then the variables between the arrays of local government
services would have made this research topic too broad. The initial independent
variable of whether a local government law enforcement organization has collective
bargaining abilities is relatively easily determined. However, there are two primary
manners in which collective bargaining practices are leveraged within certain states for
resolution when impasse in negotiations exists: 1) Mediation; or 2) Mandatory
arbitration. These traits are further detailed in Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature.
The determination of HPO traits of a local government law enforcement
8

organization is a major dimension that was further refined to determine the best
representative traits that are most aligned with the ability of the law enforcement
employee’s performance and related outcome of such performance. Factors that
influence outcomes of law enforcement services that are not as highly correlated to an
employee’s performance need to be carefully reviewed and identified via control
variables, if possible, as part of any data analysis. However, non-employee control
variables (e.g., locality’s demographic and socio-economic factors) can be helpful in
capturing similarly positioned law enforcement organizations for comparative purposes.
This research is just limited to analysis of data as it pertains to demographics,
performance and cost. Other factors, some of them grounded with the impetus that
created collective bargaining, were not subject to this analysis. This included workplace
environment (workplace safety) and determination of a fair compensation and benefits
package to better ensure that the employee is not oppressed or otherwise treated
unfairly. However, further research would need to also measure, most likely through
employee surveys, the employee satisfaction with employer and related employee’s
quality of life and workplace attributes. If such surveys resulted in no discernible
difference between collective bargaining employees and non-collective bargaining
employees, then the analytical results of this research of performance and costs would
be further validated.
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Specific Aspect of the Problem Being Addressed
The specific aspect of the problem being addressed is the influence of collective
bargaining on performance. For most organizations, including local government law
enforcement, the highest cost is labor (Putchinisky, 2007). Therefore, the performance
attributes of the labor force translate into the foundation from which HPOs can best
succeed. The present study is not focused upon unions as a whole and their relevance
or merit in the 21st century, but rather specifically focusing on local government law
enforcement services. It is through this focus that comparable and contrasting
information will be accumulated. Upon completion of data analysis, the research
attempts to determine what differentiations foster a HPO workplace that is better
positioned to achieve their outcomes – with or without collective bargaining; or no
absolute differentiation based upon the collective bargaining independent variable.

Why is this a Problem in Public Policy and Administration?
The public policy and administration field and research attempt to understand the
manner in which the public sector can best perform in meeting citizen needs and issues,
while being a proper steward of leveraging finite resources for the greatest outcome and
HPO goals. Large components of such resources are workforce costs. Therefore, it is
through further discussion, research and knowledge that policies and strategies can be
developed about how the workforce can best be recruited, retained and rewarded with
such workforce costs leveraged best to perform in a manner that enables the public
10

sector unit to achieve its goals towards HPO.
The importance of this issue from a citizen’s perspective is that the more safe
and secure their community is, the higher their quality of life in relation to a variety of
factors (CNBC, 2012). For example, higher crime areas may adversely affect property
values as evidenced by a decrease in home property values of 10% for areas with a
higher crime rate of one standard deviation (Gibbons, 2004). This is where HPOs in the
public sector distinguish themselves from the private sector. For the private sector, the
HPO may garner a more secure customer base and yield greater profits; however, for
the public sector entity, the HPO factors translate into positive quality of life attributes for
citizens and productive environment for businesses; all with a reasonable tax burden
that maximizes the potential of return on investment of such tax burden.

Justification of the Importance of the Issue
Generally-Accepted Knowledge about the Problem
As with much research, there are some things known about this problem and
other things that are not known. It would be suffice to say that if everything were known
about this problem and what is the definitive best HPO manner to provide for a safe and
secure community, and if collective bargaining was a determining factor in achieving
this or not achieving this goal, then there would be a definitive migration towards a
collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining type of organizational environmental
structure with HPO results evident.
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This research will attempt to address the bigger issue that has been arising in
many parts of the country over recent years – determining if there is a benefit to the
public sector workplace with unionized workers compared to non-unionized workers. It
has inherently become part of the American culture to form strong opinions on what the
costs and benefits are in relation to unionized and non-unionized workplaces. There can
even be escalated opinions on this topic for certain public sector workers as evidenced
in a recent Nevada meeting where proposed state bills were labeled as “insulting” and
state representatives wanted apologies for “derogatory comments” (Doughman, 2011,
p. 1). Everyone can generally agree that the necessity for unions arose from
substandard work environments (e.g., poor safety practices), suppressed market wages
and little or no benefits (e.g., retirement, health insurance, grievance process). The
formation of unions enabled workers’ rights to be negotiated through collective
bargaining and empowered unions to further protect workers via legislative changes at
federal, state and local levels for initially private sector workers, then public sector
workers. Eventually many federal and state laws were passed to protect all workers
(e.g., workplace safety).
Private sector employees and their unions in the United States were formally
recognized and empowered with the passage of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act
(also known as the Wagner Act ; after New York Senator Robert Wagner) and the
implementation and oversight provided by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB);
an independent federal agency (LaborUnionReport.com, 2012). The following NLRB
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policy excerpt from the Code of Federal Regulations (1935) is an example of the proemployee position of the NLRB in 1935:
“It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection”
The impetus for the 1935 Wagner Act was focused on the private sector as
public sector applicability was not envisioned (Code of Federal Regulations, 1935).
President Franklin Roosevelt, a private-sector union advocate, cautioned that collective
bargaining was not meant to be transplanted to the public sector (DiSalvo, 2010). As the
unions became more empowered and utilized strikes in many facets to shut down
production, the Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) union’s sit-down strike of
General Motors and Republican Steel in 1937 motivated Congress in 1938 to pass the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). A key provision related to workers was the
“elimination of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum
standards of living necessary for health, efficiency and well-being of workers” (US
History, 2012, p. 1).
As the Wagner Act and FLSA provided empowerment to the unions and many
protections to the employees (including general protections for all workers), employers
successfully lobbied Congress to enhance employer empowerment for a better balance
between employee and employer. In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act’s employer protections
13

included employees needing to vote on establishing a union which replaced prior
practices of a “closed shop” – unions established without employee votes, unions
making political contributions and little employer protections and due process prior to
the initiation of a union strike (Taft-Hartley Act, 1947). In addition, the Taft-Hartley Act
enabled states to enact “right-to-work” laws that protected employees who did not join a
union from being terminated. The Taft-Hartley Act was silent as to the rights of public
sector workers.
It was not until 1958, when New York City Mayor Robert Wagner, son of the
United States Senator Robert Wagner who sponsored the 1935 National Labor
Relations Act, issued an executive order enabling certain local public workers the ability
to unionize. Soon thereafter, many other states, starting with Wisconsin in 1959
(LaborUnionReport.com, 2012), and local governments provided such access for
defined segments of their workforce. In 1962, President John Kennedy enabled certain
federal workers the right to unionize for the first time through Executive Order 10988
(American Presidency Project, 2012). This executive order was reinforced by Title VII of
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Dilts and Walsh, 1988).
The correlation of public sector unions and performance were initially referenced
in President Kennedy’s Executive Order 10988 resolution. HPO attribute references
included: 1) “Participation of employees in the formulation and implementation of
personnel policies affecting them contributes to effective conduct of public business”;
and 2) “Efficient administration of the government and the well-being of employees
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require that orderly and constructive relationships be maintained between employee
organizations and management officials” (American Presidency Project, 2012, p.1).

Although some states preceded the federal government in enabling collective
bargaining for local government employees, the federal government’s action in 1962
was an impetus for many states to further enable and define state and local government
collective bargaining. However, variances exist amongst the states as each state has
developed its own laws at different times and under different political circumstances
which results in a variety of “scope, coverage and impasse procedures” (Dilts and
Walsh, 1988, p. 176).

In more recent times, local government public sector unions have received much
attention as certain states debate changes to their collective bargaining laws. This
attention is fueled by recessionary conditions; declining investment return rate impacts
upon public sector defined benefit pension plans that create material unfunded pension
liabilities; and collective bargaining agreements that stipulate defined salary increases
and employer payments towards health insurance during employees’ tenure and
retirement. All of these factors constrained local government budgets and resulted in
some combination of tax rate increases or service reductions; both of which are
generally opposed by the citizens.

In 2011, Wisconsin received much attention as Governor Scott Walker proposed
major revisions to Wisconsin state law in restricting collective bargaining rights of public
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sector workers located in Wisconsin. As an example of the ensuing rhetoric that
followed, the following quote is from a local Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania newspaper’s
perspective: “The fight in Wisconsin has focused the nation's attention on collective
bargaining and its role in a democratic society. Other states facing fiscal crises are
watching the battle there. Unfortunately, because of the highly partisan nature of the
fight in Wisconsin, the debate has shed more heat than light” (Clark, 2011, p. 1).
Because of similar political structures in Indiana’s General Assembly and
governor’s office, Indiana is also actively debating this issue. Ironically, Indiana enacted
a right-to-work law in 1957, but repealed it in 1965. Other states with similar political
potential to debate this issue further include Michigan, Pennsylvania, Maine, Florida,
Tennessee, Nebraska, Kansas, Idaho, North Dakota and South Dakota (Barro, 2011).

Problem’s Treatment in Professional Reports and Writings

The issue of collective bargaining has been researched often amongst many
employee classes in both public and private sector. As advocacies on either side of this
issue are passionate, it is important to ensure that professional research is not
influenced by these advocacies. Any references from advocacy-based groups should be
prefaced accordingly, with information used in illustrating a point or providing further
enlightenment on a topic further vetted for accuracy. The following studies highlighted in
the remainder of this section reflect samples of the professional research conducted in
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this area. A more representative and complete research compilation is included in
Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature.

It appears that the most researched public sector profession with collective
bargaining inferences is school teachers. From research of Richard Freeman and
Casey Ichinowski (1988, p. 305), state comparisons with greater and lesser unionization
were performed with the result that “collective bargaining coverage is associated with
higher salaries for public school teachers and generally, though not uniformly, higher
educational performance as measured by student test scores and high graduation
rates.” In addition, “fixed-effects analysis of the effects of unionism on teacher wages
and student performance yield greatly reduced estimated effects of unionism on wages,
but continue to show substantial teacher union impacts on student performance”
(Freeman and Ichinowski, 1988, p. 306). Eberts and Stone (1986) used test scores on
14,000 fourth graders in selected school districts to evaluate the impact of unionization
on performance and find that when other socio-economic factors are controlled for,
scores are 7% higher in union districts.

There is also a great deal of professional reports on collective bargaining and the
private sector. As an example, in a study that reviewed collective bargaining of private
sector call centers, workplace-level collective bargaining arrangements were associated
with significantly higher measures of job quality (Doellgast, Holtgrewe and Deery, 2009).
There also is research that compares the influence of collective bargaining between
adjoining geographic areas. As an example, Thomas Holmes (1998) compared counties
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close to the border between states with and without right-to-work laws (thereby holding
constant an array of factors related to geography and climate). Results indicated that
the cumulative growth of employment in manufacturing in the right-to-work states was
26% greater than that in the non-right-to-work states (Holmes, 1998).

There have also been many HPO-related research studies in this field. As an
example of law enforcement research, Hua Xu’s (2008) study of organizational
performance (as measured through crime clearance rates) and variables (e.g.,
spending), the outcomes of human resource strategy and application of technology did
not have a strong correlation (Xu, 2008). However, this study also recognized
challenges in the variability in how information was compiled between comparative
localities. From Laurence Putchinisky’s (2007) research, “very few studies have
researched the actual extent of union influence on the budget decision process and
none of these studies examined to what extent that influence affects local government
decisions regarding operating expenses” (Putchinisky, 2007, p. 2).
As these preceding examples and further research studies cited in Chapter 2 –
Review of the Literature illustrate, there are many different manners in which the
variables can be defined and target workforces further examined. These collective
research results will help frame the variables to be subject to the data analysis in
Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology.
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Importance of this Research in Relationship to the Problem

Through this research, a correlation between collective bargaining and local
government law enforcement’s HPO traits can be determined to exist or not exist. The
importance in knowing if such a relationship exists can help better address the problem
statement and reduce the emotional rhetoric that is often associated with this issue.
Because this problem is focused solely on law enforcement, findings are also focused
on law enforcement. This focus should contribute to a more accurate portrayal of law
enforcement, HPO and collective bargaining without being influenced by other facets of
collective bargaining, other public sector professions, public sector budgets and HPO
correlations.
If additional costs can yield higher performance, then it would be appropriate to
best gauge the high performance return on costs of such additional cost and the
incremental marginal utility rewards. From an economic perspective, there will be a
point at which such marginal utility is diminished to the point that such additional cost
investment does not provide a return on such investment (Hicks, 1935); or in this case a
higher performance return on costs. From a public sector perspective, this point may be
debated as there can be subjective determinants as to what is defined as “return” as
there may exist more qualitative factors in the public sector than private sector.
However, if agreed-upon objective measures of performance can be assembled
together with a consistent cost basis by which such services are performed, then
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correlations of costs to higher performance can possibly be calculated, analyzed and
further discussed.

Making the Problem More Understandable
The correlations of cost, performance and collective bargaining can regress into
hard to understand relations of these variables. As an example, knowing the marginal
utility point of diminishing returns is complex. An illustrative, yet simplistic example is
public school education. As further investment in the classroom may result in lower
student-teacher ratios, there may be improved performance on the part of the student,
but this improvement, while still an improvement, may diminish in its relevance at some
point. At its most extreme, a ratio of 1:1 may yield the best performance of the student,
but is cost prohibitive. Therefore, finding that appropriate threshold is a constant
challenge as advocacies will always exist in helping a child achieve their full potential
via low teacher ratios while other advocacies will note that performance can still be
achieved, at a much lower cost, with higher teacher ratios if high performing teachers
and school districts existed. A local government can invest in resources to lower the
student-teacher ratio regardless if it’s a collective bargaining entity or not. However, the
variable of unions on performance related to schools was studied and the variables
underlying why there was improved school performance in an union environment
(Freeman and Ichinowski, 1988).
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Identification of Theoretical Basis
Theoretical Framework – Rational Choice Theory (RCT)
Applying an appropriate theory enables position the research question to better
be answered. The theoretical basis utilized to best help answer the research question
for this dissertation was Rational Choice Theory (RCT). Rational Choice Theory is a
subset of the neo-classical theories (employee marginal utility and employer profit
maximization) whereby individuals through “explanation and prediction” enable a
rational choice process to ensue even with the likelihood of “high uncertainty and
imperfect information” (Harmon and Mayer, 1986, p. 404). The underlying primary value
of Rational Choice Theory is its efficiency in rational goal attainment (Harmon and
Mayer, 1986). As the research question is based upon HPO attributes which are
dependent upon employee performance, Rational Choice Theory’s approach to
employee motivation is a critical factor to high performance.
The degree of organizational reality attempts to gauge the ability of the manager
to “optimize instead of maximize on the quality of their decision” based upon the
changing environment around them (Steers, 1984, p71). It is through rational choice
process of optimization that viable alternatives emerge and that the selected alternative
is appropriate to meet environmental demands (Steers, 1984). In addition, this theory
provides a framework to better understand and analyze social and economic behavior
(Blume and Easley, 2008); which are key attributes in individual and aggregate
employee performance. Rational Choice Theory uses a specific and narrower definition
of rationality simply to mean that an individual acts as if balancing costs against benefits
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to arrive at an action that maximizes personal advantage (Friedman, 1953). Because of
the relative success of economics at understanding markets, Rational Choice Theory
has also become increasingly employed in social sciences other than economics (e.g.,
sociology and political science) (Scott, 2011).
Elements of four other theories helped support the research and the
operationalization of Rational Choice Theory. It is through the compilation of these other
theories that better efforts were made in considering the variables subject to the data
analysis. Chapter 2 - Review of the Literature contains brief summaries of the following
four theories: 1) Conflict Theory; 2) Self-Determinant Theory; 3) Self-Regulation Theory;
and 4) Expectancy Theory.

How Theoretical Framework will be Operationalized for Research
Rational Choice Theory is the primary background context from which variables
will be selected, compiled and utilized in data analysis. This theoretical framework will
also be operationalized in this research via descriptions of independent and dependent
variables; important definitions and assumptions; the type of logic employed; and other
standards of proof that may be required. The independent variable will be whether or
not there is collective bargaining for local government law enforcement services further
segmented into two tiers of collective bargaining.
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Proposed Methodology
The proposed methodology, further specified in Chapter 3 - Research Design
and Methodology, will seek to gather a representative and comparative sample group of
local governments across the United States. As noted previously, the independent
variable of collective bargaining will try to segment the sample population into two strata
initially – those with and without collective bargaining. The sample population is derived
by using all participants in the National Citizen Survey (NCS). The NCS organization is
a nationally recognized survey group that performs professionally stratified samples of
citizens for over 250 local governments. In order to ensure that comparable localities
can emerge, an assortment of demographic and socio-economic information about each
of the localities will also be accumulated. Traditional data sources for this information
will rely on federal databases (e.g., Census) and other data sources illustrating
commonly-accepted and relevant traits and characteristics of a local government (e.g.,
bond ratings). These data sources, all secondary data sources, upon compilation can
provide a perspective of the local government and enable similar local governments to
be grouped together; hopefully with enough representative collective bargaining and
non-collective bargaining local governments in each strata segment.
The importance of developing appropriate strata segments is fundamental to
ensuring empirical research can be conducted. It would not be appropriate to measure
HPOs that have higher socio-economic or differing demographics that are heavily
weighted with a “yes” type of independent variable (e.g., collective bargaining) against
lower socio-economic localities with a “no” type of independent variable (e.g., non23

collective bargaining). Fiscal information of the locality and its funding investment in law
enforcement will enable the data analysis to account for the ability of the local
government’s impact to operations. This will also help illustrate any similarities or
discrepancies of the influence that collective bargaining has on the operational cost of
law enforcement.
In determining HPO traits that may or may not exist for a local government’s law
enforcement, three primary data sources will be utilized: 1) Citizen surveys; and 2)
Crime statistics; and 3) National accreditation. Sections of the NCS standardized survey
have questions about law enforcement services and perceptions about citizen safety
and quality of life. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has a uniform crime report
process by which all local governments submit information to the FBI. These reports
capture information on the volume and types of crimes. Finally, there is a national
accreditation agency for law enforcement called Commission on Accreditation for Law
Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). The standards for accreditation emulate many best
practices for law enforcement and while not an absolute connection to HPO results, the
intent of a law enforcement office to pursue and receive such accreditation can be
deemed as a trait of a HPO.
All of data and strata categories would be entered into statistical software (e.g.,
Statistical Package for Social Services (SPSS)). The traditional statistical results will be
further compiled and analyzed in Chapter 4 - Findings for any significant variations that
may emerge.
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Definition of Terms
The definition of terms includes the following key words and their acronyms, as
applicable, that are used throughout this research:


Collective Bargaining: Process by which empowered employee unions and
employer managements negotiate and administer labor agreements. There are
generally two tiers to resolution of impasse in collective bargaining negotiations
for law enforcement organizations: 1) Mediation; and 2) Arbitration.



High Performance Organization (HPO): Ability of an organization to outperform
its peers through superior customer service, efficient utilization of resources and
effective outcomes in meeting defined strategic goals.



High Performance Return on Costs (HPRC) Composite Measure: A calculation
derived from a weighted average of the high performance attributes compared to
costs for services derived from same concepts that return on investment (ROI)
ratios are used in private sector analysis.



Rational Choice Theory: An individual’s behavior in seeking the most cost
effective means in attaining a specific goal (“ends”) whereby the “ends” justify the
“means.”

Significance of the Study
A significant contribution of this study is that it seeks to not focus on just costs,
but to put any costs in context with performance for local government law enforcement
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services. The ability to know whether there is a result or not of collective bargaining as it
pertains to a law enforcement HPO can help to include that variable in future
discussions; and if there is no correlation, then it is appropriate to not include that
variable in future discussions. The introduction of a new composite measure, high
performance return on costs (HPRC), also adds to the significance of the study as such
calculation can potentially correlate costs to performance and enable such calculations
to be uniformly compiled, compared and contrasted.
As there were two federal legislation proposals in 2007 which would have
redefined collective bargaining rights and those of law enforcement organizations
across the United States in further empowering the unions, this research can perhaps
better determine rationale of performance attribute change that may be associated for
or against such proposals. These two proposals (Employee Free Choice Act and Public
Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act) are further addressed in Chapter 2 –
Review of the Literature.

Limitations
The limitations of this study are in the ability of collective bargaining being a key
variable in differentiation amongst local governments and a factor in HPO attributes. As
there are so many variables that comprise a local government’s law enforcement
service and its ability to perform, isolating for any one variable is always a challenge. In
addition, as this research is focused solely on the quantitative aspects of the law
enforcement organization in performance, there are many qualitative aspects that are
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also important which are not addressed. As examples, there are many manners in
which law enforcement can contribute to a community and their citizens’ well-being; and
the role that being part of a union contributes positively or negatively to an employee’s
own quality of life and well-being.

Overview of the Remaining Chapters
The remaining chapters of the dissertation are organized in the following manner:
Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature: It is through this review of the literature that
history and background is provided on collective bargaining and its role in the public
sector; with emphasis on law enforcement. The theoretical frameworks of Rational
Choice Theory and the other theories utilized are addressed in order to best position the
analysis of this topic.
Chapter 3 - Research Design and Methodology: This chapter will formulate the
hypotheses to be tested and outline in detail the steps and manner in which data will be
selected and tested. Additional information will address the propriety of the data and the
analysis that will result to ensure validity and reliability of the data; as well as the
representativeness of the data to the population of all local law enforcement
organizations.
Chapter 4 – Findings: Provides the findings from the data output results from the
research process as outlined in Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology. The
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findings will focus on correlations, not causations, between the independent and
dependent variables.
Chapter 5 – Summary: Provides the summary amongst the preceding four
chapters in bringing closure to this research project and positions future research in this
area to further test and address similar or different variables in furthering the knowledge
in this key issue.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The literature review is meant to be a “useful but fallible source of ideas about
what’s going on, and to attempt to see alternative ways of framing the issues” and not
as an “authority” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 35). In addition, the theoretical framework is further
illustrated, compared and contrasted to better help inform the research and its
application to the problem statement. As first identified in Chapter 1 - Introduction, the
following is the research question:


Is there a relationship between a local government law enforcement
collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining workforce and a high
performance law enforcement organization when cost and demographic
factors are considered in determining higher performance return on
costs?

Theoretical Framework – Research and Problem Statement Applications
As part of this theoretical framework, Rational Choice Theory attributes will be
raised in regards to their application to the problem statement and research question
with focus on collective bargaining and HPO. As HPOs reliance upon the employee is
critical, it is important to differentiate between an employee’s motivation and
performance, as motivation is the “employee’s desire to perform” whereas performance
is the “extent to which an individual can successfully accomplish a task or achieve a
goal” (Steers, 1984, p. 179). In regards to the research question, if employees have just
the desire through motivation to perform better, that is not enough, as the HPO attribute
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would have them actually perform better. This research further explores the role, if any,
that collective bargaining may have upon not just the individual’s desire to perform
better, but if in fact, if they actually perform better because of a collective bargaining
environment. There is much research that indicates HPO relies upon individuals to be
working together and that “many of the failures of cooperation in collective action are
traceable to the isolation of individuals from one another” (Frohock, 1987, p. 74). It is
not determinable without further research if this isolation attribute exists at a higher or
lower rate based upon the collective bargaining environment.

Rational Choice Theory - Historical Perspective
Rational Choice Theory can trace its origins to Aristotle in 350BC and his three
observations: 1) “The same thing is deliberated and chosen”; 2) “Deliberate not about
ends, but about means”; and 3) “Wish relates rather to the end, choice to the means”
(Aristotle, 1980, p. 54). With little transformation to modern-day thought “rationality is
seen as an instrument for achieving ends which are not themselves determined by
reason” (Allingham, 1999, p. 1). Whether or not collective bargaining has an influence
on the “means” by which HPOs can be developed and then maintained is the challenge
being addressed in this research. The collective bargaining process in itself positions
the worker and the employer for potentially a different “means” path, but perhaps there
are more than one “means” path to the “ends” of being HPO.
Thomas Hobbes in 1651 helped further shape some of the early concepts of
Rational Choice Theory in observing “all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit
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of themselves; and those actions are most reasonable, that conduce most to their ends”
(Hobbes, 1994, p. 4). However, even Hobbes recognized early that human behavior is
constrained by morality. While there is nothing that is immoral with being part of a union
or not being a part of a union, this flexibility affords the individual the opportunity to
better achieve their “ends.” However, because many workplace environments do not
easily permit for the voluntary inclusion or exclusion of being part of a union, an
individual may feel the constraint of such involuntary action as an impendent in fully
attaining their “ends.” However, if the environment of collective bargaining has
positioned similar workers with similar “ends,” then it may be a more efficient “means”
process by which one entity (the union) positions the workforce to a common “ends” and
the employer can therefore negotiate with one representative body rather than the
challenges of individual processes to best motivate the worker.
Another manner in which to approach Rational Choice Theory is recognizing how
human behavior is influenced by passion and choice. The differentiation between
passion and choice is also a topic that has been discussed for many years. In 1740,
David Hume tried to explain the differentiation by denoting that reason is a “slave of the
passions” with passions neither reasonable nor unreasonable, but reason is the agent
when passions are manifested by “choice into action” (Hume, 1740, p. 415). Therefore,
whether or not collective bargaining may or may not yield greater “passion,” it will not be
the passion-fueled practices contributing to a HPO, but rather the employee “choice”
factors in maximizing utility that yields the more productive worker and highly associated
trait of HPO.
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An often referenced story illustrating human behavior, Rational Choice Theory
and the challenges of individual versus group decisions-making is “the prisoner’s
dilemma.” This story portrays a common situation that has the individual doing what is
rational for them, but the result is not rational for the group. In this story framed by
Itzhak Gilboa (2010), two people commit a crime and are arrested by law enforcement,
but the law enforcement officers cannot prove the criminals are guilty unless at least
one of them confesses. The prisoners are placed in separate holding cells as the law
enforcement officers prepare for integration. Each prisoner reflects on whether they
should confess or not with the outcomes being one of three situations: 1) If one
confesses, then that one will be set free (and possibly rewarded) in order to convict the
other, who doesn’t confess, to a harsher sentence; 2) If both confess, then they will get
a reduced sentence; or 3) If neither confesses, they will be set free for lack of evidence.
The rationality of what’s best for the individual should lead them into confessing for the
possible rewards, rather than be found guilty from their accomplices confession or the
lessor of the consequences that may result if both confess. Therefore, in this case,
doing a rational individual choice does not provide the best option that a rational group
choice would have yielded – both not confessing and being set free. “The outcome, of
both getting a reduced sentence, is Pareto-dominated by the alternative of both being
set free” (Gilboa, 2010, p. 92).
The prisoner’s dilemma is based upon the individual being selfish and ignores
the impact of positive traits that may produce more rational choices for a group. These
traits can include loyalty, altruism and other traits that a HPO related organization can
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instill upon its workforce. These traits start with the professional efforts put forth in
recruiting the law enforcement officer, training them properly prior to deployment and
rewarding them for not just individual acts of high performance, but also rewarding the
team, division or unit that may have also contributed to a successful outcome. This
sense of organizational or at least team, division or unit loyalty and altruism should
position the individual to make rational choices for positive group outcomes; which may
also serve as a byproduct result in positive individual outcomes.

Rational Choice Theory – Maximizing Utility
It is recognized that an individual’s self-interest goal is to maximize utility; which
is correlated to the concept of “ends” previously addressed and positions the individual
to make choices to best serve the individual. “Choosing rationality becomes equivalent
to maximizing utility” which seeks the “greatest fulfillment of pre-existing passions”
(Allingham, 1999, p. 1). When referring to the individual, it should be noted that an
individual’s self-interest may be for their family as well; therefore when referencing
“individual” or “employee” in this research, it is implied that their motivation may also be
that of their family. This may lead the individual to make choices that may not expressly
benefit themselves as an individual, but rather benefit the family if the “ends” and
“maximized utility” of the family unit is deemed the primary individual motivation. If
maximizing the utility and its associated outcomes occurs, then it is through rational
choice; anything less may be considered “reasonable” (Allingham, 1999, p. 2).
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Rational Choice Theory also “maximizes the satisfaction of preferences” by
“individual actors” (Hindess, 1988, p. 1). “Narrow rationality” is where individual actions
are motivated by “self-interest”; however, that does not necessarily translate to the
actions of a group as acting rationally (Hardin, 1982, p. 9). From this perspective, noncollective bargaining traits appear to be more self-interest targeted for narrow rationality
to excel. Perhaps a key connection to narrow rationality’s success in law enforcement is
whether such employees perform better in a self-interest capacity than in larger groups
most traditionally associated with law enforcement unions. It is a “mistake to suppose
that rational individuals sharing an interest in a collective outcome can normally be
expected to act so as to produce that outcome” (Hindess, 1988, p.12) as “rational selfinterested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” (Olson,
1965, p. 2). The effects of groups and the effects of their negatively portrayed
“groupthink” outcomes would appear to be a performance issue for collective bargaining
employees to overcome. However, such potential challenges could be overcome by the
individual collective bargaining employee when given an environment to perform. They
are motivated by their self-interests and associate the group-interest process of
collective bargaining as either a separate exercise apart from performance or rationalize
their self-interest motivation as part of such exercise.
Peter Abell (1991) describes the framework for rational choice in trying to explain
a specified outcome: 1) Actors responsible for generating the outcome to be rationally
self-interested given their objective resources and preferences; 2) Model the structure of
actors interdependencies in the sense that the outcome depends jointly on what others
34

do (each actor thinks about what others will do, are likely to do or have done in the
past); 3) Determine courses of action each actor will rationally pursue; 4) Predict the
outcome(s); and 5) If this simple model approach fails, then adjust variables that may
have influenced the outcome (e.g., self-interest higher or lower). As law enforcement is
a defined and technical profession for which certain individuals have similar traits and
desires in pursuing a career in law enforcement, there is a possibility that because of
such similarities that rational choice processes may not yield much variance. In addition,
the interdependency of a law enforcement officer upon another law enforcement officer
may result in “life or death” situations which may also create an environment for an
individual’s self-interest in outcome goals to also be that of the collective group’s
outcome goal.
It is through this individual’s awareness of their collective group that contributes
to their behavior in “responding to the reality of the world around them and making
decisions – the legal, approved and even encouraged decisions – that maximize their
quality of life” (Murray, 1984, p. 162). It was this “reality of the world” concept that may
have first motivated the laborer worker (and subsequently law enforcement officers) to
pursue decision-making and advocacies to maximize their quality of life. The rise of the
worker to organize and advocate for benefits is an example of the “development of the
underclass” which could have been “predicted from the changes that social policy made
in the rewards and penalties, carrots and sticks, that govern human behavior” in
becoming “rational responses to changes in the rules of the game of surviving and
getting ahead” (Murray, 1984, p. 154). It is perhaps from these rational responses that
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an environment was created for private sector unions to initially materialize from an idea
to a legal standing via the Wagner Act to having the public sector employee also
interpret such societal benefits and higher quality of life for themselves in their advocacy
of creating organized public sector unions. Until the ability to form unions existed,
individuals may not have had any defined pathway towards coordination. An “absence
of assurance and coordination among individuals can make second-best choices
rational to all” because a “joint outcome of such choices is a rationally inferior product
from the point of view of the participating individuals” (Frohock, 1987, p. 131).
Archer and Tritter (2002) identified three assumptions in their critique of Rational
Choice Theory: 1) Rationality; 2) Individualism; and 3) Temporality. For rationality, what
people care most about involves emotionality and normativity; however these traits and
the related norms are challenged in being constrained into the Rational Choice Theory
model of the average person seeking to maximize utility; even if the apparent purpose is
mysterious (Archer and Tritter, 2002). In this case the “people” are the employees and
how the effects of collective bargaining influence the employee in their perception and
feelings of how things should be from a normative state and how congruent those
perceptions and feelings are with the employer. Even if perceptions are congruent, the
next question would be if the means to achieve are aligned with HPO traits of law
enforcement. This is a challenge in many workplaces that may have benefited from
being associated with other HPOs, but their achievement was not from any employerdriven process, but simply from the collective individual actions of employee’s emotions
and normative desires. Conversely, the employer may think they have developed the
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plan and provided the environment for HPO to succeed, but may fall short in also
ensuring that employees also aspire to the same “means” path to defined HPO success.
For individualism, the structure and culture of society influence personal goalformulation, which may challenge the individual’s current state of self-interest; not by
simply changing their self-interest to a more altruistic contributing member of society,
but rather influence the individual’s environment enough for them to modify their
previously defined self-interests. An “extended sense of individuals may contribute to a
solution generalizable to several different types of rational breakdowns between
individual and collective” (Frohock, 1987, p. 75). The societal influences and the
situations presented to the individual cannot be simply treated as aggregates, but rather
influential traits that impact decision-making (Archer and Twitter, 2002). The effect of a
changing environment is a challenge that any HPO operating in a continuum state of
high performance overcomes. These environmental changes are often subjective in
nature and how an employee reacts to these changes is also subjective, but generally
within their self-interest. This challenge faced by employers is something shared by
collective and non-collective bargaining employers. In addition, the representative
unions are also faced with their self-interest as a collective group and also may change
strategies and goals over time acting in their group’s self-interest while challenged with
the ability to properly reflect their individual members also being influenced by similar or
different societal changes.
In addressing Archer and Tritter’s (2002) third assumption - temporality, the
individual’s rational choice process is not a consistently structured process that evolves
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to the same decisions through maximizing utility as an individual’s values, creativity and
environment changes over time so would the values they assign variables in defining
utility maximization. It is through these individual experiences that reflection of past
experiences will occur in the future, learning traits are further developed and their
inherent creativity make it challenging to predict what will be the preferences in the
future as current experiences continue to influence the individual (Archer and Tritter,
2000). This variability and subjective nature in which they arise should focus the
employer on developing proper educational training to mitigate adverse changes from
employee’s evolving of different utility maximization variables. Longer tenured
employees for which past experiences have been positive, may also be able to continue
on a less volatile utility maximization path or at least on a path congruent with that of the
HPO or aspiring HPO. The effect of past experiences and environmental changes also
may either challenge a union or further strengthen it in a manner similar to that of a
HPO.

Rational Choice Theory – An Individual’s Means to an End
A fundamental assumption of Rational Choice Theory is the individual’s means to
the end as the influential manner in which their behavior motivates them to make
decisions amongst alternatives for which their preferences in selecting the actual
decision are in their self-interest. An individual is considered a “simple unit of classical
rationality” when they rank preferences on “sets of knowledgeable values, settling on
means to get these preferences” (means produced by rational, constrained by moral,
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rules) and acting consistently in a “means-ends” system (Frohock, 1987, p. 131).
However, when the outcomes from these means-ends approach fall short of individual’s
rational criteria, the dilemma that arises may be from conflicts that also arise between
an individual’s own social structure, the rules used to combine values and the actions of
others (McClennen, 1983). These actions of others in the workplace may be co-worker
to co-worker, subordinate to supervisor or upper management to workforce. For those
conflicts that arise from hierarchal issues, the greater impetus exists for an environment
of fellow co-workers advocating for a similar “means-ends” system. The formality of this
advocacy is a differential between unions and their collective bargaining ability and nonunion workplaces. Regardless of the mechanism to address, the individual will continue
to seek their “means-end” system; the challenge for the employer is trying to align such
system towards a HPO environment.
Rational

Choice

Theory

analysis

involves

an

“explicit

methodological

individualism and a distinctive model of the individual actor” (Hindess, 1988, p. 93).
However, an alternative to “methodological individualism” may occur as individuals are
“acting out of social norms rather than individual rationality” (Elster, 1986, p. 23). These
social norms should not be governing forces, but rather, can be viewed as interfering
when collective thoughts of individuals have no clear choice. In addition, these social
norms, even if they are laws, can change and therefore should not be the primary basis
by which rational choice of individuals is formulated. It would appear that when no clear
choices are evident, that social norms over the long-term can either be positioned to
make a clear choice more apparent or make it permissible as a society to have multiple,
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but finite choices from which to choose. This perhaps sets the possibility that there is
neither an absolute social norm that may exist for collective bargaining or non-collective
bargaining as these choices, while clear and distinct, may each have a rational basis
from an individual’s perspective that is reinforced if that individual is surrounded by
similar collective thoughts of other individuals. This also appears to not constrain a HPO
(or existing organization seeking HPO status) in developing multiple, but finite courses
of action to best position the employee, customer and organization for continuum of
HPO success. The result for law enforcement officers is that they will be “happier in
their work and more productive when the decisions they are allowed to make for
themselves are maximized and the decisions others make for them are minimized”
(Maddox, 1975, p. 25).
In attempting to illustrate in another manner the individual’s motivation and
environment for decision-making in the “means to an ends” system, Hanna Nurmi
(1998) developed the setting of decision theory as depicted in Figure 2.1: Single
Decision-Maker. This table illustrates a single decision-maker faced with a choice
problem in an essentially passive or disinterested environment. Depending upon how
much they know about the environment, the decision-maker is operating under
“decision modalities of certainty, risk or uncertainty” (Nurmi, 1998, p. 5). If there is
certainty, then the decision-maker should know everything about the environment and
the outcomes (and consequences) of any choice. For these situations, the decisionmaker is actually choosing between consequences and would therefore make a clear
selection in maximizing their utility towards the “ends” of their goal.
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If there is risk amongst the choices, then the decision-maker is assessing the
probabilities, outcomes and consequences based upon such risks. If uncertainty, the
decision-maker does not know the probability of the outcomes and consequences as
the relative newness of such situation does not afford the decision-maker any
knowledge to assess probability. For risk or uncertainty choices, the individual still
pursues the path towards the “ends,” but because the environment for making such
decision is not absolute, there may be environmental or other factors that could change
the individual’s choice and it is the HPO that best educates and positions its employees
to make choices to further position the HPO for success.
In any of these three situations (certainty, risk or uncertainty), rationality will seek
utility maximization based upon behavioral assumptions. These behavior assumptions
follow preferences in having the decision-maker choose between preferred alternatives
in their goal to make “optimal choices in specified environments” (Nurmi, 1998, p. 15). A
high performing law enforcement officer relies upon their environment and its actors in
assessing, often in split-second decisions, what actions they as an officer will take and
the related outcomes and consequences of such actions. Because of the numerous
instances in which law enforcement officers may be in such situations, the rationality of
utility maximization is possibly more correlated to this profession than other professions.
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Figure 2.1: Single Decision-Maker
Actor
Choice 1
Choice 2
Choice x

Outcomes and
then
Consequences
Environment
State 1
State 2
State x

A model that represents the various paths to social outcomes in rational choice
explanation was developed by Debra Friedman and Michael Hechter (1988) and is
illustrated in Figure 2.2: Various Paths to Social Outcomes. The actors and the
information available to them (whether intuitive information or information sought by the
actor) enable them to begin a rational choice process. Variations in outcomes are
attributed to variations in an individual’s preference, opportunity costs of foregoing the
next most attractive course of action and institutional constraints (e.g., laws, family,
religion, employer). While the process presented represents the individual as the actor
through the social outcome of that individual’s rational choice process, many social
outcomes are actually a compilation of many separate individual actions aggregated to
produce the actual social outcome.

For the HPO employer, having an employee

(“actor”) possess the proper information and creating an environment whereby work
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productivity is very high on the hierarchy of preferences (for which opportunity costs and
institutional constraints are best managed), should produce the desired social outcome
to further contribute towards a HPO. In relation to law enforcement organizations,
structured training helps positions all the officers to attain information and it is the
employer’s hope that through such training that productive decisions and utilization of
their time while assigned will be the result.

Figure 2.2: Various Paths to Social Outcomes

Heirarchy of
Preferences
Actors and
Information

Opportunity
Costs

Result: Social
Outcome
(Aggregation
Mechansim)

Instituional
Constraints

Rational Choice Theory – From Individual to Group
While most discussion has focused upon an individual and their Rational Choice
Theory process, collective groups can also seek utility maximizing behavior strategies.
Understanding collective groups can help better frame differences that may or may not
exist between union and non-union environments as well as differences that may or
may not exist between HPOs and non-HPOs. Because of this “universal maximizing
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behavior,” other groups could include “firms, families, social movements, political
parties, governments, racial and ethnic groups, churches or scientists, as they all are
assumed to optimize their utility functions” (Zafirovski, 1999, p. 48). However, collective
groups may not always be the conduit by which an individual perceives to achieve their
goals as rational choice can also lead an individual to act in a predictable manner under
a defined set of circumstances, even if that decision is to not join the collective action of
others. Therefore, there are circumstances in which the individual and not the collective
group may be positioned to perform better given the defined set of circumstances and
environment in which to perform.
As unions are a group, they can be treated as social systems and as relational
systems consisting of group members; “their relevant interrelations and dependencies,
as well as some artifacts” (Peter and Schmid, 2007, p. 236). “Social groups are formed
by agents who have similar goals or interests (concerning some topic) and who are
mutually believed to be members of the group” with their topic of concern considered to
be the group’s “ethos” (Peter and Schmid, 2007, p. 236). For workplaces, employees
have an “ethos” that can be through informal associations, or for collective bargaining
workplaces, the “ethos” structure is more formal. It is from this “ethos” that the group
share “constitutive goals, standards and norms” that are collectively accepted by the
individual group members that enables “coherence and unity” traits to emerge in the
group and cooperation is “more likely to emerge” in these “ethos-related topics because
the agents’ preferences are likely to be positively correlated” (Peter and Schmid, 2007,
p. 236). The challenge for the law enforcement organization is to leverage such “ethos”
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towards a HPO environment and, at a minimum, not position such “ethos” to be adverse
to the law enforcement organization’s outcome goals.
For the law enforcement employee, they may be continually challenged in having
to reinforce the group’s “ethos” with the risk that issues, perhaps many, may arise in
which their own personal belief system is challenged or compromised by that of the
group. This challenge is reiterated every time an individual acts in group dynamic for
“when a group member acts as a group member” they must respect the “ethos of the
group” and reinforce the commitment collectively agreed-upon (Peter and Schmid,
2007, p. 236). If the individual believes that they do not possess the ability to influence
or change group “ethos” to their own personal belief system of utility maximization and
means-end concepts previously addressed, then stress may be incurred by the
individual with the byproduct being a lower performing worker and a lesser HPO.
Therefore, in order for the group ethos to succeed, it can be assumed that an individual
needs to possibly compromise their own individual self-interest for the betterment of the
collective group.
However, “some of the greatest mistakes in human history had to do with
assumptions that people will be kinder, gentler and more altruistic than they ended up
being” (Gilboa, 2010, p. 98). In presenting a scenario where the assumption of the
individual’s self-interest is subordinate to that of the group’s, Gilboa (2010) uses
communism as a case study. Communism may have sounded better than it actually
turned out to be, because a flawed assumption was that the people would provide for
the well-being of others. However, because of selfishness and other variables, secret
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law enforcement officers and other overzealous governing institutions were often
created and survival of the individual (or family) and not of the group became a more
paramount motivator; which in effect negated any of the initial perceived benefits of
communism. This is not to intend any correlation to collective bargaining or other
workplace collective group roles to communism, but rather to recognize inherent
challenges exist when an individual with their self-interest is constrained daily to
sacrifice their self-interest for that of a larger group. This group in some cases may be
people who do not share the individual’s value or judgment system, are influenced by
different environmental factors or who otherwise may not simply work as hard for the
collective action for which the individual may deem these other individuals a “free-rider”
at the expense of their own hard working efforts.
The “free-rider” analogy is similar to national defense – once a country has a
national defense to properly protect its citizens, both the taxpayer and the non-taxpayer
receive the same benefit from national defense regardless of who may have invested
more of their time, money (taxes) or sentiment towards the national defense program. A
remedy for the “free-rider” problem is “social coercion” (Hindess, 1988, p. 13) whereby
apparent and visible pressure is applied to individuals, perhaps in a mandatory or
compulsory fashion, in order for all applicable individuals to “appear” vested in the
situation. This does not differentiate whether voluntarily or involuntarily vested; hence
the “appear” emphasis. As it pertains to collective bargaining, social coercion
techniques leveraged many state laws and its employers to have employees pay
compulsory dues and upon such mandatory payments, the “employees voted in much
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more overwhelming margins for union-advocated topics” (Olson, 1982, p. 22). The
compulsory nature of such union operations may be challenged if it is not in the selfinterest of the employee to be compelled towards anything compulsory; however, if
such compulsory items serve the individual’s means-end and utility maximization
desires, then such compulsory items may be tolerated by the employee.
Perhaps what provides unions their momentum and continuity of existence is that
the employees that they represent may generally be the same types of employees for
whom the needs for the unions were first advocated. The actions of the current day
employee’s predecessors was for a purposeful change in the manner of how an
employee should be treated by the employer; with a common-shared goal with the
employer – to have the employer maintain its operation and thereby its workforce for
employer profit and employee income. This initial grass-roots action of employees who
may have felt disenfranchised may be a cornerstone to a “functioning society” as well as
the “engine of social change could be grounded in the purposive actions of individuals,
taken in particular institutional and structural settings that shaped the incentives and
thus the action” (Coleman, 1986, p. 1309). It is groups of people, and perhaps unions
themselves, that utilized their collective means to define their group’s necessary
compensation, benefits, grievance and workplace conditions and performed the
necessary action steps to try and attain such goals.
The more similar a group’s underlying characteristics and traits are, the better the
group is able to leverage the proper resources (e.g., time and money) needed to act on
behalf of the larger group. “Group heterogeneity has a positive effect on the prospects
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for collective action” as a smaller critical mass can provide “collective goods that can
benefit others” (Oliver and Marwell, 1988, p. 4). In essence, the number of group
members willing and able to give at any contribution level is always higher for a larger
group. “Since collective goods with pure joint benefit of supply have a fixed cost that
does not vary with the size of the group enjoying the good, the greater expected number
of large contributors in a larger group means that, in general, fewer people will be
needed to achieve a given total contribution size than in a small group” (Oliver and
Marwell, 1988, p. 6). This may be a factor in how over time various unions have joined
forces (e.g., American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
(AFL-CIO)) in uniting for a common good as the efficiency of one entity may not only be
more successful in its advocacies, but that the resources needed to advocate may be
easier to attain with such a large group. Even though the AFL-CIO is comprised of 56
underlying national and international unions with little direct influence over the collective
bargaining processes that these individual unions may go through with their employers,
it nevertheless serves as a common entity with resources to be shared amongst its
member organizations in best positioning them to be a successful union (AFL-CIO,
2008).
While the preceding highlights the advantages and rewards of social groups
acting on behalf the individual, there are also many disadvantages and challenges
experienced. Many social groups are subject to collective sanctions, including both
collective punishment (e.g., the military practice of punishing all recruits in a barracks for
the violation of a single recruit) and collective rewards (e.g., bonuses for especially
48

productive work groups). These incentives sometimes “encourage group members to
monitor and regulate one another’s behavior and, in doing so, create norms and enforce
their compliance” to such norms (Heckathorn, 1988, p. 535). As the individual’s selfinterest may not be aligned with any third party’s regulations and constraints over them,
it is important for any employee representative group, union or non-union, and the
employer to monitor its regulatory and constraining nature in reinforcing desired or
targeted behavior. Simply changing its culture from removing collective disincentives to
be replaced with collective incentives may not in itself change the constraining attribute
of the employee and their self-interest. In reference to law enforcement organizations
and unions, the nature of a law enforcement officer’s solitude in performing their job
(e.g., patrolling alone), may often leave the officer without a sense of belonging. The law
enforcement union can provide a “sense of belonging”; an accomplishment that they
cannot get from a largely impersonal law enforcement organization (Salerno, 1981, p.
38).
However, if designed properly, collective incentives can have exactly the
“opposite effect as a group threatened by collective punishment could react by not
complying and attack the agent that issues the threat” (Heckathorn, 1988, p. 536).
Douglas Heckathorn (1988, p. 378) studied collective reward and punishment incentives
and determined that they can be highly effective at creating “exogenous compliance
norms” or may have the “opposite effect and provoke passivity or even revolt.”
According to the model, the effect of control depends upon both the attributes of the
agent that controls collective incentives (e.g., agent’s monitoring capabilities,
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vulnerability to revolt and the strength of the agent’s sanctions) and the attributes of the
group (e.g., the group’s size, degree of intragroup control, proportion of potential
violators, costliness of normative control and revolt). It would appear that a HPO
challenge is to have a collective incentive system designed to create a culture of high
performance norms without having adverse side-effects (e.g., passivity or revolt) arise.
This challenge is also one shared by employee unions in representing their members.
This constraining aspect is further reinforced for unions that require a majority of the
workers in a “specific bargaining unit to vote for union representation” and the growing,
and better managed “employer resistance” and labor laws benefiting employers (Verma
and Kochan, 2004, p. 7).

Other Theories Utilized to Support the Research
Conflict Theory frames the perspective of the impoverished worker through
which collective bargaining was a means to which improved working conditions and fair
wages and benefits could be better realized. From a rational perspective, “systematic
deduction of public policies from moral principles, with the welfare function one derives
polices from quantitative (economic) analysis that calculates how general preferences
around ends may most effectively be realized” (Harmon and Mayer, 1986, p. 268). Two
concepts as it pertains to unions and Conflict Theory revolve around the ability of a
union having a “voice” through constituent membership and how such “voice” impacts
policies and decisions of an organization.
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Chris Argyris (1960) tries to connect the individual’s psychological contract with a
“seminal dynamism” or future action of various forces as a manner in which
organizational policy can be evolved and embraced. Albert Hirschman (1970) describes
an “inceptive or beginning value” whereby the individual is part of an action or policy
which affects both the individual and the organization. While Karl Marx focused on the
way individual behavior is conditioned by social structure, Max Weber emphasized the
importance of social action, the ability of individuals to affect their social relationships
(Livesay, 2010). C. Wright Mills highlighted social structures created through conflict
between people with differing interests and resources whereby individuals and
resources, in turn, are influenced by these structures and by society’s unequal
distribution of power and resources (Knapp, 1994). As it pertains to HPO, workplace
environments may or may not be differentiated between unions and non-unionized;
therefore Conflict Theory may or may not have the same propensity to motivate worker
to perform better.
Self-Determinant Theory focuses on an organizational design and behavior
perspective of intrinsic motivation (i.e., workers have passion to advocate on behalf of
clients which in return enables the worker to be more enriched on the job and to
personally and professionally grow as an individual). This theory was initially developed
by Edward Deci and Richard Ryan (2002) and noted the importance of the employee to
feel the need for competence, autonomy and relatedness. Another element that arose
from this study was the satisfaction union members got in not just advocating in areas
specifically associated with their area of expertise, but also in having a voice in the
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community on other areas of community interest in helping give attention to such issues
(e.g., social injustices). Finally, the correlation of current union members to their family’s
history of union involvement represents a “loyalty” measure that may motivate the
worker to perform better.
The intrinsic motivation of workers to advocate on behalf of co-workers enables
the worker to be more enriched on the job and to personally and professionally grow as
an individual. The Self-Determinant Theory is focused upon employee’s motivation
while mitigating external influences. Deci and Vansteenkiste (2004) claim that there are
three essential elements of the theory: 1) Humans are inherently proactive with their
potential and mastering their inner forces (e.g., drives and emotions); 2) Humans have
inherent tendency toward growth development and integrated functioning; and 3)
Optimal development and actions are inherent in humans, but they don’t happen
automatically. While there may be extrinsic factors of motivation, the primary focus is on
intrinsic factors. However, the influences of a union may represent an extrinsic factor in
the rewards of compensation and benefits.
Self-Regulation Theory is also focused on an individual’s desire to control their
environment; especially during stressful conditions. Illusions of control can arise when
the environment may not be conducive or receptive in enabling the employee the
opportunity for such control (Fenton-O’Creevy, Nicholson, Soane and Willman, 2003).
The effect of collective bargaining may enable such control to be realized by the
employee if the union and the individual’s control-related goals are the same and stress
is mitigated. However, if such traits are not aligned between the individual and the
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union, then an individual’s control desires may be more comprised than if they were not
in a union. Karoly (1993) defines Self-Regulation Theory as those processes, internal
and/or transactional, that enable an individual to guide their goal-directed activities over
time and across changing circumstances. The processes of self-regulation are apparent
when recurring activity is constrained by irrelevant goals, new challenges and the failure
that can occur from repetitive actions without regard to thought. Self-Regulation Theory
appears to be the stable element attempting to guide behavior along a specific path to a
directed aim or goal (Karoly, 1993).
Expectancy Theory is the motivation an employee has based upon the desired
outcomes which emphasizes the employer’s rewards should “relate directly to
performance and to ensure that the rewards provided are those rewards deserved and
wanted” by the employees (Montana and Charnov, 2008). As collective bargaining may
be more associated with uniform rewards provided to the employees, then the
employee’s motivation may be mitigated without employee rewards for employee
performance. However, if the tasks are being performed require team traits and such
rewards were better aligned with the team accomplishments, then perhaps such
motivation may not be mitigated. The Expectancy Theory focuses on the three
components: 1) Expectancy; 2) Instrumentality; and 3) Valence; with the “motivational
force” being a factor of all three (Rao, 2000). It can be applied in two different formats
according to Kim and Bae (2005).
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Firstly: For the union organizations, it is the union’s motivation in participating
in organizational change and innovation that will produce a desired outcome
for which the union will benefit. The union also goes through the cognitive
process acting as an agent for the employees in making the choice to
participate. In essence, the employee has deferred such cognitive process to
the union and is accepting of the union’s judgment, then is motivated to
succeed and be rewarded in a collective manner by such outcome (individual
reward not apparent).



Secondly: For the non-union organizations, the traditional Expectancy Theory
process is experienced at the individual employee level; and it is the
expectation of the individual that individual rewards will be granted to
reinforce such motivation that enables them to make the choice of positively
participating in change and innovation.

Workforce Classifications and Collective Bargaining
Historical Perspective
The United Nations recognized the ability of workers to organize unions as a
fundamental human right (United Nations, 1948) and the Internal Labour Organization
notes the "freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining" as an essential right of workers (Internal Labour Organization, 1998). In
contrast, collective bargaining has also been associated with increased costs of labor
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and benefits, especially health insurance and retirement, which may over compensate
the employee and may provide an inability of the employer to be competitive and adapt
to market changes. Over the past fifty years, private sector unions have declined in
membership while public sector unions have grown or at least remained stable (Carrell
and Heavrin, 2004). According to the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2004), public sector employees represented by unions constituted over 40%
of the total government employment in 2003; the highest amongst any private sector
categories of employment is only 13%. Union organizing was primarily motivated by
dissatisfaction with working conditions and the perspective that unions could improve
these conditions; however, this motivational aspect of organizing is not as applicable in
the 21st century (Verma and Kochan, 2004).
While this motivational aspect may be less in the 21st century, this fragmentation
between employer and employee as it pertains to law enforcement was evident in the
early actions of the Boston Police Social Club (called a “club” prior to formal law
enforcement unions with no collective bargaining powers). When the Boston law
enforcement chief in 1919 refused to recognize this social club as having union status, a
majority of the law enforcement officers “walked off the job” for four days which resulted
in “widespread looting, hundreds of injuries and seven deaths” with order restored only
upon National Guard arrival (DeLord, Burpo, Shannon, and Spearing, 2008, p. 227).
With the National Guard’s presence, all striking law enforcement officers were
“terminated and related labor unions (e.g., American Federation of Labor (AFL))
concern about solidarity and strikebreakers did not have them further advocate or strike”
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on behalf of the law enforcement organization (DeLord, Burpo, Shannon, and Spearing,
2008, p. 227).
Even though political intervention did not arise in providing the opportunity for law
enforcement officers to form unions and collective bargaining, that does not mean that
such services were absent of any politics. During the first half of the 20 th century, there
was a high level of political interference in law enforcement organizations. “Patronage
was rampant, and employment or promotion was often dependent on how well
connected an individual was, rather than how capable he was to fill the position”
(Salerno, 1981, p. 4). Perhaps because of such organizational structure, which appears
to be completely devoid of any HPO characteristics, there was no incentive by many of
the rank and file officers for forming unions as the politically-influenced employment and
promotion aspects of the law enforcement organization began at the hiring stage of the
entry level officer. Therefore, the entry level officer, already benefiting from some form
of political patronage, may have been positioned to benefit over and over from the same
patronage; even if the benefit was simply retaining their job with low productivity and
performance.
It wasn’t until New York City started the law enforcement union movement in
1958 did law enforcement unions begin to gain momentum and prominence. However,
public sentiment toward public sector collective bargaining, especially law enforcement
was hostile (Ichinowski, Freeman and Lauer, 1989). President Kennedy’s 1962
Executive Order 10988 is largely credited with providing the momentum for public sector
unions to gain momentum nationwide. While Kennedy’s Executive Order only pertained
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to certain federal workers (i.e., armed forces have never been unionized), many state
legislatures began to feel pressure to enact collective bargaining-friendly laws (Kearney,
2001). Between 1958 and 1968, various court cases and local government policies
discouraged collective bargaining in the public sector. An example was a 1963 Michigan
Supreme Court decision that upheld the “Muskegon Police Chief’s policy that essentially
prohibited law enforcement officers from becoming members of unions” (Morgan and
Korstad, 1977, p. 3). However, in 1968, the 7th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in
McLaughlin v. Tilendis ruled that an individuals’ right to form and join unions are
protected by the First Amendment (398 F 2nd 287, 7th Cir., 1968).
The two national law enforcement unions that started out as employee
organizations, not unions, are the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) and the Police
Benevolent Association (PBA). The FOP, with 310,000 members currently, formed in
1915 in Fort Pitt, Pennsylvania as law enforcement officers were unhappy with 12 hour
working days and other poor working conditions (Fraternal Order of Police, 2004). The
PBA (actually the “P” initially stood for “Patrolmen”) began in New York City in 1892 as
a social institution and by 1914 became an effective political lobbying force in defeating
New York legislation associated with mitigating a law enforcement officer’s right to
appeal dismissal (Colwell, 1994). Even though these and many other examples of poor
working conditions for the law enforcement officer existed similar to that of other
laborers, law enforcement unions did not initially experience the same expansion in
unions or collective bargaining ability as other labor unions (private and public sector).
One rationale behind such lagging unionization is that law enforcement officers have
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been “historically opposed to true unionization, because of their generally conservative
philosophies, the unsavory history of some trade unions and the fear that unionism is
diametrically opposed to professionalism” (Salerno, 1981, p. 36).
Even though such law enforcement unions may not exert the same powers (e.g.,
no strikes permitted in 49 states and in the remaining state (Montana) there are many
barriers to striking), law enforcement officers have large representation in unions. Law
enforcement officers and firefighters have over 36% of their employees nationwide part
of a union; which is second only to teachers for all occupational categories, private or
public (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2004). This percentage
increases substantially when it is just large law enforcement organizations; with over
70% of organizations with greater than 100 sworn officers engaging in collective
bargaining (Zhao and Lovrich, 1997).
Ultimately, it has been a state’s right to determine whether or not to permit
collective bargaining (and the related unions needed to represent the worker) for local
government employees and law enforcement officers. The threshold of enabling a union
first divides each state into “right-to-work” (twenty-three states) and “agency shops”
(twenty-seven states) whereby two tiers exist for the right-to-work states: 1) The state,
generally through its constitution (six states) or legislative code (seventeen states),
defines whether or not a union can be established and if so, does it also enable public
sector unions and if so, does it enable law enforcement unions; and 2) If it does enable
unions, then the employees have the right to either join or not join such union. Indiana
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was the most recent to change its status to right-to-work in 2012 with the previous state
change to right-to-work being Oklahoma in 2001. What makes Indiana’s change to rightto-work unique is that it is now the only non-contiguous right-to-work state.
For the twenty-seven states that are not right-to-work, these states enable unions
via “agency shops” to be formed through membership votes. Upon the formation of the
union, the union acts as an agent for all employees in negotiating with the employer,
whether or not they are formally part of the union membership. For those employees
who choose to not become a member after a defined period of time after employment,
these non-union employees still may be required to pay a portion of established union
dues for the union’s actual efforts involved with collective bargaining on behalf of the
non-unionized employee.
The Supreme Court, in Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988),
ruled that “objecting nonmembers cannot be required to pay union dues. The most that
nonmembers can be required to pay is an agency fee that equals their share of what the
union can prove is its costs of collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment with their employer” (National Right-to-work Legal Defense
Foundation, 2012, p. 1). This situation creates a variance between those employees
who are members of a union and the higher number of employees that are represented
by a union.
It is through more formal employee organizations that arise from collective
bargaining that a law enforcement officer can “improve not only their personal means”
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(e.g., compensation and benefits), but also improve their “professional destinies”
through having more formal opportunities of input (Maddox, 1975, p. 25). As Figure 2.3:
Public Sector Union Membership and Representation illustrates, this divide has
narrowed between 1983 and 1995 as it appears that a greater percentage of employees
actually are members of the unions that represent them.
Figure 2.3: Public Sector Union Membership and Representation

Figure 2.4: Right-to-Work States Map is reproduced from the National Right-towork Legal Defense Foundation and highlights the twenty-three states with “right-towork” laws as evidenced by darker shaded areas (National Right-to-work Legal Defense
Foundation, 2012). What can be confusing terminology to many is that even in right-towork states there may be the enabling of unions to form, but it is not uniformly granted
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that these unions have collective bargaining powers bestowed to them. Instead these
unions, if permitted, may be a membership-based group that employees can join
voluntarily; which generally impede its ability to attract and retain members as it is
challenged to overcome the “free-rider” concept discussed previously. For these rightto-work states, the employee representative groups may act in capacity of presenting
needs and requests to the employer, but the employer is under no contractual process
to negotiate or bargain with such group. These unions may also not have rights to “work
to the contract,” slow down their work or strike as many other collective bargaining
empowered unions have those tools in non-right-to-work states (National Right-to-work
Legal Defense Foundation, 2012, p. 1).
While the preceding sentence may not be as applicable for law enforcement
unions (e.g., strikes, with many limitations, are only permitted in one of the non-right-towork states for law enforcement unions), it does illustrate the variances that can arise
between states. For example, Florida is considered a right-to-work state, but their state
law permits unions to be organized; however, such membership in the union is not an
expectation for the new employee. The Florida constitution outlines such provision as
follows: “The right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or non-membership in any labor union or labor organization. The right of
employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively shall not be
denied or abridged” (US History, 2012, p. 1).
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Figure 2.4: Right-to-Work States Map (Darker Shade)

As in Florida and other places in which the collective bargaining exercise must be
performed, “there is no doubt that collective bargaining has taken or will continue to take
some of a chief’s unilateral decision-making authority away from him” (Salerno, 1981, p.
43). The manner in which such time constraints and authoritative manners are
suppressed and its correlation to performance is not readily apparent. However, from an
efficiency perspective, any additional time of the employee or employer that is
consumed on tasks (e.g., collective bargaining negotiating) that are not correlated to an
increase in efficiencies that arise with agreed-upon labor contracts, may represent an
inefficient use of time and its related cost incurred on such time-consuming activities.
From a time management perspective, “collective bargaining as a concept is not
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incompatible with professionalism because it is no more than a device in which men sit
across a table from one another for communication purposes” (Maddox, 1975, p. 130).
In illustrating the difference in organizations across the United States, a study of
private sector employees determined that 20% of the private sector workforce was a
member of a union in non-right-to-work states whereas only 8% of private sector
employees were members of unions in right-to-work states (Davis and Huston, 1995, p.
223). This difference reflects that not only is there a difference in how the states view
their private sector workforce’s ability to collective bargaining, but how such persona is
also reflected in the politician (who makes the laws) in how private sector workers are
also viewed. In addition, there is a “paradigm shift” occurring in labor unions in “where,
how and by whom goods are produced” and four trends continue to support this shift: 1)
Global completion and deregulation; 2) Workforce demographics (e.g., women and parttime workers), increase in number of illegal immigrants who fear retribution in organized
structures and transition from manufacturing to service-based industries; 3) Federal
laws (e.g., safe workplace conditions and family medical leave); and 4) General little
interest from the new generation of workers (Wagner, 2008, p. 17).
All of these issues has challenged the HPO in determining where and the
manner it should produce its goods, and when mobility issues are not over-constraining,
then the employer may often move such production facilities to an environment that the
employer believes can position it better to maintain or attain HPO status. A current
example of this challenge is Boeing. As Boeing created a new product, the 787
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Dreamliner, it decided that it would be better for the company to build it in South
Carolina (a right-to-work state) instead of Washington with its unions that caused
various Boeing plant shutdowns over the years during contractual negotiations. What
has made this private sector decision more complicated and the subject of national
attention is that the United States government has intervened and determined that
Boeing’s move cannot occur if the primary reason is seeking a non-unionized workforce;
a current legal challenge requiring a lengthy court process to resolve (Steinglass, 2011).
While mobility issues in the production of goods is not applicable to the public sector
(e.g., City ABC can’t move to another state), it does illustrate an inherent variance
between public and private sector unions. The economic factors benefiting one locality
and hindering another locality because of private sector relocations may impact the
quality of life factors for general citizens’ at-large in the localities affected by such
migrations.

Collective Bargaining – Benefits to Today’s Worker
With regard to collective bargaining, the benefits bestowed from the union to the
employee will most likely occur whether the employee is active in helping the union or
the collective bargaining negotiation process to succeed. Because of this inherent
dilemma, there may not be a connection between the employee and the union. This
dilemma causes the challenges that arise in voluntary union workplaces whereby the
non-union members may receive the same benefits as the union members without the
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contribution of union dues and the time needed for union activities. For these
workplaces, additional incentives from the union may need to be provided so that union
members feel the return on investment of such costs and time (Hindess, 1988). This
would also avert the “free-rider” challenges previously addressed as the non-union
“free-rider” employee receives the same contractual benefit as the dues-paying
employee. This challenge is partially overcome in legal authority granted to unions to
recover the pro-rata costs of collective bargaining negotiations from non-union members
via a calculated fee. This fee may be far less than any union membership dues and
does not grant the employee any other union membership privilege.
Today’s employee expresses a “strong interest in having a job environment that
supports continued learning and development,” enables the worker flexibility in
balancing work and family life; all without the stress commonly associated with “risks of
strikes, employer retaliation and resistance” (Verma and Kochan, 2004, p. 7). These
self-interest worker desires can be compatible with a HPO. The organizations that can
meet these current day desires of the worker will be in higher demand for existing
employees to remain and prospective employees to apply. It is when these workplace
traits don’t exist that the employee would feel more compelled to leverage the abilities of
a union to advocate for such traits or migrate to another employer that provides the
environment of such traits; regardless if the new employer is an union or non-union
workplace. Many of these organizational trait concepts illustrated for the self-interest of
the worker may not be traits that traditional unions possess; which is also a challenge to
continued or growing membership. In addition, there is “twice as many former union
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members as there are current union members”; which makes recruiting for union
membership increases even more challenging (Verma and Kochan, 2004, p. 8).
The premise that workers would be long-term employees of a single company
helped position for a strong union with a continuum of members. However, an
“independent workforce” has emerged that enables them to perform in a variety of
manners and often “flexible models of work” (e.g., self-employed, independent
contractors, temporary worker, contracted employees) (Wagner, 2008, p. 204). These
growing populations of an independent workforce are more directly responsible for
themselves in earning an income, getting access to affordable health insurance and
plans for retirement savings. Because of the very nature in how the individual defines in
their own self-interest the work environment and scope, moving from one employer to
another or changing their scope for new challenges and rewards, negates their need to
be part of a union whose foundation is built-upon continuity of same employer with
increased benefits as a reward for tenure.
An additional challenge for the law enforcement officer union is the inherent
conflicts between their law and order mantra with that of certain union strategies of
creating disruption when impasse in negotiations occur. When the labor movement was
in its infancy, it was the local law enforcement officers who were needed to restore
order from protesting workers in the early stages of their union or during a strike; which
created divides between the law enforcement officer and union worker – “a situation that
has never been completely rectified” (Salerno, 1981, p. 4). In addition, because many
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law enforcement unions negotiate locality by locality for their own union, there are
challenges in having these segmented union contract processes seek the same benefits
and desires; even with affiliation of national law enforcement union organizations.
There is a “fragmented local, state and national law enforcement labor
movement” and the lack of a unified voice from law enforcement unions on issues
pertaining to the “democratization and improvements of policing” (DeLord, Burpo,
Shannon, and Spearing, 2008, p. 224). The effects of these fragmentations on the
ability to attain HPO is not readily known, but it is through this type research that
additional insight may be gained into determining correlations, if any, between collective
bargaining and high performance. However, even with these uncertainties, an analysis
of law enforcement union contracts between 1975 and 1981 determined that collective
bargaining over time favors the local law enforcement union as it becomes more
empowered and influential (Feuille, Delaney and Hendricks, 1985). Therefore, the
longer standing unions and their collective bargaining strategies are a sustaining force;
whether or not HPO correlations exist.
Johnson and Jarley (2004) approached this topic from another perspective.
Through the application of mobilization, social exchange and organizational justice
theories, union participants were surveyed to determine worker’s perceptions of
workplace injustice and union justice in explaining an individual’s participation in unions.
These measures were also benchmarked against more traditional measures of union
participation (e.g., job satisfaction and union instrumentality perceptions), to determine
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what factors correlated better for union participation. As workers often assign blame for
their work-related problems to their employer, this research tried to distinguish such
directed dissatisfaction. The Equity Theory is evident as it deals with workers’
perceptions of fairness and equity regarding how rewards, punishments and workloads
are provided amongst the workforce (Johnson and Jarley, 2004). Rational Choice
Theory is also noted in how workers weigh the costs (“means”) and benefits (potential
“ends”) of union participation and its correlation to the actual member goals (actual
“ends”) that can be satisfied through union participation (Johnson and Jarley, 2004).
Public sector unions not only have “voice privileges” at the negotiating table with
their employer similar to private sector unions, they also “exert voice at the policy
making table with elected officials” (Freeman, 1986, p. 42). This influence can also be
associated with public sector workers voting at a higher rate than private sector workers
and with this higher turnout rate a “greater influence over political conditions within
government” also occurs (Babcock, Engberg and Glazer (1997). Therefore, the
combination of higher voting participation of being in a union and also working in the
public sector can represent a significant voting influence over elected officials. This
influence can encompass local, state and federal politicians. It is the local politician who
ultimately enacts the tax structure to balance budgets for agreed-upon union contracts.
It is the state politician who can define laws regarding right-to-work status, abilities for
law enforcement unions to exist and the manner in which impasse resolutions are
resolved. It is the federal politician who can set national labor relation policies in defining
agency shops, compensation, benefit and workplace environment laws. As recently as
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2007, federal legislation was proposed to remove the state’s right in determining its
right-to-work to status; an action that would better empower unions nationwide.
In 2007, two federal legislative acts were proposed that were designed to remove
the right-to-work state determination in favor of a national standard (Employee Free
Choice Act) and favor a national standard for unionization of state and local public
safety personnel (Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act). There does not
appear to be any formal research conducted in the formulation of these bills in regards
to HPO correlations associated with the passage of such bills. For the Employee Free
Choice Act (HR800), its purpose was to “amend the National Labor Relations Act to
establish an efficient system to enable employees to form, join, or assist labor unions, to
provide for mandatory injunctions for unfair labor practices during organizing efforts, and
for other purposes” (HR800, 2007, p. 1). For the Public Safety Employer-Employee
Cooperation Act (HR980), its purpose was to enable public safety employees, including
all employees of local government law enforcement organizations, “the right to join a
union and have the union recognized by the employer; the right of public safety officers
to bargain over wages, hours, and working conditions; a dispute resolution mechanism
(e.g., fact finding or mediation); and enforcement of contracts through state courts”
(HR980, 2007, p. 1).
Both of these bills failed to get passed as Democrats generally supported
passage and Republicans generally supported rejection of the bills. There are also
numerous advocacy groups that were for and against such legislation; even some
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advocacy groups who may be on different sides of certain issues that were united for
this issue. As with many federal legislative processes, even though these bills were
defeated or tabled, that does not mean that the motivation to reintroduce them has
diminished. Even if successfully passed, these new federal legislative mandates may
seek legal challenges from states as their “state’s rights” will become further diminished
and may not be resolved until a Supreme Court decision. The interesting facet of federal
versus states’ rights, employer versus employee rights and local law enforcement
organization employee versus employer rights provides for continued advocacies,
alliances and to the layperson, sometimes confusion. Through this research, it is hoped
that fact-based information can better help illustrate, at least, the roles of collective
bargaining to high performance.

High Performance Organizations (HPO)
HPO - Background
HPOs are defined in many ways, but generally address the ability of the
organization to leverage its collective resources to achieve the highest production value
of products and services produced. Continuous improvement in four critical areas is
also indicative of a HPO: “1) Quality of goods and services; 2) Cost of producing goods
and services; 3) Speed at which products and services are brought to the market; and
4) Innovation in the development of new products and services” (Lawler, 2012, p. 3).
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These preceding critical areas are also subject to continuous improvement as the
organization “must know what one wants to create, so one must continually reflect on
their sense of purpose/vision and, second, one must continually develop the capability
to move in that direction” (Wooldridge, 2007, p, 44).
The challenge is that there is no universal manner in which continuous
improvement practices can be developed and deployed to attain the four preceding
goals. In fact, because of the competitive nature of businesses, the ability for a business
to creatively distinguish itself from another provides it the necessary competitive edge to
stay HPO. This inherent and continuing challenge positions management in “a
continuing search for independence in the pursuit of professional objectives, a quest
which managers do not always view in sympathetic terms” (Maddox, 1975, p. 25).
The measures of performance should not just focus on the “production of certain
tangible units of output, but also on less tangible outputs; like effectively supervising
others, thinking in a creative way, inventing a new product, resolving conflicts between
others, or selling a good or service” (Steers, 1984, p. 179). Key factors, in addition to
motivation, for performance to flourish include: 1) Abilities and traits; 2) Role clarity and
acceptance; and 3) Opportunity to perform (Porter and Lawler, 1968; Campbell and
Pritchard, 1976). HPO traits are more evident when higher standards exist for employee
knowledge, skill and abilities; understanding of what their job function is required to
perform; and the opportunity to attain performance goals. It is through these manners
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that maximizing utility (a Rational Choice Theory trait) and HPO are linked as part of a
process and pathway towards and continuum of HPO.
A key trait of HPO is quality of work life and the workplace should be designed to
meet needs for human achievement, continuous learning and stimulation of minds,
mutually supportive relationships with others, and sense that contributions are being
made to society (Rosen, 1993). It is from the framework of a quality of work life that
worker productivity can be positioned to occur through a properly designed rewards
system as “productivity improvement and human satisfaction are directly related”
(Rosen, 1993, p. 155). While HPOs and the traits previously noted appear to cater to
private sector entities, “public organizations must become as competitive as the private
sector, rapidly handle clients’ requests and respond to them, attentively manage the
resources that are available to them, while at the same time, obtaining significant value
added for the clients” (Charih, Bourgault, Maltais, and Rouillard, 2007, p. 31). It is these
and similar HPO traits that initially may have arisen via a privatization movement which
has raised the expectation for HPO standards in the public sector (Wooldridge, Amagoh
and Menefee, 2002).
As outlined by Wendell L. French and Cecil H. Bell (1973), the HPO development
program has eight major foundations: 1) On-going, interactive process (always needing
to learn new skills); 2) Form of applied behavioral science (enables logical and effective
decisions); 3) Reductive strategy of change (rational changes that develops reasoning
skills); 4) Systems-based (relationship of one event to others); 5) Day-to-day approach
to planned change (timely evaluation of data required); 6) Experienced-based
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(knowledge is gained from learning experiences); 7) Goal setting and planning
(compare against measurable and attainable goals); and 8) Focus on work teams
(beliefs and experiences from many levels).
As illustrated in Figure 2.5: Effective Decisions from Donald Lynch (1986), the
ability to achieve effective decisions in an HPO environment clearly shows that the
effectiveness of the decision is best correlated to a consensus-based approach with the
individual decision being the least effective (in Figure 2.5, a “6” is the highest score of
decision making whereas a “0” is the lowest score; with the line representing the
“adequacy curve”). For the consensus decision-making approach, ideally all members
share equally in the final decision and interaction amongst members is “encouraged,
accepted and utilized” (Lynch, 1986, p. 218).
Figure 2.5: Effective Decisions
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The motivational aspects of the employee from the managers perspective had
changed little between 1946 to 1995 (Kovach, 1995), yet the variance between what
these managers believed and what the actual employees wanted continued to differ
considerably (Jurkiewicz and Massey, 1996). This inability of managers to recognize the
needs and desires of their subordinates creates this trust division between manager and
worker and contributes to the challenge in becoming a HPO and the underlying distrust
that fosters further divisions between unions and management.

HPO and Collective Bargaining
Previous research has indicated “no significant relationship to organizational
structure and incentives structure and the level of organizational performance” (Xu,
2008). This organizational structure relationship can also be further defined to note
collective bargaining aspects of the structure. For purposes of defining the union
structure, there are four traits of a powerful union: 1) Organizational power (sole
purpose is to achieve union goals); 2) Political action (it is the source of strength in
mastering the “power game”); 3) Media involvement (a “use it or it will use you”
challenge); and 4) Confrontation (tool to maintain respect between union, management
and elected officials) (DeLord, Burpo, Shannon, and Spearing, 2008, p. 9). In absence
of a powerful union structure, the preceding four traits are not necessarily the manner in
which the individual seeks out to maximize utility as each individual may approach such
roles and advocacies with their employer differently.
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Other attributes that may impact HPO traits with correlations to collective
bargaining, include, but are not limited to: 1) Additional dynamics that may arise from
political power that unions can foster through lobbying and consensus-based leverage
(e.g., non-workplace advocacies on behalf of the employee); and 2) Quality of life
attributes from the employee’s perspective. For each of these attributes, further scope,
including employee and employer surveys, would be required to effectively gauge the
impact of such attributes. If such attributes lead to better employee performance, not
just a desire for the employee to perform better, then the correlation of these and other
attributes would be considered to positively influence an organization towards a HPO.
Likewise, if employee performance is not enhanced or even decreased, then these
attributes would not be considered in an HPO-seeking environment.
Donna Baines (2010) focus on “social unionism” as an intrinsic factor identified
three “power resources” that serve as union strength: 1) Proactivity (capacity to form an
independent agenda); 2) Internal solidarity (internal mechanisms for democratic and
cohesive actions); and 3) External solidarity (community activity with horizontal-vertical
ties within their union and other unions). However, while such power resources were
identified, non-unionized comparative “power resources” were not identified nor
addressed to determine what similarities or contrasts may exist between union and nonunionized workplaces. There does appear to be a correlation in the ability for the worker
to feel empowered and providing a service to a client that can correlate to their vested
interest in their job. This correlation of vested interest can also enable HPO traits to
emerge more readily and sustainably.
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Union contracts can have macro statements regarding performance or
productivity which represent attempts to address HPO desires. A union contract
example would be the following statement regarding delivery of services - in the “most
efficient, effective and courteous manner is of paramount importance” and that this is
“recognized to be a mutual obligation of both parties within their respective roles”
(Zagoria, 1973, p. 16). In a separate study of collective bargaining of private sector call
centers, unionized call centers and in-house call centers (compared to outsourced)
were associated with significantly higher measures of job quality (Doellgast, Holtgrewe
and Deery, 2009). High job quality is a factor in an environment of HPO success, but as
noted previously, just having a high job quality environment alone does not guarantee
employee higher performance.
A motivational aspect that may enable workers to perform at a higher ability may
be the worker’s ability to advocate on behalf of their vested interests (e.g., client,
themself). Baines (2010) compared and contrasted the experiences of Canadian and
Australian social services workers; both unionized workplaces. While both sets of
workers benefited from leveraging their vested interest in their service area to advocate
for the service, budget constraints in Canada mitigated the time available for advocacy.
As the budget constraints mounted, social workers became isolated and worked in
solitude; often performing redundant and bureaucratic tasks. This lack of time for
community involvement and empowering clients outside of the workplace “pushing
paper” led employees to feel less able to help advocate for their clients. A law
enforcement employee's solitude shift or constant negative interactions with potential
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lawbreakers can also lead to constraints in positive interactions. HPO law enforcement
organizations may be able to overcome such constraints through positive interactions
whereby the law enforcement officer can meet with good citizens and businesses as
part of their shift (e.g., “park, walk and talk” programs with neighborhoods and
businesses).
In another study about union workers and high performance traits, Kim and Bae
(2005) examined two different Korean companies to determine if there was a correlation
between being unionized and innovation. Innovation is another HPO trait that is always
encouraged and further developed in a HPO. It was evident that for union workplaces
that embraced the innovative change proposed, that such performance outcomes were
better, but when the union did not embrace such change, then outcomes were less.
Two separate approaches for unions and non-union workplaces arose: “Lean
production’s” more centralized approach preferred by non-union workplaces and “team
production’s” more decentralized approach preferred by union workplaces. As both
entities yielded success from two different approaches in implementing change, it
appears that good organizational design practices would adapt to the better approach
relative to the type of workers in order to succeed. This is an example that a HPO
pathway may not be through one absolute path as different workers positively respond,
via higher performance, to different approaches in how to achieve innovation goals.
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HPO and the Public Sector
The measures and metrics of HPOs in the public sector rightfully are different
than those in the private sector for many, but not all facets, of HPOs. The primary
differentials may pertain to measures of profitability and defining the customer.
However, from an employee workplace perspective, an HPO should strive to provide
the most conducive environment to enable its workers to perform at their best and
motivated to perform on behalf of the locality or company; while also primarily motivated
by their self-interest. An example of a simple HPO-type measure for both private and
public sectors is the employee turnover rate. As the time and investment put forth in
recruiting, selecting and training an employee is significant, the retention of these
trained employees enables the organization to be more effective and efficient. However,
that does not mean that all employees once hired need to be retained for their entire
careers. While low turnover is a HPO trait, a HPO should also have some manner in
which lower performing employees are dismissed.
For law enforcement organizations, large organizations retain employees longer
than smaller organizations (Koper, Maguire and Moore, 2001) and larger organizations
also tend to be more associated with collective bargaining (Valletta, 1989). Collective
bargaining’s “strong voice” to an employee is considered a primary factor for lower
turnover rates than non-collective bargaining law enforcement organizations (Rees,
1991, p. 31). However, even such statistics on their surface may not represent
underlying issues associated with employee turnover that should be vetted further. For
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example, this would include analysis to determine if mobility issues make it harder to
leave one unionized employer for another or whether promotional rewards are greater
and apparent for a unionized employer based primarily upon tenure (and not
performance) compared to a non-unionized employer.
Continued focus on organizational development is an integral component of
HPO. One goal of organizational development is to create an “open, problem-solving
climate” throughout the law enforcement organization (Lynch, 1986, p. 209). This
process “decides specifically what objectives are to be reached in the upcoming few
years, how these objectives are to be reached and how the resultant changes will be
evaluated, in terms of overall departmental effectiveness” (Lynch, 1986, p. 209).
Constraints to starting organizational design include abilities of key staff, the values of
the organization and community; and any legal restrictions. Law enforcement chiefs
also may not have to just overcome creating an environment of trust within its
organization to proceed, but also need to get approval from those in the hierarchy of its
local government (e.g., other non-law enforcement organizations, chief administrative
officer, local governing body).
Employee and employer management relations focused herein have primarily
centered on employee compensation, benefits and work environment. As a few
measures are focused on highly, other measures (e.g., equity and accountability) are
less focused upon (ICMA, 1991). As an example, a HPO does not just convene
employee committees for employee negotiations, but rather formally establishes such
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committees, and empowers them to be a partner in addressing other organizational
matters. This performance

improvement strategy of

using labor-management

committees that are usually standing committees when not consumed with their
collective bargaining issues, can leverage their time and talent into performance
enhancements (e.g., review of policies, creation of new policies). This type of
engagement can be “very successful and provide a wealth of new ideas and a great
spirit of cooperation” (Salerno, 1981, p. 44). However a challenge exists as many law
enforcement organizations utilize “minority control” where a few leaders traditionally
make the decision or the “majority vote” as both of these may be easier (less time) than
the efforts needed to reach consensus (Lynch, 1986, p. 218). A HPO needs to carefully
assess when such easier practices are prudent for the organization and when more
deliberative and employee-engaged practices are more prudent.

HPO and Law Enforcement - Background
Having an appreciation for the historical environment that has given rise to the
motivations of the law enforcement union worker may help frame the motivations for
performance

and

employer-employee

perceptions

of

workplace

environment,

compensation and benefits. The word “police” was correlated with corruption or the
imposition of the ruling regime in Europe through 1748, when Henry Fielding was
appointed to magistrate role in London. Fielding began to publish pamphlets on the
effectiveness of “parochial” law enforcement forces in better providing justice through
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reliable information to judges, constables and the general public (More, 1979, p. 3). The
next evolution of effectiveness was also in England in 1829 through Robert Peel’s “an
Act for Improving Police in and Near the Metropolis” which was in response to the
apprehension many citizens had on the ability of local law enforcement to protect their
life and property (Lyman, 1955, p. 53). Robert Peel’s officers were affectionately known
as “bobbies” (nickname for Robert); a term still used today (ICMA, 1991).
In the United States, Lawrence Fuld is credited in 1909 with outlining traits of an
effective law enforcement organization and its officers who “need to live up to a higher
code of conduct and morality than that demanded from other citizens” and the most
important duty was “knowledge” (Fuld, 1909, p. 112). In 1915, Raymond Fosdick
performed a study of law enforcement organizations in seventy-two cities and
determined that the higher performing law enforcement organizations had fulfilled three
conditions: “1) Relationship between supervision and work was well-balanced; 2)
Different parts of the mechanism must be adjusted to each other; and 3) Whole
machine must be adapted to its task” (Fosdick, 1969, p. 382). In 1921, Elmer Graper
recognized that law enforcement organizations perform better when their officers were
organized into divisions accounting to the special kinds of law enforcement services
they perform (e.g., detective, patrol) and were properly distributed throughout the city
(Graper, 1921). O.W. Wilson’s Police Administration book in 1950 is considered a
“monumental work” by Harry More (1979, p. 27) and frames high performing objectives
of the law enforcement organization, including: 1) “Each assignment of responsibility
carries with it commensurate authority to fulfill the responsibility”; and 2) “No more units
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or persons are placed under the direct control” of one person than they are able to
manage (Wilson, 1950, p. 9).
There were not only individuals committed to helping make law enforcement
organizations higher performing, but also organizations; such as International City
(County) Management Association (ICMA). Their first book on law enforcement
management was in 1938 and subsequent editions have periodically been done ever
since. The law enforcement organization was defined as “the grouping of related tasks
to assure more effective accomplishment, and the establishment of clear-cut channels
of communication, authority and responsibility” (ICMA, 1943, p. 69).

HPO and Law Enforcement
HPO traits of law enforcement include performance measurement techniques.
Performance

criteria

generally

are

segmented

into

the

following

measures:

“Effectiveness, efficiency, equity and accountability” (ICMA, 1991, p. 380). As an
example, performance measurement enables the law enforcement organization to
establish law enforcement capacity to accomplish a given objective and monitor
objectives previously defined (ICMA, 1991). “Performance measures can measure the
output produced by the organization or the outcomes created in the community which
results from organizational output” (Wooldridge, 2007, p. 47). A HPO-type performance
measurement strategy can position the law enforcement organization to be proactive in
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dealing with issues as they arise, rather than reactive strategies hurriedly put together to
appease politicians or the public.
A law enforcement organization evolves from being a “reactive component into a
proactive component by sensing and accommodating change” (More, 1979, p. 222). A
key trait of HPOs is in their ability to have an environment that accepts change;
especially as it pertains to the ability to continuous improvement. In order to create or
further maintain such an environment, management “must accentuate to a maximum
degree” the following attributes: 1) In-depth delegation; 2) Maximize participation in
objective setting and planning processes; 3) Managers are permitted to make some
mistakes; 4) Change is encouraged and planned; 5) Minimal policies and procedures,
and updated when necessary; 6) Minimum, but strong controls imposed; 7) Meaningful
reward experiences; and 8) High degree of “self-management, self-discipline and selfcontrol from managers” (More, 1979, p. 228).
There are many manners in how objectives for HPO-related traits can exist
amongst law enforcement organizations. The following are some examples and their
source:


Law enforcement patrol objectives: 1) Crime deterrence; 2) Apprehension of
criminal offenders (clearance rate); 3) Citizen satisfaction; 4) Recovery of stolen
property; and 5) Provide community with sense of security (National Commission
on Productivity, 1973)
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Highly effective law enforcement organization goals: “1) Requests from the
public are to receive the most immediate possible response; 2) All law
enforcement officers are to do their utmost always to be courteous; and 3) Law is
to be justly enforced” (Lynch, 1986, p. 230).



Law enforcement goal attainment strategies (with officers committed to their
work): 1) “Bias of law enforcement chief towards some form of action” (willing to
take risks); 2) Simple organizational structure (focused on front-line staff who
can make decisions); 3) Oriented towards productivity and such productivity
depends on employee improvement; and 4) “Emphasis is on a few key goals and
not burdensome with too many rules and regulations that causes big picture to
be lost” (Lynch, 1986, p. 230).
As noted previously, clearance rate is regarded as a performance standard and

there can be an assumption that investment in the resources via budgets can be a
contributing factor in having a higher clearance rate. However, Xu’s study of
organizational performance (as measured through clearance rate) and variables such
as spending, human resource strategy and application of technology did not have a
strong correlation (Xu, 2008). However, this study also recognized challenges in the
variability in how information was compiled between comparative localities. This study
may also recognize that there are contributing factors in any law enforcement
organization that may result in a high cost commitment for which clearance results may
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not be correlated (e.g., other law enforcement programs (deterrence), higher levels of
patrol).
The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment in 1975 was designed to see what
correlations existed between preventive patrol (the general patrolling of a law
enforcement officer not on a call for service) increases and citizen perception of law
enforcement presence or personal safety, or reported crimes (Kelling, 1975). Although
against the traditional mindset and even intuitive perception that there should be a
positive correlation, the Kansas City study found that there was little or no effect. This
study is still highly discussed and debated as it was bold in ascertaining that a law
enforcement organization’s resources could be better deployed to non-patrol programs
and efforts. Perhaps the challenge is that many law enforcement organizations have a
“social broad goal that focuses on crime deterrence”; but the challenge is this social
broad goal is not readily observable simply by watching law enforcement officers as
they go about their duties (ICMA, 1991, p. 378).
Another study with deterrence as a theme is commonly referred to as “broken
windows” which illustrated the correlation of mitigation practices of abandoned or state
of disrepair homes and businesses and the perception of citizens of how safe they feel
(Wilson and Kelling, 1982). As was determined in the study regarding “broken
windows”-type neighborhoods: 1) Primary source of citizen fear; 2) Sense that nobody
cares, which can lead to more series disorders of crime; and 3) Reducing this disorder
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needs to have the law enforcement organization, and their local government, leverage
the resources of the citizens for both legitimacy and assistance.
It appears that a HPO law enforcement organization cannot be achieved if
criminal activity is higher than any tolerated threshold with consideration to socioeconomic factors of the locality. “For all of its problems, crime is still one of the few
measures” that law enforcement managers have to “provide some check – however
general and unreliable – on their activities” (More, 1979, p. 337). The crime rate and the
trend fluctuations of the crime rate often involves much media attention, anecdotes and
analysis as to the cause in the change - good or bad – in measuring law enforcement
effectiveness. However, it has recently become popular to measure law enforcement
effectiveness by focusing on “victimization data and citizens’ satisfaction with law
enforcement service” (ICMA, 1991, p. 381). The accounts from the victim’s perspective
and the community at-large on how well law enforcement is performing in a variety of
manners may help better frame the strengths and weaknesses of the law enforcement
organization for which the community may want further action plans initiated in reducing
any weaknesses.
How law enforcement organization leaders react to these perceptions can also
be a factor towards HPO attainment. On one end of the scale is ignorance, which is not
a HPO trait and on the other end of the scale would be strategic action plans developed,
monitored and adjusted to focus attention towards a defined problem with metrics
established to determine success. Determining what these specific areas needing
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attention or the metrics gathered in determining how well the law enforcement
organization is performing is a skill that the law enforcement organization and the
locality’s leaders need to work on together; with applicable input from employees,
citizens and businesses. “In the absence of scientific validation of the vast majority of
departmental performance measures, the fact remains that law enforcement
administrators are paid to exercise their best judgment on enormously complex topics,
and they will necessarily have to decide whether and how to use imperfect measures
currently available” (ICMA, 1991, p. 383).
Having an organizational culture that is recognized by the community, leaders
and media as being effective is another HPO trait. This culture can be the “informal
rules and regulations or the policies that may not be outlined” which in many cases
provides for the flexibility and adaption of the law enforcement officer and their
organization to evolve, grow and be responsive to their community (Lynch, 1986, p.
211). The positively viewed status of the law enforcement organization enables the
HPO to continue and the potential HPO to gravitate towards becoming a HPO. This
status of the internal operations can be varied and can include such topics: 1) Are
younger or older law enforcement offices viewed differently?; or 2) Are college
educational achievements viewed differently?
Utilizing the resources of a national accreditation agency can assist these
leaders in performing an environmental scan throughout their organization. CALEA
accreditation standards are not an “assessment in how well a local law enforcement
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organization has controlled crime or disorder, but rather how the organization has
complied with guidelines that CALEA believes are associated with “good administrative
practices” and “if these practices produce better performance, the law enforcement
leader may claim that their organization is a higher performer as a result of such
practices” (ICMA, 1991, p. 391). Because CALEA is a respected accreditation
organization and utilizes a stringent process in developing standards and having
independent assessors from outside the state of the locality asking for the review, the
earning of such accreditation is deemed to be a component of HPO. For those who
seek accreditation, but fail to earn it, then implementing the CALEA recommendations in
a timely manner can be associated with HPO pursuit. In leveraging CALEA-type
standards into an operational mode, the productivity of law enforcement can be
increased through: “1) Improving current policies and practices to the highest level; 2)
Allocating resources most efficiently to the varied law enforcement services; 3)
Increasing the probability of goal accomplishment; and 4) Leveraging the workforce
talents to their full potential” (More, 1979, p. 326). All of the previous measures and
attributes for the HPO need to also be done in a continuous improvement environment,
and in the most efficient manner, in order for HPO attainment and continuum of HPO
status.
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Costs of Services and Operations
The cost of services and operations for law enforcement are often highly debated
during a locality’s budget process with expectations on high correlations of service
performance to costs. Compensation and benefits is also the highest portion of an
organization’s budget; therefore inclusion of this cost measure is warranted as a
dependent variable. Compensation is the set of rewards that organizations provide to
individuals in return for their willingness to perform various jobs and tasks within the
organization (DeNisi and Griffin, 2001). Prior studies have indicated that local
government union employees are paid 32% more than non-union local government
employees (Department of Labor, 2004). However, even costs can have conflicting
results as illustrated by the following statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(DiSalvo, 2010):


Average annual salary for the roughly 330,000 office clerks who work in the
public sector was almost $27,000 in 2005, while the 2.7 million in the private
sector received an average pay of just under $23,000. Nationwide, among the
108,000 janitors who work in the public sector, the average salary was $23,700;
the average salary of the 2.0 million janitors working in the private sector,
meanwhile, was $19,800.



Private-sector economists earn an average of $99,000 a year, compared to the
$69,000 earned by their government colleagues. Accountants in the private
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sector world earn average annual salaries of $52,000, compared to $48,000 for
their public sector counterparts.

Public Sector
As HPOs rely upon measures, constrained public sector budgets must rely on
decreasing workload resources and productivity measures to meet budgets (Hatry,
1972); with these measures primarily focused upon efficiency and effectiveness
measures. If there is a correlation to having a higher wage and also having the ability to
join a union, then through the “selectivity argument” of both employer and union in the
hiring process, then the “more able” workers should be selected (Garonna, Mori and
Tedeschi, 1992, p. 106). Labor costs are generally the highest component of local
government departmental budgets; therefore, the ability to get a high performance
return on costs of such costs needs to be achieved at any level of investment. The
higher the investment, the greater expectation should then exist in having a higher
return. Conversely, if the labor costs are lower, then those same correlated reasonable
expectations should be modified for a proportionately lower return.
There are many resources which address the inherent overhead costs of public
sector unions, for which law enforcement unions emulate such overhead practices.
Examples primarily include the additional time of resources spent on collective
bargaining agreements between not just union and management representatives, but
also to the union members in educating them and soliciting votes on union agreement
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proposals. There are also studies that illustrate that unionized workplaces have higher
hourly wage rates and benefit advantages (e.g., healthcare and retirement) over nonunionized comparable positions. For example, the Economic Policy Institute notes that
unionized wages are 20% higher and increase to 28% higher when benefits are
factored into total compensation (Mishel and Walters, 2003).
From a public sector standpoint, these differentials may even be higher as
private sector workplace costs have an inherent ceiling in order for the employer to
remain competitive in the marketplace. With the monopolistic perspectives of the public
sector, the inherent ceiling is not as evident; which can give rise to even a higher
differential. However, the public sector through its citizens does have a certain tolerance
for what may be a maximum tax burden ceiling for which good elected officials are
keenly aware. Mobility may enable some, not all, to move their household or businesses
to less taxed areas and if not, then advocacy roles for lower taxes may be greater.
From analysis of ballot measures in California and Oregon, economist Richard
Freeman notes public sector unions use their political power to increase public sector
service demand and their bargaining power to lobby for increased compensation
(DiSalvo, 2010). These market forces on demand, and its correlated supply, are not
attributes as evident in the private sector; therefore, if additive costs exist for public
sector unions, other tangible benefits and measures of performance would need to be
correlated to such added costs. If additional costs can yield higher performance, then it
would be appropriate to best gauge the high performance return on costs and the
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incremental marginal utility rewards. From an economic perspective, there will be a
point at which such marginal utility is diminished to the point that such additional cost
investment does not provide a higher performance return on such investment. From a
public sector perspective, this point may be debated as there can be more subjective
determinants as to public sector “return” as compared to more industry standard
definitions for private sector “return.” As Figure 2.6: Marginal Utility Graph illustrates, the
increasing utility return of “x” decreases as the quantity of “x” increases and there will
actually be a point that any further addition of “x” does not result in any further additional
utility.
Figure 2.6: Marginal Utility Graph
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Law Enforcement
Compensation and benefits of the union worker are better in many traditional
measures: 1) 20% higher wages; 2) Greater opportunity for paid leave; 3) Over 18%
more likely to have employer-provided health insurance; and 4) “Over 23% more likely
to have employer-provided pension plans with employer providing over 28% more
funding” (Wagner, 2008, p. 49). Laurence Putchinisky’s (2007) study of 257 Florida
cities provided evidence that unions do influence law enforcement expenditures and
“influence these expenditures to a substantial degree” (Putchinisky, 2007, p. 223).
However, since Florida is a right-to-work state (more employer-favored) and through its
state statutes enables law enforcement unions to exist with any impasse in negotiations
via mediation (employer-favored approach in agreements), additional influential
attributes of law enforcement may be present.
As noted previously, there is a clear distinction between a union that has
collective bargaining abilities and “unions” in many right-to work states that may have an
association or volunteer-based group that may call itself a union. Putchinisky
recognized the “union voice” ability of the worker in having influence over the employer
and extrapolated that if such voice was effective in a right-to-work state, then it could be
easily assumed that such “union voice” would be even more effective in a state where
collective bargaining was a granted state right to all employees within a state
(Putchinisky, 2007, p. 225). Even with such empowerment capabilities availed to certain
law enforcement officers and correlations to higher compensation and benefits as a
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result of union representation, survey results of law enforcement officer employees did
not have economic factors high on their list of job concerns. The highest rated job
concern factor of these employees was “job security, job protection, citizen apathy and
prestige” (Maddox, 1975, p. 24).
In another study of compensation and law enforcement unions, Richard Victor
(1977) determined the differential to be that union law enforcement officers and
firefighters were paid 8 – 12% over their non-union counterparts. However, a
determining factor in this study was not just the effect of the firefighter’s union in being
able to leverage additional compensation and benefit packages because of the law
enforcement unions contract (5% impact), but rather the effect of any other “key
bargains” leveraged by the law enforcement unions and its “spillover effect” towards the
firefighters (12% impact). This illustrates a recurring challenge for local government - as
any increased or perceived increase in benefits of one class of employees in a newly
agreed-upon collective bargaining agreement become the benchmark for another class
of employees that is beginning its collective bargaining process. This issue is further
extrapolated when the first group of employees in their new contract has pent-up
increased demands when the second group of employees finishes their contract with
results equal to or exceeding the first group’s contract. Victor also notes “union power
is a function of the wage elasticity of demand for labor of the unionized group – more
inelastic demand is associated with more powerful unions” (Victor, 1977, p. 39). This
recognizes the many other inherent characters or traits that a powerful union has in its
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ability to recruit and retain fellow union members in addition to traditionally viewed
positive traits of increased wages.
This inelasticity can be better illustrated in Figure 2.7: Elasticity Comparisons for
Law Enforcement Employees. In the figure 1 diagram a perfectly elastic demand is
illustrated whereby the price (Pe) can represent wages paid to law enforcement officers
and it has an inherent ceiling regardless of the quantity of law enforcement officers
supplied. Above Pe there is no demand and while there may be demand for wages
below Pe, because market wages are being sought by all law enforcement officers,
there would be nobody willing to be employed for a lower wage. In contrast, in the figure
2 diagram a perfectly inelastic demand is illustrated whereby the demand (Qi) is not
subject to any price threshold. From a law enforcement officer perspective, a perfectly
inelastic demand would have their wages continually increase and only subject to the
constraint of the demand for law enforcement officers. As both of these illustrations are
absolute representations of perfect elastic and perfect inelastic demand, they are not
generally representative of a law enforcement’s demand for wages. However, as noted
in the preceding paragraph regarding Victor’s study, those in unions are more
associated with inelastic demand.
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Figure 2.7: Elasticity Comparisons for Law Enforcement Employees

In a cross-sectional study of costs (Feuille and Delaney, 1985), law enforcement
organizations were classified into one of the following four categories: 1) Nonbargaining cities; 2) Collective bargaining cities without a mandate to bargain; 3)
Collective bargaining cities with a legislative mandate to bargain but no arbitration
availability; and 4) Collective bargaining with legislative mandate to bargain and access
to arbitration. The results of this study indicated those organizations with legislative
mandated collective bargaining practices resulted in significant influences on human
and financial resource allocations and a 7.5% differential than non-bargaining cities. It
appears that the further collective bargaining is recognized by the state for public sector
workers and especially for law enforcement workers, an identified benefit accrues to the
worker in higher compensation and benefits.
Additional salary benefits were also noted by Zhao and Lovrich (1997) for large
law enforcement organizations that have collective bargaining and by cities with
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collective bargaining in a study by Zax (1988). While Putchinisky's study analyzed
personnel, operating and capital costs separately and together with personnel and
operating costs higher for collective bargaining organizations, capital costs did not have
any higher or lower correlated effect (Putchinisky, 2007). However, because capital
costs may fluctuate from year-to-year with varying degrees of vehicle purchases, the
effects of this variability was not part of the scope of such research. There are many
other studies regarding correlations of collective bargaining and its influence on
compensation and benefits; with some of these studies also focused upon law
enforcement organizations. In an illustration on how these studies were designed,
sample selection process, methodologies and results, Table 2.1: Studies, Scope and
Results for Law Enforcement Unions highlights two studies as they pertain to law
enforcement collective bargaining and costs (Putchinisky, 2008).
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Table 2.1: Studies, Scope and Results for Law Enforcement Unions
Author/Year

Study

Sample

Sample
Date
1990

Methodology

Zhao
and Collective
Lovrich
bargaining
(1997)
effect
on
supplemental
compensation

Law
Enforcement
Management
and
Administrative
Statistics
Report
(LEMAS):
2945
law
enforcement
organizations

Logistic
regression
analysis

Gely
and Impact of law
Chandler
enforcement
(1993)
and firefighter
unions
on
departmental
expenditures

Law
1981 and Ordinary
enforcement
1986
least
and
fire
squares
departments
regression
in 614 cities >
25,000
population

Results
Existence of
a collective
bargaining
mechanism
in large law
enforcement
organizations
is
significantly
correlated
with
the
presence of
supplemental
pay benefits
favorable to
officers
Presence of
a collective
bargaining
agreement
increases the
overall level
of
departmental
expenditures
by 19%

Hypotheses
Based upon the environmental scan and theory development in this chapter,
developing appropriate data to help measure is imperative in determining costs and
high performance traits. Based upon the problem statement and research question, and
related literature review, the following hypotheses were derived:
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Law Enforcement Performance Hypotheses (1)
o Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when
compared to non-collective bargaining
o Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when
compared to non-collective bargaining



Law Enforcement Cost Hypotheses (2)
o Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to noncollective bargaining
o Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to noncollective bargaining



Law Enforcement Higher Performance Return on Costs Hypotheses (3)
o Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining
o Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining

For each of the hypothesis, the independent variable is defined as collective
bargaining. The “collective bargaining” attribute refers to the manner in which the
workforce can leverage the employer and ranges from non-collective bargaining to
collective bargaining’s mediation and mandatory arbitration processes. The collective
bargaining distinction is through impasse resolution practices whereby mandatory
arbitration generally favors the employee more than mediation. In Chapter 3 – Research
Design and Methodology additional information will be presented to segment collective
bargaining localities into these two classifications regarding how impasse resolution is
approached.
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For purposes of testing the hypothesis, collective bargaining for law enforcement
services and its related workforce classification factor for employees (mediation or
mandatory arbitration) would be defining whether a locality has collective bargaining for
its law enforcement workforce. The high performance return on costs (HPRC)
composite measure attribute attempts to compare high performance traits to the
correlating costs that contributed to such high performance traits. HPRC is a
performance measure used to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of taxpayers’
costs for law enforcement. It is similar to the private sector’s return on investment (ROI)
which measures the efficiency of an investment or to compare the efficiency of one
investment amongst other choices (Money-zine, 2012). The ROI formula can be
generically expressed as ROI = (change from investment – cost of investment)/cost of
investment, but can also be modified for this research as HPRC = high performance law
enforcement attributes/law enforcement costs. Because performance attributes can be
of varying measures, a rationale and systematic process is needed to convert such
measures into comparative quantitative factors in order for such HPRC calculation to
occur. Refer to Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology for further information
on how the HPRC is calculated.
In order to gauge correlations between costs and performance which may have
elements of time lapse effects of a change in variable, collective bargaining traits would
need to be present for a defined time period prior to the measurement of performance
and costs. For this research, that time period is defined as five years (i.e., only those
local governments with law enforcement organization collective bargaining (with
100

impasse resolution through mediation or mandatory arbitration) for greater than five
years are subject to the sample for collective bargaining and those non-collective
bargaining localities would not have had any collective bargaining agreements also
during that same period of time).
The following helps illustrate how each of the hypotheses will respond to each of
the variables:


Workforce Classification:
o Hypotheses 1: As workforce classification is the independent variable, the
proper definition of type of employee workforce will be defined and also
assigned to each of the sample localities. Through statistical research, the
dependent variable of a composite performance index will be analyzed as
it pertains to employee workforce classification.
o Hypotheses 2: As workforce classification is the independent variable, the
proper definition of type of employee workforce will be defined and
assigned to each of the sample localities. Through statistical research, the
dependent variable of cost will be analyzed as it pertains to employee
workforce classification.
o Hypotheses 3: This hypothesis gauges the relationship between
dependent variables of performance and cost to determine what high
performance return on cost composite measure exists amongst the
workforce classifications assigned.
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Performance:
o Hypotheses 1: Performance attributes will be defined and through
statistical research, the composite performance index will be noted for
each sample locality.
o Hypotheses 2: Not applicable as performance attributes are not a
dependent variable or subject to other analytical tests as part of these
hypotheses.
o Hypotheses 3: These hypotheses gauge the high performance return on
costs composite measure between dependent variables of performance
attributes and cost to determine what differentiation exists amongst the
classifications of employee workforce.



Costs:
o Hypotheses 1: Not applicable as cost attributes are not a dependent
variable or subject to other analytical tests as part of these hypotheses.
o Hypotheses 2: Cost attributes will be defined and through statistical
research, cost attributes will be noted for each sample locality.
o Hypotheses 3: These hypotheses gauge the high performance return on
costs composite measure between dependent variables of performance
and

cost

to

determine

what

differentiation

classifications of employee workforce.
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Research Goal
Through the restatement of the research question and how each hypothesis will
be tested, the following research goal is anticipated to be accomplished: To be able to
determine if the hypotheses statements, upon testing, can help better answer or refine
the research question and attempt to provide credible research in furthering the
knowledge in regards to the problem. The relationship of the research question to
Chapter 2 - Review of the Literature represents the relationship of workforce
classification and its service cost to high performance with the scope limited to local
government law enforcement services. The ability to best control for these variables is
accomplished by focusing on certain tools from authoritative sources that can mitigate
any externality.
Problem Statement and Research Question
As noted in Chapter 1 - Introduction, the problem statement and research
question were initially formulated and subjected to further review and analysis in
Chapter 2 - Review of the Literature. Based upon this further review and analysis, no
alternations to either the problem statement or research question are proposed. The
problem statement and research question are therefore repeated as follows:
103



Problem Statement: Local government law enforcement collective
bargaining practices appear to create advocacy groups in support and
against such practices; however, these emotional debates seem to
focus on just salary and benefit costs and not on any high performance
law enforcement organization factors; especially when total law
enforcement costs and demographic factors are considered in
determining high performance return on costs.



Research Question: Is there a relationship between a local government
law enforcement collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining
workforce and a high performance law enforcement organization when
cost and demographic factors are considered in determining high
performance return on costs?
Linking of Hypothesis to Rational Choice Theory

From the general observations of Rational Choice Theory, the hypotheses
developed from Rational Choice Theory tenets helps frame the analysis approach. With
the hypothesis, the likely relationship between two or more phenomena or key variables
together with empirical indicators, may enable tests to be conducted, and where
necessary, refuted. In addition, through propositions or sets of propositions that seek to
explain or predict something, modifications to the conceptual framework may emerge.
The hypotheses link to Rational Choice Theory is apparent in higher performance
attributes from the law enforcement workforce in the motivation and roles workers have
in helping achieve and maintain a HPO environment. The manner in which the law
enforcement officer attempts to maximize their utility and their “means” should be
complimented by the manner that the employer recognizes these employee Rational
Choice Theory traits. Each law enforcement worker, regardless of collective bargaining
or not, may be motivated by these Rational Choice Theory attributes. In addition, as the
104

costs will be analyzed as part of this research and costs are most represented by the
law enforcement officers in performing their service, the correlations, if any, of Rational
Choice Theory traits of the worker and their costs will be determined.
Independent Variable – Workforce Classification
For purposes of potentially identifying workforce classification, each locality was
placed in one of three classifications: 1) Non-collective bargaining localities (which
include localities with union representation that formally “meet and confer,” but
employer’s position is deciding factor); 2) Collective bargaining localities with any
impasse resolved through mediation; and 3) Collective bargaining localities with any
impasse resolved through arbitration. While there are similar traits of collective
bargaining in two of the classifications, the research can help better gauge if there are
any implications for the dependent variable based upon the type of impasse resolution.
Mediation is a “voluntary process where an impartial, neutral, third party with the
professional training and experience acts as a catalyst to enable clear and concise
communication and negotiation between two conflicting parties” (Conflict Resolution,
2012, p. 1). With a goal of a mutually satisfactory resolution, the process may provide
solutions that otherwise were not apparent at the start of the negation process. This
flexibility component is a contrast to arbitration, whereby a more structured legally
binding arbitration process may focus on whether the employer or the union is right. For
arbitration, an attorney or retired judge may utilize sworn testimony and employer and
union can each present their “evidence” in having the arbitrator reach a final decision.
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Certain challenges with mediation may arise if compromise mindsets are not apparent
and the impasse needs to be resolved. However, mediation may provide leverage to the
employer’s position whereas arbitration may provide leverage to the employee’s union;
therefore, arbitration impasse resolution is more often associated with more powerful
unions.
Table 3.1: Collective Bargaining State Laws for Law Enforcement Employees
was derived from Charles Salerno’s Police at the Bargaining Table (1981), amended for
environment that existed in 2010, and illustrates the variance of collective bargaining
laws for law enforcement employees amongst the states. As Table 3.1 illustrates, there
are thirty-two states that permit collective bargaining for its law enforcement
organizations and for the other eighteen states not listed in the table (36.0% of total
states), those states do not permit collective bargaining. For these collective bargaining
states, they are segmented in two manners based upon how an impasse (inability) in
negotiations to proceed further towards agreement is resolved: 1) Fifteen states (30.0%
of total states) - Any impasse is resolved through mediation and not any binding
arbitration; and 2) Seventeen states (34.0% of total states) - Any impasse is resolved
through binding arbitration. While the table was compiled in 1981, additional reviews
were done through state-by-state research to determine if any state changes have been
done with regards to local law enforcement organizations, with adjustments made as
applicable, and based upon such reviews, the data in the table appears accurate for the
performance, cost and control variable period under review (2008-2011).
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Table 3.1: Collective Bargaining State Laws
for Law Enforcement Employees

State

Mediation

Mandatory Arbitration

when Impasse (15 states)

when Impasse (17 states)

AK
CA

Yes
Yes

CT

Yes

DE

Yes

FL

Yes-1

HI

Yes

IA

Yes-1

IL

Yes

IN

Yes-1

ME

Yes

MA
MD

Yes
Yes

MI

Yes

MN

Yes

MT

Yes

NE

Yes-1

NV

Yes-1

NH

Yes

NV

Yes-1

NJ

Yes

NM

Yes

NY

Yes

OH

Yes

OK

Yes-1

OR

Yes

PA

Yes

RI

Yes

SD

Yes-1

TX

Yes-1

VT

Yes

WA

Yes

WI

Yes
-1 Also a right-to-work state (9 states)
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There appears to be geographic spread amongst both categories as there is no
concentration of mediation or arbitration in any one geographic region. In addition,
Table 3.1 also illustrates what states (nine in total) that have collective bargaining also
classified as right-to-work states. This classification of right-to-work vs. non-right-to-work
was initially addressed in Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature (Figure 2.4: Right-toWork States Map) and is included later in this chapter as this classification will be a
control variable to determine if any variability exists between localities with such legal
classifications because of their respective state law. However, because of each state’s
definition of local law enforcement organizations, their abilities to unionize and their
abilities to resolve impasse appear to be the hierarchal manner in measuring a law
enforcement organization’s collective bargaining ability. Therefore, it is this classification
that will be focused upon as the independent variable rather than the more broad rightto-work classification which is better represented as a control variable.
Not included in the thirty-two collective bargaining states are two states: 1)
Kentucky which permits collective bargaining, but only for Louisville (which will be
appropriately coded as collective bargaining if Louisville is in the sample); and 2)
Kansas - which enable law enforcement organization and the employer to “meet and
confer” for the purpose of negotiating a contract. However, “meet and confer” generally
favor the employer’s desired terms and conditions as the employee union simply
presents its desires and not demands. Therefore, because the employer is positioned to
not negotiate further, these “meet and confer” states have been classified as non-
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collective bargaining for the purposes of data coding. Therefore, there are eighteen
states in total that do not permit law enforcement collective bargaining.
For the thirty-two collective bargaining states, the ability for the employee (law
enforcement officer) to grievance exists in all but three states (Alaska, Delaware and
Nevada); and because of these few states and the inability to find research which
focuses on the classification differentials in unions that arise because of a grievance
process, such trait was not subject to further data analysis or special coding. Only one
state enables law enforcement to strike (Montana), but there are many restrictions on
this ability (e.g., request state’s permission, ensure adjoining locality coverage);
therefore this trait is also not considered a differentiating factor worthy of further
consideration for data analysis.

Dependent Variable – Composite Performance Measure
In determining the population of dependent variables, as they pertain to law
enforcement HPO measures, focus was placed upon four primary high performance
statistics or traits: 1) Survey Results - the perception a citizen has about the law
enforcement services provided in their locality and how safe and secure they feel in
factors that are key to high quality of life; 2) Crime Index – data from actual crimes
committed; and 3) National Accreditation – recognition of a professionally managed law
enforcement organization. The preceding indicators appear to be representative and an
appropriate gauge for performance from both an internal (staff, elected official) and
external (citizen, business, media) perspective. dependent and control variables to use,
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the ICMA’s Performance Measurement Survey was a good source and Appendix C
includes the complete population of those variables related to law enforcement services
(ICMA, 2011). From this population of variables, the most relevant to the hypotheses
were utilized in this research. Each of these four primary HPO statistics or traits is
further addressed in the following sections.
Performance and cost of services can also be influenced by factors that are not
correlated to workplace practices or controlled by the locality which can result in
variability between two otherwise similar law enforcement organizations. These would
include: 1) Adverse weather; 2) Federal and state influences (e.g., mandates, funding,
local taxing authority constraints, classification of correctional officers as law
enforcement

officers);

3)

Socio-economic

factors

(e.g.

household

incomes,

unemployment rate); 4) Overlapping law enforcement jurisdictions in service area (e.g.,
town-county, state law enforcement officer roles in localities); and 5) Demographic traits
(e.g., density of service area, variations between citizen population and others served
(business workers, visitors, tourists, college students, pass-through traffic), traffic
congestion, road networks) (ICMA, 2011).
In addition, the priority of law enforcement services amongst funding priorities of
other services can change the investment in law enforcement and any correlated result
outcomes associated with such investment. The locality may also have certain
demographic and socio-economic traits similar to a comparable locality, but may have a
large variance in its priority, citizen preferences or political philosophy to tax its citizens
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and businesses in a comparable manner. Finally, local law enforcement policies may be
different in administering and interpreting the law which could cause arrests to be higher
or lower for certain crimes committed (ICMA, 2011).
Even an otherwise simplistic measurement term for law enforcement from a
citizen’s perspective - “response time” (how quickly a law enforcement officer responds
on a service call) - is not universally defined as to the parameters to consistently
calculate. In some local governments, the 911 call is received by a 911 center and
dispatched directly to a responding law enforcement unit whereas in other local
governments, the 911 center may transfer the call to the law enforcement organization
for them to dispatch officers. Any calls that result in transferring to another entity would
add to any response time from the citizen’s perspective of when the 911 call was first
made, but the performance information tracked by the law enforcement division may
only begin tracking the “response time” after getting the transferred call or when the call
was actually dispatched to a responding law enforcement unit. Another factor that
challenges comparability includes density bias as a higher density population has an
inherent advantage in having a faster response time than a lower density population.
Therefore, the performance measurement of “response time” has been excluded due to
inconsistent manners between local governments of how such measurement is reported
and natural variances that arise because of density attributes.
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Survey Results - National Citizens Survey
Measures of high performance include customer satisfaction with service
(effectiveness measures) that is obtained via survey with citizens. The International
City-County Managers Association (ICMA) has a partnership with the National
Research Center, Inc. (NRC) to promote a product called National Citizens Survey
(NCS). ICMA is a recognized professional membership-based organization serving local
government managers. NRC is a professionally recognized survey business that is
contracted by local governments to perform standardized surveys that provides a report
with comparable results of other local governments. There are many survey questions
to citizens that inquire about quality of services and quality of life attributes.
NRC has a current inventory from 2002-2011 of over 250 localities in 41 states,
but it also compiles information from another 300 local governments that had other
survey institutions conducting similar surveys of local government services (NRC,
2012). The surveys of local governments reflect results 2002–2011, with the most
recent local government’s survey represented in the sample size. Because many local
governments benefit from cyclical surveys every 2-3 years, much of the sample size
reflects surveys conducted 2008-2011. This concentration 2008-2011 also correlates to
the time frames utilized for crime rates, Census data, financial results and other
variables utilized in data analysis. As public access to the NCS database of all localities
and their survey results is not publicly available, a phone conversation with the NRC
Director Tom Miller enabled access to this information. The only caveat to gaining
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access to this database is that specific local government survey results cannot be
reproduced publicly.
Because local governments elect to participate in such surveys and pay NRC to
conduct the survey, a self-selection bias may arise in the results of data. This bias
arises as population of data may not be a random sample amongst the entire population
of local governments and their law enforcement organizations. However, this bias is
mitigated based upon the following: 1) The NCS is not designed solely to gauge law
enforcement services performance, but rather all local government services; therefore
law enforcement service performance attributes are part of a much larger review with
the local government governing body or chief administrative officers contracting for the
survey (and not the law enforcement chief); 2) The NCS process does utilize random
sampling methods for its survey, so the underlying results by locality meet standardized
random sampling principles; and 3) Additional demographic information about the local
governments

were

accumulated

to

determine

their

composite

demographic

representation amongst all local governments. The results of the composite
demographic analysis are included in Chapter 4 – Findings. Table 3.2: The National
Citizen Survey Methods and Goals summarize the NCS (NRC, 2012):
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Table 3.2: The National Citizen Survey Methods and Goals
Survey Objectives



Assessment Methods

*Identify community strengths and weaknesses
 *Multi-contact mailed survey
*Identify service strengths and weaknesses  *Representative sample of 1,200 residents
and households
 *5% margin of error
 *Data statistically weighted to reflect
population
Assessment Goals







Immediate:
*Provide useful information for:
*Planning resource allocation
*Performance measurement
*Program and policy







Long-term:
*Improve services
*More civic engagement
*Better community quality
*Stronger public trust

Survey validity can be segmented into two parts: 1) How can a locality be
confident that the results from those who completed the survey are representative of the
results that would been obtained had the survey been administered to the entire
population? and 2) How closely do the perspectives recorded on the survey reflect what
residents really believe or do? (NRC, 2011). In addressing the first question, NRC
attempts to have high response rates via mail surveys to residents within a local
government in a manner consistent with the original Dillman Approach: 1) Respondentfriendly questionnaire; 2) Multiple contacts by first-class mail (e.g., respondents
contacted three times by NCS); 3) Return postage free envelopes; and 4) Personalized
correspondence (e.g., letter from mayor encouraging citizen to respond) (Thorpe, 2009).
Revised Dillman approaches, also known as Tailored-Designed Method (TDM), which
include token financial incentives, are not deployed by NRC.
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Because of a vested and affiliated nature that exists amongst citizens of their
locality, response rates traditionally range between 20 – 45%; which together with the
randomness of the sample selection enable sample error rates of less than 5% (NRC,
2011). For example, in Hanover County, Virginia’s NCS in 2011, 1200 households were
randomly selected with 458 surveys returned for a 39% response rate (NRC, 2011). In
addition, for Hanover County, NRC states that the confidence interval is 95% which
indicates that for every “100 random samples of 1200 households, 95 of the confidence
intervals created will include the “true” population response” (NRC, 2011, p. 83).
“Survey data weighting” is another attribute deployed by NRC to better align the
sample with the demographic characteristics of the population and is accomplished via:
1) “Reviewing sampling demographics and comparing them to the population norms
from the most recent census or other sources; and 2) Comparing the responses to
different questions for demographic subgroups” (NRC, 2011, p. 85). NRC utilizes a
special software program using mathematical algorithms to calculate the appropriate
weights to best fit the data to the demographic profile.
Additional NCS attributes in determining the confidence of the results include
(NRC, 2012): 1) Over-sampling of multi-family housing units to improve response from
hard-to-reach, lower income or younger apartment dwellers; 2) Selecting the
respondent within the household using an unbiased sampling procedure whereby the
member of the household asked to respond to the survey is over 18 who most recently
had a birthday; 3) Offering survey in non-English; and 4) Use most current demographic
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database of locality to best produce representative sample whereby every nth
household is systematically selected.
In addressing the second question of how closely does the survey’s results
reflect what the people really believe, the citizen’s expectations of service quality play a
role as well as the objective quality of the service itself provided. NCS research has
concluded that there is a strong correlation between low survey results in a specific
topical question being asked (e.g., how safe do you feel?) and low performance
attributes of the local government organization administering the service (e.g., law
enforcement) (NRC, 2011).

Even if there is a disparity between the results (e.g., low

survey result, but HPO confirmed via other means), local government officials cannot
ignore citizen opinion. Using a non-law enforcement example cited by NRC - even if you
collect trash three times a day, but residents think that your trash haul is poor, the local
government still has an issue to overcome with the citizens (NRC, 2011). However,
strategies in overcoming perception may be more easily developed and deployed (e.g.,
marketing, citizen focus groups) compared to strategies in overcoming poor
performance (e.g., additional resources, costs, law changes, training).
All of the following questions as they pertain to law enforcement services from
NCS surveys were included in this research analysis:


Please rate how safe or unsafe you feel from the following (potential answers are
very safe, somewhat safe, neither safe nor unsafe, somewhat unsafe, very
unsafe, don’t know)
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o Violent crimes (e.g., rape, assault, robbery)
o Property crimes (e.g., burglary, theft)
o In your neighborhood during the day
o In your neighborhood after dark
o In shopping areas during the day
o In shopping areas after dark


Please rate the quality of law enforcement services (potential answers are
excellent, good, fair, poor” or don’t know)
An additional question from the survey will help capture any correlation or

variance between collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining localities and their
citizens’ viewpoint of quality of life compared to law enforcement services. This will be
further addressed under control variables. The entire survey was examined to
determine if additional questions would be helpful as part of this research analysis and it
appears that the overall quality of life question best represents the non-law
enforcement-related questions. Many of the other questions were for other services of
the local government as well as perceptions about other attributes of the local
government and their community.
For purposes of data input, the average overall score will be indexed to reflect
one variable and its intensity of rating. For example, excellent-good % of total and very
safe-somewhat safe % of total. For purposes of calculating the total, those respondents
who didn’t answer the question or noted “don’t know” were excluded from the total.
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Another resource provided from the surveys is demographic information that will help
populate some of the control variables that are addressed later in this chapter. There
may be some local governments that do not formally, or at least statistically, survey their
customers and this also would be an undesirable trait for any aspiring HPO.
Through factor analysis, the survey questions can be grouped together to
determine correlations within the questions. This enables ordinal data to better
represent normal distributions. The “measured variables depend on a smaller number of
unobserved (latent) factors” and because each factor may affect “several variables in
common,” they are known as "common factors" (Mathworks, 2012, p.1). “Each variable
is assumed to depend on a linear combination of the common factors, and the
coefficients are known as loadings” and with each measured variable, it also includes a
“component due to independent random variability, known as "specific variance"
because it is specific to one variable” (Mathworks, 2012, p.1).
There are qualitative aspects to any survey as surveys represent a respondent’s
perceptions of what they think about the question being posed to them. Survey
respondents are not necessarily given the time, data and other quantitative information
needed to form an educated response to the question. Rather, they are asked to
respond in a fairly quick manner within a finite range of options to what they think about
the question being posed to them.
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Crime Index – Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) had developed two measures to
uniformly capture the type, intensity, volume and citizen reporting of crime. These two
measures are: 1) National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) which reports via sample
surveys reported and unreported crime from the victim's perspective; and 2) Uniform
Crime Reports (UCR) based upon standardized local reporting by local law enforcement
organizations to the FBI. DOJ recommends use of both of these complimentary and
comprehensive indicators to assess crime and its trends in the United States (USDOJ,
2012). Some of the differences between UCR and NCVS are illustrated in the Table 3.3:
Comparison Between Uniform Crime Rate (UCR) and National Crime Victimization
Survey (NCVS) (USDOJ, 2012). However, because the NCVS data is not segmented by
locality, it is not able to be used as part of this research.
Table 3.3: Comparison Between Uniform Crime Rate (UCR) and
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)
UCR

NCVS

Geographic
coverage

National and State estimates, local law
National estimates
enforcement organization reports

Collection
method

Reports by law enforcement organization Survey of over 77,000 households and
to the FBI on a monthly basis
134,000 individuals age 12 or older.

Measures

Index of serious types of crimes reported Reported and unreported crime; details
by law enforcement
about the crimes, victims, and offenders

The UCR Part I crimes is the common reference point for serious crimes. The
UCR Part I crimes data is reduced by “unfounded cases” whereby an initial crime
reported is later removed from the report due to defined circumstances (e.g., victim
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recants that a crime ever took place). Not included in UCR Part I crimes are unreported
crimes as some crime victims are unwilling to report offenses against themselves for
fear of retribution from the offender whereas others report actions as criminal even
though they may not be criminal (ICMA, 2011). While these constraints are noted, it is
not possible to segment out the variations between localities that may exist in reporting
and citizen’s willingness to report. For purposes of this research, it is assumed that such
variations are immaterial in their influence of the analytical results.

The UCR Part I crimes are classified between violent and property crimes.
Violent crimes include aggravated assault, forcible rape, murder and robbery. Property
crimes include arson, burglary, larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft. The UCR Part II
crimes are considered less severe and include, but are not limited to, simple assault,
loitering, embezzlement, forgery, disorderly conduct, driving under the influence, drug
offenses, gambling, prostitution, sex offenses, stolen property, vandalism and weapons
offenses (USDOJ, 2012). When multiple crimes are committed by the same offender in
one event, only the most serious of all the crimes committed is reported. For purposes
of this research, only UCR Part I crimes are captured in determining crime indexes; as
there may be more variability in which localities record UCR Part II crimes. The
comparison between actual crime rates and the survey response results noted in the
previous section of a citizen’s perception of crime will help illustrate any correlation or
contrast between actual crime and its perception. Figure 3.1: Violent Crime, Arrests,
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Reports and Unknown helps capture the manners in which crimes are reported or not
reported (Robey, 2012).

Figure 3.1: Violent Crime, Arrests, Reports and Unknown

A source for the crime rates is the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports database in
which all localities have information self-reported to one source. This information is also
available for the public to review and was utilized as a source for this research (FBI,
2010). The most recent complete data source year available is 2010. As violent crimes
are more serious in nature than property crimes, but property crimes are more
voluminous, each of these crime rates will be captured and analyzed separately in order
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to not distort the violent crime rate. The denominator will be the total demand; which in
this case is planned to be population In order to present the modified crime rate index
as an appropriate ratio and not a small fractional ratio, the crimes over the demand
indicator will be multiplied by a factor of 10,000.
Accreditation – Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA)
The pursuit and attainment of national accreditation for local government law
enforcement is recognized as a HPO trait in ensuring compliance to generally accepted
standards of the profession. The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement
Agencies, Inc. (CALEA) was formed in 1987 by the four major national law enforcement
associations: International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Organization for
Black Law Enforcement Executives, National Sheriff’s Association and Police Executive
Research Forum. CALEA has published a standards manual containing professional
standards that address nine major law enforcement areas: 1) Role, responsibilities, and
relationships; 2) Organization, management, and administration; 3) Personnel structure;
4) Personnel process; 5) Operations; 6) Operation support; 7) Traffic operations; 8)
Detainee and court-related activities; and 9) Auxiliary and technical services (CALEA,
2012).
As Table 3.4: CALEA Certifications by Type of Organization illustrates, there are
605 organizations in the United States that have earned CALEA accreditation and once
accredited, the local organization is required to get reaccredited every three years
(CALEA, 2012). Of these 605 organizations, only the first three classifications would be
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subject to a local government survey utilizing NCS; therefore it can be assumed that
there are potentially 487 local government law enforcement organizations that have
received CALEA national accreditation.

Table 3.4: CALEA Certifications by Type of Organization
Organization Type

CALEA Certification

Municipal (City, Town)

390

Sheriff’s Office

78

County Law Enforcement

19

State Organizations

29

Campus Law Enforcement

57

Other (e.g. Railroad Authorities)

32

Total

605

From the U.S. Department of Justice’s (2008) Census of State and Local Law
Enforcement Agencies, there are 12,501 (80.3% of total) local police departments and
3,063 sheriff offices (19.7% of total) in the United States for a total 15,564. As noted in
the types of local government control variable, many law enforcement agencies may be
overlapping in nature and for many small towns, the law enforcement coverage may be
performed though inter-local agreements or oversight (e.g., County sheriff for town).
The standards denote what a law enforcement organization should be doing
while illustrating compliance with established standards. However, this does not
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necessarily refer to how the standard is performed or implemented as there is permitted
variability and discretion deferred to individual local law enforcement organizations.
There are over 600 standards that comprise over 80 categories. For example, one
category is titled “Criminal Investigation” and one standard in this category states “if the
criminal investigative function does not provide 24-hour coverage, an “on-call” schedule
of investigators is maintained” (CALEA, 2012, p. 1). However, flexibility and discretion is
given to the local law enforcement organization on how such schedule is developed,
deployed and reviewed for effectiveness.
The standards help law enforcement organizations in the following manners: 1)
Strengthen crime prevention and control capabilities; 2) Formalize essential
management procedures; 3) Establish fair and nondiscriminatory personnel practices;
4) Improve service-delivery; 5) Solidify inter-organization cooperation and coordination;
and 6) Boost citizen and staff confidence in the organization (CALEA, 2012).
Organizations that seek accreditation are required to comply only with those standards
that are specifically applicable to them. Applicability is based on two factors: 1)
Organization’s size; and 2) Functions it performs. Applicable standards are categorized
as mandatory or other-than-mandatory. Organizations must comply with all applicable
mandatory standards and at least 80% of applicable other-than-mandatory standards. If
an organization cannot comply with a standard because of legislation, labor
agreements, court orders, or case law, waivers can be sought from CALEA. However,
there are very few local law enforcement organizations amongst the 605 that have
sought a waiver because of their labor agreement. Therefore, while such waiver factor
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may be worthy of a separate analysis, it was not considered a determining factor for this
research analysis.
As an overview to their accreditation standards, CALEA provides the following
benchmarks (CALEA, 2012):


Requires an organization to develop a comprehensive and uniform set of written
directives to reach goals, while also providing direction to personnel



Provide the necessary reports and analyses a law enforcement chief needs to
make fact-based, informed management decisions



Requires a preparedness program be put in place so an organization is ready to
address natural or man-made unusual occurrences.



Means for developing or improving upon an organization’s relationship with the
community



Strengthens an organization’s accountability, both within the organization and the
community, through a continuum of standards that clearly define authority,
performance, and responsibilities



Limit an organization’s liability and risk exposure because it demonstrates that
internationally recognized standards for law enforcement have been met, as
verified by a team of independent outside CALEA-trained assessors



Facilitates an organization’s pursuit of professional excellence
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For some local law enforcement organizations, national CALEA accreditation is
not pursued because of the equivalent value, lower cost and general acceptance for
those states that have their own state accreditation process. As an example, the
Virginia Law Enforcement Professional Standards Commission (VLEPSC) is managed
by the State’s Department of Criminal Justice Services and was created in 1993 by the
governing bodies of the Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police and the Virginia Sheriff’s
Association.

The

VLEPSC’s

187

professional

standards

are

in

four

areas

(administration, operations, personnel and training). In 2011, there were 82 law
enforcement organizations in Virginia with VLEPSC accreditation (Va DCJS, 2012).
Once accredited, the organization is required to be reaccredited every four years. Of
these 82 organizations with Virginia accreditation, only three also have national CALEA
accreditation. However, there are 19 Virginia law enforcement organizations that just
have CALEA accreditation and no VLEPSC accreditation. From a national perspective,
of the 605 organizations with CALEA accreditation, there appears to be similar
dynamics to Virginia in which many more have state accreditation, some of which have
both state and national accreditation and some just have national accreditation.
Because of the variability of state accreditation practices (e.g., some states may have
standards similar to CALEA whereas other states may have far less demanding
standards resulting in easier accreditation), only the national accreditation measure will
be used in representing a HPO trait of law enforcement organization.
CALEA actually recognizes law enforcement organizations that are in the selfassessment phase as part of their CALEA accreditation-seeking process. This step is
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required prior to a site visit and formal accreditation review. From discussions with
CALEA Accreditation Assessor Doug Goodman, it appears that any organization that is
at that step in the accreditation process will seek the formal accreditation review and
very often, such organization has demonstrated traits of HPO as part of selfassessment (Goodman, 2012). In essence, the self-assessment helps position the law
enforcement organization to know the accreditation standards and enables them to
implement such standards prior to the formal accreditation review. Therefore, as part of
the data analysis, those law enforcement organizations that are part of the sample that
have been identified to be part of the self-assessment process will be recognized to
have 50% of the accreditation HPO trait as opposed to 0% for those organizations that
have chosen to not participate at all in such process.
Composite Performance Measure
The preceding measures comprise a representative array of performance
attributes for law enforcement agencies. In order to convert these individual measures
into one composite performance measure, each of the dependent variables are
converted to a quantitative ordinal measure and assigned a weight so that all of the
dependent variables are best represented in the one ordinal measure. Therefore,
additional coding was needed for the composite performance measure in order to
position the data for consistent and comparable statistical analysis via a 100-point
scale. The composite performance survey questions were on a 100-point % scale that
was converted to 100-point scale via multiplying factor of 100. The accreditation
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variable, as noted previously, was converted to a 100 point scale (0 – none, 50 – selfassessment, 100 – accreditation). The violent and property crime rate indices were
each ranked. Those with the lowest index were assigned a 100-point scale value of 100
and the highest index were assigned a 100-point scale of 1 with incremental
assignments between 1 to 100 applied to the remainder of the sample. Table 3.5:
Composite Performance Measure illustrates how each of these variables can be
transformed into a performance (“return”) composite measure.
Table 3.5: Composite Performance Measure
Additional
Process to
Classify 1 100

Weighted
Average

Dependent
Variable

Measure

Initial Score
Range

Process to
Convert to
100 Scale

Survey questions
on feeling safe

Average Score of
six questions

1-100

No change

No change

25%

Survey question
on law
enforcement office
quality

Score of one
question

1-100

No change

No change

25%

Crime rate

Crime rate for UCR
Part I Violent (50%
weighted) and
Property (50%
weighted)

Calculated
index for
Violent and
Property

No
additional
change

40%
(20%
violent,
20%
property)

Accreditation, SelfAssessment
Process or No
Accreditation

Yes, SelfAssessment
or None

No
additional
change

10%

Accreditation
Total Composite
Performance
Measure

Lowest rate
given "100",
scaled down
to highest
rate at "1"
Yes =100,
SelfAssessment
= 50, None =
0

100%
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The weighted average percent ranges from 10% - 25% amongst the five
dependent variable categories. While these weighted average scales are subjective in
nature, it was important to define these weighted averages prior to the calculations of
the HPRC formula on the sample in order to negate unintended bias. For each of the
weighted criteria, a rationale behind its weighted average is described as follows:


Survey Questions on Feeling Safe (25%): A very important attribute from
the perspective of a citizen and the safety of their environment (home,
work, shopping, etc.). Although this ranking may be a perception of the
citizen, such perceptions are based upon a rationale from the citizen’s
perspective. In order for a citizen and their community to have the
opportunities for a higher quality of life, the ability of the local government
to provide a sense of safety for the citizen, their family, their employer and
other activities the citizen participates in warrant such a high weighted
average criteria in this attribute. As an inherent goal for any locality should
be to perform services in a manner to achieve an outcome of having their
citizens feel safe, the high weighted average criteria for this attribute is
warranted.



Survey Question on Law Enforcement Office Quality (25%): Another
important attribute from a citizen’s perspective in how their law
enforcement office performs. While there may be high correlations
between a citizen’s perspective of how safe they feel and the quality of the
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law enforcement office, the importance of distinguishing this attribute
separate and apart from feeling safe is recognizing the HPO potential from
the law enforcement services perspective, not the safety outcomes that
the feeling safe and crime rate attributes capture.


Crime Rate (20% violent, 20% property): Whereas the previous two
criteria are based upon the perspective of the citizen and account for 50%
of the weighted average, the crime rate is based upon actual measures of
crime. The two primary manners in which crime rates are determined are
violent and property, each of which is important from measuring the
relative impact and volume of crime to its community. The factors at 20%
each are less than the 25% factors applied to the survey questions as the
survey questions recognize an essential key of a quality of life from a
citizen’s perspective whereas there may be other variables that affect
crime rates in comparing them between localities as noted previously
(e.g., different demand indicators of business and tourism that are not
reflected in the denominator of citizens).



Accreditation (10%): While accreditation at 10% is ranked the lowest, it is
still an important variable. The low ranking was primarily a result of the
voluntary nature in which law enforcement organizations participate in the
national accreditation process; and also recognizes that the time, cost and
other options available (e.g., State accreditation) may negate an otherwise
high performing law enforcement organization from participating in the
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national accreditation process. However, because accreditation is a good
indicator of an organization’s desire to perform at higher levels and attain
HPO attributes, it is worthy of being included in the weighted average
calculation; even if it is just 10%.

Performance Measure Not Utilized - Clearance Rate
Crime rates alone are not an absolute guide as to the performance of local law
enforcement organizations. While the crime rates are most commonly used for
measuring overall law enforcement performance, “the incidence of crime is a function of
many factors unrelated to law enforcement activity”; therefore “crime rates alone are
insufficient” measures of law enforcement performance (More, 1979, p. 318). Because
of that limitation, other measurements were sought for law enforcement performance
(e.g., surveys, accreditation).
However, another recognized measure of performance, clearance rate, was
researched, but ultimately not included as an appropriate measure for this research. A
clearance rate measures the ability to bring closure to a reported crime. While the
efforts of the investigative division of the law enforcement organization are highly
correlated with the clearance results, there are still external factors that can cause
differentiations between law enforcement organizations. These differences include: 1)
Complexity of the crime and quality of evidence (e.g., how well was crime scene
preserved); 2) Willingness and ability of witnesses to assist; 3) Death of the possible
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suspect; and 4) Extradition challenges for suspected offenders being charged and
detained elsewhere for another crime (ICMA, 2011).
Although a valid measure of performance (via ability and effort of law
enforcement personnel to “clear” a crime, this measure was not reliable enough to be
captured for this research for the following reasons: 1) Inability of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to easily and publicly disclose such data at the local government
level; 2) Inconsistency of reporting between local governments of what constitutes a
crime being cleared; 3) Challenges in reporting of cleared crimes in one year for a crime
that occurred in a prior year in developing a ratio of “clearance rate” that is comparable
amongst local governments; and 4) Less emphasis of FBI and localities to disclose and
report, respectively, clearance rates for public consumption and comparability amongst
localities. Although not utilized, research in the clearance rate was performed to
determine any contributions such research would have in furthering this or future
research projects.
Ideally, data recordation systems would record information into varying
demographic attributes to enable better analysis to be conducted to determine if there
may be other factors influencing performance and costs from a demographic or socioeconomic perspective. This is an especially important validation procedure for law
enforcement services as the demand for such services may vary by factors others than
population (e.g., higher density areas may have more efficient delivery methods for law
enforcement response, higher unemployment areas may have higher per capita law
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enforcement responses). Again, a challenge for any HPO, public or private sector, is
being able to know their customers and their preferences; with this knowledge benefited
from also knowing the demographics of their customers through appropriate data
collection techniques that can be done in a professional and non-intrusive or bias-free
manner.
A study of local governments was performed by Wellford and Cronin (2000) that
determined that there were two dominant traits correlated to higher clearance rates for
homicides: 1) Performance factors of local law enforcement organization; and 2) Types
of weapons used to commit crime. As it pertains to performance, policies and practices
can have a “substantial impact on the clearance of homicide cases and can be
increased by improving certain investigation policies and procedures involving the
actions taken by the first officer to the scene, how quickly detectives arrive on the scene
and the subsequent actions they take, and how many resources the organization
dedicates to the investigation” (Wellford and Cronin, 2000, p.1). Additional performance
factors identified as significant in Wellford and Cronin’s study include the ability to
secure the crime scene, identify and reach out to potential witnesses, assigning multiple
detectives to the case, detective response times to crime scene, and use of technology
(e.g., crime lab work on weapons, gun checks in national systems).
While the positive effects of clearance rate can be attributable to the law
enforcement organization’s performance, the inability to accurately capture and
compare such data in its current state warrants exclusion of such measure from this
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research. The performance attributes utilized for this research are of such quality to
properly distinguish low from high performing law enforcement organizations and
formulate a composite performance measure to be analyzed in hypotheses 1 and 3.

Dependent Variable - Law Enforcement Cost per Capita
Law enforcement organizations “traditionally have been more concerned with
measures of resources than with measures of results” (More, 1979, p. 323). The
expenditures (or costs as these terms can be used interchangeably) to provide law
enforcement services are comprised of personal services (salaries and fringe benefits),
operating (e.g., supplies, fuel, training, contractual services) and capital (e.g., vehicles).
The first source for actual expenditures of personnel, operating and capital will be
ICMA’s FY10 Police Services from ICMA’s annual compilation of local government
services for their Performance Measurement Report (ICMA, 2011). For those localities
not part of the voluntary submittal of costs, state databases that compile actual costs for
local government comparative reporting will be reviewed. For states that do not provide
such comparative budget reports of local governments, then secondary data sources
will be sought (e.g., individual local government budgets).

The law enforcement workforce is generally comprised of sworn officers or its
equivalent and the civilian workforce that provides administrative and support services.
Efforts were not made to try and segment the sworn officers and their costs separate
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and apart from non-sworn personnel as such data was not readily available. For
purposes of this research, it is assumed that such non-sworn officer support services
are proportionally the same amongst localities. In addition, the support services are an
integral component to such HPOs and CALEA accreditation has many standards that
could not be compliant without such support service efforts.

Actual costs as compared to budgeted costs will be utilized in order to better
gauge the actual resources of the local government committed to law enforcement
Efforts will be made to ascertain accounting classifications to ensure that similar
expenditures amongst law enforcement organizations are recognized in a similar
fashion. In order for expenditure data to be comparable, the expenditures will be divided
by population for per capita measures. It is not anticipated that any variability in these
expenditure data gathering methods would otherwise reflect a materially different result
in positioning a certain locality or aggregate localities, with similar other performance
and demographic information, in yielding a different result in Chapter 4 – Findings.
However, as more complete data is gathered for certain localities, additional efforts will
be made to determine what volatility exists, if any, amongst these categories and its
impact, if any, upon results.

Dependent Variable - High Performance Return on Costs
As noted in Chapter 2, the high performance return on costs (HPRC) composite
measure attempts to compare high performance traits to the correlating costs that may
have contributed to such high performance traits. The HPRC formula modified for law
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enforcement services can be expressed as HPRC = Total composite performance
measure (for law enforcement)/Law enforcement costs per capita. The higher the ratio,
the higher the performance is relative to the costs.

Control Variables – Demographic, Socio-Economic and Other Measures
There are many control variables which can illustrate the environment that exists
in a locality for which law enforcement services would need to be configured, funded
and managed to achieve reasonable and representative results considering such
environmental factors. In determining the population of control variables to use, the
ICMA Comparative Performance Measurement Program (more information in Appendix
C) includes a detail of those variables related to law enforcement services or control
variables (ICMA, 2011). These control variables are not manipulated as part of the
research similar to the independent variables or measured after a manipulation has
occurred similar to dependent variables. Certain control variables selected for the
sample population will also be utilized in an additional random sample of medians of the
United States to determine the variance between the sample population utilized in this
research and the overall medians of the United States. The control variables are
addressed in two categories: 1) Municipal bond ratings (uninsured) and 2) Other
demographic and socio-economic measures.
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Municipal Bond Ratings (Uninsured)
Municipal bond ratings are used as a measure to give existing and prospective
bond holders an assessment of risk for the debt obligation of the locality. The higher the
bond rating, the lower the risk of default. There are three primary bond rating agencies
recognized: Moody’s Investors Service, 2) Standard and Poor’s; and 3) Fitch Ratings.
The ratings scale vary slightly amongst the three rating agencies and are illustrated in
Table 3.6: Bond Rating Scales of Three Primary Rating Agencies, but generally range
from the highest and best rating of AAA to generally nine incremental lower ratings (WM
Financial, 2012). The rating variations for most localities municipal debt is within the first
ten incremental ratings and are classified as “investment grade” (Moody’s, 2009, p.1).
Some localities may not have issued debt or have acquired debt financing in
different manners (e.g., bank loans, state loans, insured bonds that default to AAA
through bond insurance) for which an uninsured bond rating does not exist. The rating
agencies generally base a bond rating on a composite of the following factors specific to
the local government: 1) Economic factors (e.g., unemployment rate, business
environment); 2) Debt factors which include outstanding debt burden ratios (e.g., debt
per capita, debt to assessed value, debt service to actual expenditures) and pay down
ratios of existing debt, which is how fast (measured in years) the principal portion of the
overall debt portfolio will be retired within five and ten years; 3) Administrative factors
(e.g., skilled and stable leaders); and 4) Financial factors (e.g., fund balance levels).
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Table 3.6: Bond Rating Scales of Three Primary Rating Agencies
Moody's

Standard &
Poor's

Fitch

Best Quality

Aaa

AAA

AAA

High Quality

Aa1
Aa2
Aa3

AA+
AA
AA-

AA+
AA
AA-

Upper Medium Grade

A1
A2
A3

A+
A
A-

A+
A
A-

Medium Grade

Baa1
Baa2
Baa3

BBB+
BBB
BBB-

BBB+
BBB
BBB-

Bond ratings for a locality’s debt issuance may receive a AAA bond rating for
factors not associated with the four previously mentioned factors. These higher bond
ratings are the result of bond insurance; an insurance program whereby a premium is
paid to bond insurance agencies to provide additional protections to bondholders in the
event of default. The insurance premium cost is generally proportional to how far the
locality’s actual underlying bond rating would have been from AAA. For example, a
locality that would have naturally received an A bond rating (underlying rating) would
pay a higher insurance premium for the AAA insured bond rating than an underlying AA
bond rated locality. Underlying ratings information is not made formally available to the
locality as they are not formally issued as part of the debt issuance process. Because
these insured AAA bond ratings are not representative of the fiscal health of a locality,
the proper measure for bond ratings are uninsured bond ratings.
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In best positioning the sample using the variable of bond ratings, the data
analysis will utilize one of the rating agencies – Moody’s Investors Services. The
rationale of focusing more specifically on those local governments with bond ratings at
A or above, would then be based upon the following factors: 1) 3,104 of the 3,197 local
governments (> 97%) that have bond uninsured ratings, have such ratings at or greater
than A bond rating (Moody’s, 2012); 2) Sufficient size and scope enabling a more
complete array of data to be compiled (e.g., citizen surveys, crime statistics, budgetary
information); and 3) Opportunity for HPO-based policies and practices to be developed,
implemented and monitored.
As ordinal scales are developed for the statistical analysis, a no rating
connotation therefore does not mean that it is below an A rating. However, because
there appears to be correlations through observation between governments of a lower
size and scope and no or uninsured bond ratings, the no rating connotation may be
suitable for such statistical purposes.
As Figure 3.2: Adjusted Bond Rating Scale illustrates, the incremental changes in
the bond rating scale are not linear, but rather have higher incremental interest rate
savings between lower bond rating scale improvements (e.g., A to AA), then changes
between higher bond rating scale improvements (e.g., AA to AAA). Therefore, in
assigning a scaled value to the bond rating, each of the incremental ordinal values (1
through 7) will be subject to an inverse transformation as such a linear scale better
reflects the change in incremental bond rating changes. For example the value of 1
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converts to 0, 2 converts to .69, 3 coverts to 1.1, 4 converts to 1.39, 5 converts to 1.61,
6 converts to 1.79 and 7 converts to 1.95.

Figure 3.2: Adjusted Bond Rating Scale
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Additional Control Variables (Demographic, Socio-Economic and Other Measures)
The following additional control variables are available from the United States
Census and will be used in helping frame comparative analysis amongst similar
localities that may have a different independent variable of collective bargaining. For
many of these variables, the U.S. Census five-year estimate 2006 - 2010 is utilized as
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the source. This range actually matches well to the sample’s reporting period of 2002 –
2011.


Population (000): This is the demand statistic for a local government’s law
enforcement services. The size of the population in prior research has been
correlated to higher crime statistics from a per capita and related demand
statistic perspective (Ellis, Beaver and Wright, 2009). In order to ensure
consistency, population variable was derived from the U.S. Census and its 2011
estimate. Efforts were made to determine if there are other factors that warrant
including additional demand traits in addition to the population. Examples would
include hotel rooms which may better reflect tourist or business destinations and
the impact that they may bring upon law enforcement. Another example is the
number employees in the locality as law enforcement services need to provide
coverage to citizens and businesses; and the public safety risk activities that can
be associated with certain businesses. However, because of inability to get
consistent and reliable data for either hotel rooms or number of employees, such
demand measures were not included. In order to not have the impact of small
population localities distort data results, a minimum population threshold of 5,000
was considered, but further scrutiny of the data in < 5,000 localities will be done
in Chapter 4 – Findings to determine if removing such data influences results.
This is because “communities with small populations, and subsequently small
law enforcement forces, usually do not have law enforcement unions and yet
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experience a higher proportionate level of law enforcement service expenditures”
(Valetta, 1989, p. 433). As part of the data analysis, all surveyed localities will
initially be included, but reviewed to determine if outliners that may affect the
analysis are present with the smaller populated localities. Varying demographics
of a locality can be a significant variable that influences the size and scope of a
law enforcement organization. A related correlating demographic trait is rural vs.
urban (which is also addressed in density measure) and size of population;
whereby expenditures are higher in an urban environment (Feuille and Delaney,
1986) and increases at higher rates as the population increases (Gely and
Chandler, 1993). The population variable was converted to a 1000 unit measure
(population/1000) so as to have the unstandardized coefficient value be in a
more understandable number.


Education Level (High School Graduates): An education level of the citizens
may influence the need for law enforcement services. An increase in the
educational level significantly reduces subsequent violent and property crimes
with numerous other positive impacts upon the community (Lochner, 2008). The
threshold for education level for this research will be the percentage of population
over the age of 25 with a high school diploma or greater per the U.S. Census
five-year estimate 2006-2010 (national average is 85.4%). Research indicates
that about 75% of America’s state prison inmates, 59% of federal inmates and
69% of jail inmates did not complete high school with these statistics increasing
over prior years (Harlow, 2003). A commonly-used demographic that has mixed
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correlations

is

education

and

law

enforcement

expenditures.

While

generalizations can be made that a lower educated citizenry may yield higher
crime potential, as it pertains to expenditures, a Chandler and Gely (1995) study
did not correlate education and expenditures. The mixed results may be
attributable to a higher educated citizenry may be more understanding of law
enforcement constraints and willing to commit higher law enforcement
expenditures in providing for an even safer and more secure community.
Chandler and Gely (1995) positively correlated the link of increasing percentage
of residents with a high school education to the increased wages of law
enforcement personnel. The education level may also be highly correlated to the
employment potential of the citizen. In addition, as a person becomes further
educated, they should have greater capacities to understand consequences of
criminal activity and would therefore not engage in such activity. As noted under
employment rate, the additional time that is spent occupied with a positive activity
(e.g., school), reduces the idle time that could contribute to association with
those with criminal intentions.


Wealth (Median Household Income (000)): Median household incomes, per the
U.S. Census 2006-2010 five-year estimate, can provide a perspective of the
relative wealth of a locality (national average $52,762). “Income inequality has
been found to contribute significantly to increases in crime” (Hsieh and Pugh,
1993). The wealth of a locality may also enable it to contribute to other factors
that not only stem the increase of crime, but also provide an environment for
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crime deterrence. An example may be higher taxes from a wealthier tax base
that may contribute additional resources to law enforcement; not just additional
law enforcement officers, but also in the various equipment and technologies that
better enable deterrence and clearance of crimes committed. Another example of
a wealthier tax base is additional security measures that can be afforded by
citizens and businesses (e.g., home alarm systems, surveillance cameras,
contracted security officers). These additional security measures can not only
deter crimes from occurring, but also enable higher clearance rates through more
timely notifications to law enforcement of a crime in progress or incriminating
evidence via video or pictures of perpetrator. Median household income variable
was converted to a 1000 unit measure (median household income/1000) so as to
have the unstandardized coefficient value be a more understandable number.


Density: This represents population per square miles per the U.S. Census for
2010 and can affect services that are more associated with density (national
average 87.4 persons per square mile). Examples include: 1) Response times
(although excluded as a performance measure because of comparability issued
previously noted, it may factor into survey results); 2) Higher probability for calls
for service (e.g., neighbor’s noise complaints); and 3) Type of community (e.g.,
urban, suburban, rural). However, the correlation to density and crime are not
apparent from research conducted. Keith Harries (2006) concluded that in
analysing a variety of density measures across communities, that there was no
evidence of a differential between property and violent crimes based on
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population density (Harries, 2006). As it is correlated to how often people come
into contact with one another, Witt (1990, p. 171) concluded that population
density was one of the most “influential variables” that influences law
enforcement expenditures.


Unemployment Rate: Local governments need for law enforcement services
may change based upon the unemployment rate. Policies designed to increase
employment in cities and related studies have illustrated a positive correlation to
higher employment and reduction in crime (Winter-Ebmer and Raphael, 2012).
Examples often cited for this correlation include the responsibilities that are
associated with a job and the wages earned by the employee cause the
employee to be a more law abiding citizen. If the employee’s wages can provide
for the needs of the employee and their family (e.g., food, shelter, clothing) as
well as some luxuries (e.g., vacation, entertainment), then the employed citizen
should not want to risk such provisions in committing a crime. Another
contributing factor is simply time as the employed citizen’s additional forty hours
plus per week is hours that are not otherwise spent idle and subject to criminal
influences of others who may not be employed. In order to ensure consistency
amongst the sample population, the U.S. Census 2006-2010 five-year estimate
for unemployment rate will be utilized (national average is 8.7% unemployment
rate).



Age (% Between 15 to 24): Local governments need for law enforcement
services may change based upon the age of its population. For this research, the
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age factor utilized is the population % between 15 to 24 years per the 2010 U.S.
Census as the older (and younger) the population, the volume and severity of the
crimes committed decreases (national average 13.5%). After age 24, a steep
drop in criminal activity occurs as people take-on new roles (e.g., wage-earner,
parent, spouse) and the possibility of jail time becomes a relatively more-serious
matter because of the impact it will have on the perpetrators life and
responsibilities (Sociology.org, 2012). As the US Census data for population is
segmented into different strata every five years, there is the ability to segment
the population for those above and below the age of 24.


Survey Question - Quality of Life: Being able to segment the sample
population’s overall perception of quality of life may provide analytical results
showing variances amongst local governments, independent variables and
dependent variables. In addition, correlations between quality of life and survey
results of law enforcement noted previously can also be analyzed. The NCS
survey questions regarding law enforcement were previously addressed under
dependent variables, but the following NCS survey question about quality of life
is included as a control variable (NRC, 2011): “Please rate the overall quality of
life” (potential answers are “excellent, “good,” “fair, “poor” or “don’t know). For the
purposes of compiling results in this category “excellent” and “good” were
combined as a result for positive quality of life measure. The “don’t know”
attribute amongst the sample ranged from 0% - 4.8% (only three localities were >
2.5%), but because such response rates were not included in the positive
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measure and because such rates were so low, there appears to be no effect of
such response category on the positive quality of life citizen rating.


Right-to-Work States: While the independent variable properly distinguishes
between unionized and non-unionized law enforcement unions, some of these
unions are permitted in right-to-work states and in some non-right-to-work states,
there may not be a law enforcement union. As noted in Chapter 2 – Review of
the Literature, it has been a state’s right to determine whether or not to permit
collective bargaining (and the related unions needed to represent the worker) for
local government employees and law enforcement officers. The threshold of
enabling a union first divides each state into “right-to-work” (twenty-three states)
and “agency shops” (twenty-seven states), whereby two tiers exist for the rightto-work states: 1) The state, generally through its constitution (six states) or
legislative code (seventeen states), defines whether or not a union can be
established and if so, does it also enable public sector unions and if so, does it
enable law enforcement unions which results in seven right-to-work states having
law enforcement unions; and 2) If it does enable unions, then it can also define
the employee’s right to join such union and the benefits that even a non-union
employee receives from the union. The utilization of this attribute may illustrate if
there are any variances in performance as a result of a state being classified as
right-to-work state. As previously illustrated for Figure 2.4: Right-to-Work States
Map and Table 3.1: Collective Bargaining State Laws for Public Employees,
there appears to be a concentration of right-to-work states in the southeast
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corridor and then the Midwest states from Texas north to Minnesota. While the
right-to-work states are contiguous, as they stretch from Virginia to Nevada with
some contiguous states only one-state wide across the country. As a
comparison, the non-right-to-work states are virtually contiguous as well from
Maine to California except for two states along the way (Montana and Idaho).
The reason for this contiguous alignment of this many states may be the result of
similar political philosophies or similar competition for business and workers.


Form of Government (County, City, Other): There are three primary types of
local government structures: City, County and Town (includes all others as well
(e.g., borough, parish)). They are reflected in Table 3.7: Governments in the
United States (Census, 2002). Within each type of government, there may be a
different manner in how the government is structured and managed which could
contribute to variability in how performance is achieved. In order to account for
the known variability of certain states whereby there are no overlapping
jurisdictions of city and county (e.g., Virginia), county information will be further
segmented between counties whose area is comprised of cities and/or towns or if
there are no such 100% overlapping jurisdictions. The U.S. Census reflects the
definition of City, County or Town as part of its data resource by locality. For
purposes of defining the population, those identified as “county”, “municipal” or
“town” would total 38,967; however as noted previously, because of overlapping
services amongst two and possibly three local governments, the actual number
of law enforcement organizations would accordingly be much lower. Further
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classification on the number of local government law enforcement organizations
(total 15,564) was previously addressed under Accreditation - CALEA; therefore,
on average, there are about 2.5 local governments for every 1 law enforcement
agency.
Table 3.7: Governments in the United States
Type

Number

Federal

1

State

50

County

3,034

Municipal (city, town, village...) *

19,429

Township (in some states called Town) ** 16,504
School district

13,506

Special purpose
35,052
(utility, fire, law enforcement, library, etc.)
Total

87,576

* Municipalities are any incorporated places (e.g., cities, towns, villages, boroughs)
**New England, New York and Wisconsin towns are classified as civil townships for census
purposes

There are two primary structures of local government: 1) Mayor-council; and 2)
Council-manager. For mayor-council, voters elect both a mayor (who may also serve as
the chief executive) and a city council and for council-manager, voters elect a city
council (and possibly an independent mayor) to make public policy for the city, but the
city council, in turn, appoints a professional city manager to serve as chief executive of
the city and to administer public policy (Lineberry, 2012). The type and structure of local
government may influence the type of law enforcement services needed. For the
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purposes of this research, only the type of government will be captured for the sample
size.

Sampling Process and Data Collection
A quantitative approach is taken in this research because of its nominal-level
measurement. Quantitative approach represents numeric description on some subset of
the population through data collection process which “enables a researcher to
generalize the findings” (Creswell, 2009, p. 117). Through an exploratory crosssectional study utilizing SPSS, the data collection is a compilation of information
generally available for local governments that can be further analyzed. In this type of
research study, the entire population of the National Citizens Survey (NCS) local
government participants was selected; which is a subset of the local government total
population. It is from this population selected that data is collected to help answer the
research question. It is called cross-sectional because the information about X and Y
that is gathered represents what is going on at only one point in time; and in this case it
would be the year of the most recent survey and related dependent and control
variables in relatively close proximity to such survey date (Olsen and St. George, 2004).
The subjects will be a sample of local governments.
As the demographics and related control variables are accumulated for the
survey group, efforts will be made to compare characteristics of the survey group to
other local governments. This will help evaluate the representativeness of the survey
group to local governments as a whole or better define what subset of local
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governments the survey group may better represent. While there are over 30,000 local
governments (including counties, cities and towns) according to the United States
Census in 2002, the survey population of 238 was selected. In Chapter 4 - Findings,
additional information is provided regarding many of the variables to help illustrate how
the sample size compares to the population of local governments in this cross-sectional
study.
Additional techniques are needed to ensure the data is accurate and suitable for
comparability as part of the analysis stage. The techniques to be deployed include the
following:


Coding System: Because of the various data sources, a coding system will need
to be constructed to proportionally align the variances amongst data within its set
criteria and to also not proportionally distort it with data from another criteria data
source.



Expenditure Reporting: Uniformity of expenditure reporting would need to be
conducted to ensure that disparities, if any, between the manners in which local
governments classify expenditures can be accounted for and adjusted
accordingly.

Design
Construct validity is a means of assessing how well the measures being used
assert themselves to be the proper measures. Through use of independent authoritative
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sources of performance indicators and traditional sources of citizen surveys, the
measures appear to be the proper measures.
Through the use of statistical analysis, construct validity can further be analyzed.
The primary manners in which data was analyzed are as follows:


Linear Regression: Linear Regression estimates the coefficients of the linear
equation, involving one or more independent variables that best predict the value
of the dependent variable (SPSS, 2009). Linear regression will be utilized for
each of the hypothesis with focus on the beta standardized coefficient, t-scores
and significance of the t test. As part of the output from the linear regression, the
following focused areas helped determine the relationship of the independent
variable and control variables to the each of the dependent variables (unless
otherwise noted, definition sources are SPSS, 2009):
o

R Score: A Pearson’s correlation (also referenced as r) will illustrate a
number between negative 1 (absolute negative correlation) and 1
(absolute positive correlation) with a 0 serving as an absolute no
correlation. As a general guideline of r and correlation is (positive or
negative, as applicable): 1) None from .0 to .09; 2) Small from .1 to .3; 3)
Medium from .3 to .5; and 4) Strong from .5 to 1; however, it should be
cautioned that there is no universally accepted measure for correlation
with regards to this statistic (Buda and Jarynowski, 2010). Another manner
in which to evaluate the r strength of correlation is from Berman (2002)
with strong = > .40 and very strong > .65 (Berman, 2002).
152

o

Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) – F Value: The ANOVA F–test (of the nullhypothesis that all treatments have exactly the same effect) is
“recommended as a practical test, because of its robustness against many
alternative distributions” (Moore and McCabe, 2003, p 763). The F Value
is the value used to determine if the variances of the two distributions
differ significantly from each other.

o

Collinearity Statistic – Variance Inflation Factor (VIF): Multicollinearity
refers to the “presence of highly inter-correlated predictor variables in
regression models, and its effect is to invalidate some of the basic
assumptions underlying their mathematical estimation” and colllinearity
diagnostics measure how much “regressors are related to other
regressors and how this affects the stability and variance of the regression
estimates” (StatPac, 2013). VIF quantifies the severity of multicollinearity
through an index that measures how much the variance (the square of the
estimate's standard deviation) of an estimated regression coefficient is
increased because of colllinearity. Having a low VIF score (< 3.0) is a
good indication that the variables subject to the test are good fit amongst
the variables being compared against as part of the statistical test.
Therefore, for VIFs below 3.0, further statistical analysis will be performed
on the variable.

o

Significance: Probability that a particular correlation could occur by chance
with a significance <.05 reflecting that there is less than a 5% probability
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that the relationship occurred by chance. Therefore, for purposes of
statistical analysis, further focus of the variable will be on the output
calculations that have a .05 value or less. For output calculations that
have a > .05 value, such additional focus is not warranted as there is a
higher probability that the relationship occurred by chance.
o

t test (independent sample): A comparison of two sample populations
measured against one common variable (e.g., dependent variable) to
determine if the means of the two sample populations differ significantly
from each other as there is no overlap of membership between the two
sample groups. The actual calculation of the t test is the difference
between the means (shown as unstandardized coefficient B) divided by
the standard error.

o

Standardized Coefficient – Beta: The number of standard deviations a
dependent variable will change, per standard deviation increase in the
independent or control variable being examined and because this
coefficient is standardized, the comparisons between variables can be
performed easier. This accounts for variables that are measured in
different units of measurement (e.g., dollars, percent change, numbers, or
values that may be stated in high values (population) or low values
(unemployment rate). For purposes of statistical analysis, the higher
standardized coefficient – beta scores reflect, the higher the impact of that
variable upon the dependent variable.
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o

Standard Error: The standard deviation divided by the square root of
sample (N) and is a measure of stability or sampling error of the sample
means.

o

Unstandardized Coefficient – B: Represents the unit’s change of 1 in the
independent or control variable and its effect on the mean of the
dependent variable. Because each of the independent or control variables
have different basis for their units (e.g., %, $ or #), the size of the B does
not necessarily reflect the significance of the change.



Descriptive Statistics: In order to ensure that the sample is representative of the
population, descriptive statistics (frequency tabulations for variables comprising
ordinal or nominal traits) and descriptive tabulations for variables comprising
scale traits (mean) are utilized.

Threats to Reliability and Validity (Internal and External)

Internal validity is properly demonstrating the causal relationship between two
variables based upon three criteria as illustrated by Shadish, Cook and Campbell
(2002): 1): The "cause" precedes the "effect" in time (temporal precedence); 2) The
"cause" and the "effect" are related (co-variation); and 3) There are no plausible
alternative explanations for the observed co-variation. For each of the hypotheses, the
independent variable is law enforcement collective bargaining and its effect on
performance, cost and HPRC. In best testing the “cause” (collective bargaining) on
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effects, it would be important to define appropriate time horizons through which the
introduction of the independent variable would rationally begin to illustrate changes in
the dependent variable (defined as five years or greater for purposes of this research).
While not a part of this research, time studies can illustrate those without any collective
bargaining and the subsequent impact to performance and costs at various time
intervals subsequent to the introduction of collective bargaining or removal of collective
bargaining.

However, an inherent challenge that can arise are other unknown variables that
may arise in the community to cause changes in performance or costs that are not
correlated to collective bargaining (or non-collective bargaining) localities; yet impacts of
such changes may disproportionately impact collective bargaining trait localities versus
non-collective bargaining localities. Examples would include: 1) National economic
conditions that impact communities and challenge sustainability of local programs,
which may lead to lower citizen satisfaction results or related lower performance
indicators; or 2) National or state issue arising (e.g., state judicial sentencing guideline
changes) that could change the demand indicators in sections of the country differently.
In order to better control for this effect, a cursory review was performed of state law
changes as they pertain to law enforcement or related factors that could be associated
with materially changing performance or cost results. As the recession’s effect are
virtually nationwide and because all the information and data obtained is relatively within
the same time period, there does not appear to internal validity concerns. There also
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does not appear to be any major state law enacted in past few years that would
influence the performance results. However, review of locality by locality law changes or
related factors, while a further diligent task to fully overcome this inherent internal
validity challenge, is impractical as part of this research of 255 localities.

Chava and David Nachmias (2007) identified additional attributes of internal
validity that could be assessed to ensure proper research design. These attributes have
either been incorporated as part of this research, have been excluded or are not
applicable. For attributes excluded (e.g., history impacts), such efforts to properly
account for each locality in the sample are beyond the scope of this research as it would
require a detailed knowledge about each of the surveyed localities that is not readily
available. The following Nachmias attributes do illustrate the strategies to respond to the
concerns that may arise in these variables (Nachmias, 2007):


Addressed as Part of this Research:
o Maturation impacts would need to be considered, especially if there is an
elongated time horizon between the introduction or removal of collective
bargaining and any performance or cost results. Because each locality in
the sample is in its current state of collective bargaining for five years or
greater, maturation impacts have been considered and addressed.
o Instrumental changes also have to be mitigated; therefore the tools of
measurement used as part of the initial research study are intended to be
replicated throughout the study. If certain improvements to these
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instruments are detected during the research, then an assessment would
be done to determine whether to apply an improved tool to all subjects
and variables, or simply to note such recommendations for improvement
for subsequent additional research on this topic.
o Selection bias will be mitigated by attempting to best ensure that the
demographics of local governments reviewed are classified similar. This
mitigates effects of one locality that may have a disproportional age,
education, income or other factors when compared to another local
government.
o Experimental mortality factors are mitigated by the relative non-transition
nature of local governments and collective bargaining agreements during
the period of this research which is accessing data over the prior one –
three years generally. The adversity of this factor is further mitigated as all
data captured for independent and dependent variables will be within the
same time horizon.


Not Addressed as Part of this Research:
o History impacts can be controlled through a checklist of major events,
internal or external to a local government or community, which would
impact the validity of research. This could include not just natural
disasters, but also severe economic conditions, that would affect the
relationship of the variables, or perhaps delay or accelerate any
correlating effect. While efforts were made to determine if any of the
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localities sampled suffered from national newsworthy events, the ability to
know detailed local news over the past few years for each of the sampled
localities is beyond the scope of this research.


Not Applicable as Part of this Research:
o Regression artifacts should not be applicable with this study as it is not
the intention to determine extreme outliners whose impacts towards
regressing to the mean may arise from any introduction of an independent
variable or even an external variable. However, it is assumed that those
who respond to customer satisfaction surveys are deemed to be not 100%
apathetic or passive, but rather have some traits of engagement and
desire to respond to satisfaction surveys.
o Selection-maturation interaction is not expected to impact the research
as the duration is of such a short time period that any physical attribute
changes that would occur would be minor and is further mitigated by the
non-relevance of such factors upon the variables being examined (e.g.,
hair color is not a relevant variable being studied nor an external threat to
captured informational results).
External validity, which is not disjointed from internal validity, is concerned with

the causal inferences made from experiment groups to the population as a whole. As
the effort was made in selecting the localities appropriately for this research and
capturing the demographic profiles behind such subject matters for appropriate
groupings, the transferability of results should occur. Cross sectional studies, as
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opposed to longitudinal data, can have the effect of “generalizability of the results” being
constrained, and definitively “causality cannot be conclusively stated” (Putchinisky,
2007, p. 238). However, for purposes of further illustrating external validity, traditional
quantitative defenses are addressed.


Selection of the local governments studied would be a representative sample
of local governments and not subject to which local governments “volunteer”
to be studied; which is often a concern with external validity. Although the
sample is derived from those local governments that elect to participate in a
survey, such participants are assumed to participate in the survey to meet or
satisfy their own local government desire for information far beyond that of
just law enforcement services. In addition, the ability to segment similar
demographic and socio-economic local governments helps mitigate relative
external validity concerns.



Measurement effects are mitigated in a similar manner as previously noted
under instrument effects of internal validity.



Confounded treatment effects are mitigated by focusing on the incremental
changes between the dependent variable based upon the independent
variable with efforts to include those in the sample that have varying levels of
dependent variable attributes of performance and costs. Therefore, the risk of
generalization of one group (e.g., those with low performance) to an entire
population of local governments is mitigated.
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Situational effects are mitigated as the subjects are local governments and
their citizens, all subject to the same scope and duration of study.



Effects due to differential mortality are mitigated in a similar manner as noted
under internal validity.

Reliability is the consistency in a set of measurements of the actual measuring
instrument. Reliability is not to be confused with validity, as reliability seeks to ensure
that what is being measured is being measured consistently without regard to whether it
is the right variable to measure. Therefore, with regards to this research design, the
consistency is the application of the same set of parameters of questions to answer
through research for each and every local government studied.

Conceptual Framework and Concept Map
The conceptual framework best illustrates the research problem and the
beginning of the pathway by which such problem can be researched properly. In order
to help frame the background and mindset of the researcher, Appendix A includes a
Research Identity Memo. As noted previously, research in the past focused primarily on
collective bargaining costs. In addition, this prior type of research inordinately focused
on the bureaucracy of unions and the time, stress, resources and compliance efforts
devoted to collective bargaining agreements. However, in this research, the ontological
(nature of existence) perspective is about general assumptions of what similar
groupings may occur. This will hopefully yield towards an epistemological knowledge161

based approach whereby an understanding of the actual differentiations that exist
between the two types of workplaces.
From this conceptual framework, goals were further refined and a realistic and
relevant mindset was sought in developing the research question. The following Figure
3.3: Concept Map illustrates the theory and the various relationships amongst the
concepts being captured as part of this research. The attributes of performance and
costs will be examined from both a collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining
perspective; then appropriately compared and contrasted.
Figure 3.3: Concept Map

Law Enforcement Services
(Lens: Rational Choice Theory)

Subject to
Collective
Bargaining

Yes (Mediation or Arbitration) -

No -

HPRC, Performance and Costs

HPRC, Performance and Costs

Compare and Analyze Results with Control Variables
Threats to Reliability and Validity (Internal and External)

162

In determining the array of research literature used, it was important to ensure
the validity and credibility of such documents. There are many sources for information
regarding public sector unions, their costs and performance, but underlying bias can be
expected to occur. This bias is directly associated with an author’s belief in the
necessity of public sector unions. In addition, HPO traits for the public sector can also
be skewed in documents to support the position of the author of such documents.
Therefore, it was important to ascertain that the documents are presented from a nonbiased perspective of the author, that any quantitative research is properly supported
and that the lens of qualitative research is not too narrowly focused upon a segment
that may not be representative of the environment.
The documents utilized were primarily research-based articles and books. Efforts
were made to find resources that compare and contrast collective bargaining and noncollective bargaining workforces and workplaces; with a focus on public sector unions
and, more specifically, law enforcement services. In addition, information was reviewed
as it pertains to generally accepted HPO traits and measures with emphasis on law
enforcement services. These traits and measures should be the same regardless of
whether it is from a collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining locality.
Validating the accuracy of findings can traditionally be performed via two of the
three permissible means (Creswell, 2005): 1) Triangulation (utilizing different sources);
2) Member checking (using participants to check the accuracy); and 3) External audit
(outside expert perspective). As this stage of the research project is simply data
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collection, triangulation and external audit are the only alternatives. However, even
triangulation has its limitations as data collection techniques were focused on limited
sources (e.g., survey, uniform crime reports, and census-based information). Therefore,
the external audit resources of the dissertation committee reviewing this project will
serve as an additional means to the validation of accuracy.

Data Variable Coding
For each of the variables noted the SPSS statistical variable classification, the
following traits were inputted for each of the 238 sample items.


Name: Variable name



Type: Other than “Locality Name” which is classified as a “string”, all variables
are classified as “numeric”



Width: The width is appropriate to capture the largest variable name for each
variable



Decimals: All “numeric” classified variables have been assigned a “0” decimal
point if represented in dollars or other non-percentage classification and a “1”
decimal point if a percentage



Label: Generally, the label has followed the “Name” classification noted
previously
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Value: All of the values are noted as “None” except for five of the variables
that have had a 0,1,2, etc. numeric assignment and appropriate description
noted as follows:
o Collective Bargaining Classification: Initially coded as 0 – none; 1 –
collective bargaining via mediation; and 2 – collective bargaining via
mandatory arbitration. However, for purposes of positioning the ordinal
data to be properly analyzed with linear regression via two variables (0
and 1), the workforce classification was recoded as follows: Mediation
(coded as 1) singularly identified and compared to non-collective
bargaining and arbitration (coded as 0); and arbitration (coded as 1)
singularly identified and compared to non-collective bargaining and
mediation (coded as 0).
o Accreditation: Initially coded as 0 – none; 1 – self-assessment; and 2 –
accredited, this coding was converted to a 100 point scale for purposes
of the composite performance measure calculation with an assignment
of 0 points for none, 50 points for self-assessment and 100 for
accreditation. This point assignment is meant to illustrate the complete
100 point variance between accreditation and non-accreditation, while
recognizing a high performance aspect and desire for self-assessment.
The even nature of the spread of 50 points to self-assessment and
another 50 points to accreditation is based upon an understanding of
the efforts taken to accomplish such a recognized task. There does not
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appear to be any quantitative research of assigning a linear 100-point
scale to levels of accreditation. However, a rationale can be applied to
stating that full accreditation is worthy of the highest point scale (100
and that not having any indication of any potential accreditation in the
short-term is worthy of the lowest point scale (0). Therefore, the only
subject measure may be self-assessment’s 50 point scale measure
and with only eight localities with such trait and the realization that
being self-assessed is neither accredited nor no accreditation, a 50
point scale appears reasonable.
o Bond Rating Adjustment Scale: Initially coded as 1 – no rating; 2 - < A;
3 – A; 4 – AA3; 5 – AA2; 6 - AA1; and 7 – AAA. As Figure 3.2:
Adjusted Bond Rating Scale illustrates, the incremental changes in the
bond rating scale are not linear, but rather have higher incremental
interest rate savings between lower bond rating scale improvements
(e.g., A to AA), then changes between higher bond rating scale
improvements (e.g., AA to AAA). Therefore, in assigning a scaled
value to the bond rating, each of the incremental ordinal values (1
through 7) will be subject to an inverse transformation as such a linear
scale better reflects the change in incremental bond rating changes.
For example the value of 1 converts to 0, 2 converts to .69, 3 coverts
to 1.1, 4 converts to 1.39, 5 converts to 1.61, 6 converts to 1.79 and 7
converts to 1.95.
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o Local Government: 1 – city; 2 – county; and 3 – other. However, for
purposes of positioning the nominal data to be properly analyzed via
two variables (0 and 1 for linear regression and related t-tests), the
local governments were coded in two different manners: County
(coded as 1) singularly identified and compared to city and other local
governments (coded as 0); and City (coded as 1) singularly identified
and compared to county and other local governments (coded as 0).
o Right-to-work: 0 – right-to-work state; and 1 – non-right-to-work state


Missing: All data variables have no missing data



Column: Appropriate width assigned to capture data results



Align: All variables are aligned right with the exception of locality name which
aligned left



Measure: All variables are aligned to scale as they represent an interval
manner in how data is recorded with each interval higher a proportional
difference between the prior interval with the following exceptions to the scale
classification (those with ordinal are labeled as such because as each interval
becomes higher it may not necessarily represent a proportional difference
between the higher variable and the lower variable:
o Locality Name: Nominal as it represent a word classification
o Collective Bargaining Classification: Ordinal
o Accreditation: Ordinal
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o Bond Rating: Initially recorded as ordinal, but as illustrated previously
with adjustments applied based upon actual interest rates amongst
different tiers of bond rating scale, an inverse transformation line better
illustrates a scale linear relationship
o Local Government: Nominal as it merely classifies each locality name
into city, county or other
o Right-to-work: Nominal as it merely classified each state into one of
two categories


Role: All variables are classified as “input”
Comparison of Sample Size to the Population

The comparison of the sample size to the population in this cross-sectional study
can be better confirmed via the comparison of many of the variables and their traits to
overall local government and related population statistics. Through such comparison, it
can better illustrate that the 238 sample size utilized for this research is representative
of the population; or at a minimum can be qualified accordingly and classified to better
represent a trait of the population. The sample size was compiled from the National
Citizens Survey (NCS) entire population of those localities that initiated with NCS to
perform a survey. The surveys of local governments reflect results 2002–2011, with the
most recent local government’s survey represented in the sample size. Because many
local governments benefit from cyclical surveys every 2-3 years, much of the sample
size reflects surveys conducted 2008-2011. This concentration 2008-2011 also
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correlates to the time frames utilized for crime rates, Census data, financial results and
other variables utilized in data analysis.
There may be an inherent bias in recognizing that higher performing or those
formally and publicly desiring to become higher performing would initiate such a survey
whereas lower performing or those not publicly wanting to capture such information may
not want to initiate such survey. The sample size comparability analysis was comprised
of frequency tabulations and descriptive tabulations; depending upon the variable and
its coding methodology.
Frequency Tabulations
Through SPSS, frequency tables were compiled on those variables assigned a
value classification (either nominal or ordinal). For Table 3.8: Workforce Classification
(independent variable), there is 68 with no collective bargaining (28.6% of total), 83 with
collective bargaining via mediation (34.9% of total) and 87 with collective bargaining via
mandatory arbitration (36.6% of total). As noted in Table 3.1: Collective Bargaining
State Laws for Law Enforcement Employees, the classification amongst states
illustrated the following composition: 1) No collective bargaining 36.0%; 2) Collective
bargaining via mediation 30.0%; and 3) Collective bargaining via mandatory arbitration
34.0%. Based upon the distribution of the sample size compared to the population, it
appears that the sample is representative of the population.
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Table 3.8: Workforce Classification
Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Non-Collective Barg.

68

28.6

28.6

28.6

Mediation

83

34.9

34.9

63.4

Arbitration

87

36.6

36.6

100.0

238

100.0

100.0

Valid
Total

Regarding national accreditation for law enforcement services, Table 3.9:
Accreditation (dependent variable) illustrates that those accredited were 19.3% of the
total sample while self-assessment process (defined by CALEA to be major step
towards national accreditation) was at 3.4% of the total sample – together both of these
represent 22.7% of the sample population. There are a total of 487 local government
law enforcement organizations with national accreditation (CALEA, 2012); of which 46
of those local governments were included in this sample. In addition, there are a total of
15,564 local government law enforcement agencies in total (US Census, 2009).
Comparing total national accreditation (487) to total law enforcement agencies (15,564)
indicates that 3.1% of all law enforcement agencies have national accreditation.
While the sample illustrates a much higher rate at 19.3%, it is recognized that
many of the 15,564 law enforcement agencies are small organizations that may not
have the resources (staff and funding) to comply with or initiate an accreditation
process. Also, as noted previously, there can be assumption that local governments
which initiate a citizen’s survey also have that same characteristic trait in pursuit of
many accreditations; including law enforcement.
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The sample’s 19.3% factor applied to the 487 accredited local government
organizations could calculate that of the 2,523 local governments (487/19.3%) that have
the ability to pursue and achieve national accreditation, 487 have achieved such
accomplishment. That statement has a rationale nexus that provides support that the
sample size does proportionately capture the same population traits of local law
enforcement organizations. As the top 1,000 cities of the United States ranks the 1000 th
ranked city (Cottonwood Heights UT) with a population of 35,394 in 2009
(biggestcities.com, 2009), it would appear that recognizing approximately 2,500 local
governments that have the size and scope of a local law enforcement organization to be
subject to this population trait for performance-related attributes is a reasonable
assumption.
As a further measure of the scope of local governments suitable for the
population, the bond rating control variable analyzed in the next section notes that there
are 4,240 local governments with an uninsured bond rating. The nationally accredited
law enforcement organizations (487) would represent 11.5% of total law enforcement
organizations (4,240) which is closer to the 19.3% of the sample population. The
differential between 19.3% and 11.5% can then be more narrowly rationalized to other
attributes already addressed (e.g., time and funding to comply; lower performing
electing to not participate; or preference of just having state accreditation).
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Table 3.9: Accreditation
Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

None
Self-Assessment

184

77.3

77.3

77.3

8

3.4

3.4

80.7

46

19.3

19.3

100.0

238

100.0

100.0

Valid
Accredited
Total

Table 3.10: Bond Rating (control variable) illustrates the distribution of bond
ratings amongst the sample size with 55 of the local governments (23.1% of the total)
having no bond rating. For those 76.9% of local governments with a bond rating, Aa2
was the most prevalent bond rating with 60 rated at Aa2 (25.2% of the total and 32.8%
of total with bond ratings). For the highest bond rating of Aaa, there were 22 rated Aaa
(9.2% of the total).
From the Moody’s Investors Services (2009) listing of all municipal bond ratings
there are 4,240 local governments with a bond rating. Comparing these totals with total
local governments previously noted, 10.9% of all local governments (4,240 total local
governments with bond ratings/38,967 total local governments) have a bond rating.
Based upon the distribution of those with and without bond ratings, the sample with
23.1% not having a bond rating compares to the national average of 89.1%. However,
using the 15,564 total local governments with law enforcement organizations, this
lowers the total without bond ratings from 89.1% down to 72.8%. In addition, for those
with a bond rating, selecting the most prevalent bond rating of Aa2, for which there are
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1,282 local governments representing 30.2% of the total of all bond ratings (1,282
Aa2/4,240 total bond ratings). This compares favorably with the previously noted 32.8%
of the sample with bond ratings of Aa2. The distribution amongst the other bond rating
categories appears to also compare favorably between the sample and population of
bond ratings.
The incremental changes in the bond rating scale are not linear, but rather have
higher incremental interest rate savings between lower bond rating scale improvements
(e.g., A to AA), then changes between higher bond rating scale improvements (e.g., AA
to AAA). Therefore, in assigning a scaled value to the bond rating, each of the
incremental ordinal values (1 through 7) was subject to an inverse transformation as
such a linear scale better reflects the change in incremental bond rating changes. Refer
to Table 3.6: Bond Rating Scales of Three Primary Rating Agencies and Figure 3.2:
Adjusted Bond Rating Scale for further information regarding scale and data coding.

Table 3.10: Bond Rating
Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

No Rating

55

23.1

23.1

23.1

<A

4

1.7

1.7

24.8

A

24

10.1

10.1

34.9

Aa3

44

18.5

18.5

53.4

Aa2

60

25.2

25.2

78.6

Aa1

29

12.2

12.2

90.8

Aaa

22

9.2

9.2

100.0

Total

238

100.0

100.0

Valid
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Table 3.11: Type of Local Governments (control variable) illustrates the
distribution between cities, counties and other (includes towns, villages, boroughs,
districts). As the sample had 14 counties (5.9% of the total sampled), it compares
favorably with the total population whereby counties represent 7.8% of the total local
governments. As states classify cities, towns, villages, boroughs in different manners for
statistical tracking in census data, the sample’s classification of city was only noted
when the term “city” was part of the local government name; otherwise it was classified
as “other.” The differentiation between county and city-other is a more important
distinction as there are counties that may perform a variety of law enforcement services
within their overlapping cities, towns, villages and boroughs rather than overlapping
jurisdictions amongst the non-counties.

Table 3.11: Type of Local Governments
Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

City

191

80.3

80.3

80.3

County

14

5.9

5.9

86.1

Other

33

13.9

13.9

100.0

Total

238

100.0

100.0

Valid

Table 3.12: Non-Right-to-work States (control variable) indicates a distribution by
state between right-to work states (46.2% of sample) and those states without right-towork provisions (53.8% of sample). Generally, the differentiation is that in non-right-towork states, the state laws are more favorable towards the collective bargaining process
and/or related workforce classification practices for public and private sector workers.
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Previously, Figure 2.4: Right-to-Work States Map illustrated 23 states (46.0% of total)
with right-to-work classification and 27 without such classification (54.0% of total).
Based upon the close proximity between the sample’s distribution between these two
classifications and the population of all states, it appears the sample is representative in
this control variable.

Table 3.12: Non-Right-to-work States
Frequency

Percent

Valid Percent

Cumulative
Percent

Valid

Right-to-Work

110

46.2

46.2

46.2

Non-Right-to-Work

128

53.8

53.8

100.0

Total

238

100.0

100.0

Descriptive Tabulations
Descriptive tabulation is a SPSS statistical term used to capture traits about a
sample variable. Generally, it measures the minimum, maximum, median and standard
deviation of a data set. While frequencies in the previous section help determine
correlations of nominal or ordinal data of sample to population, descriptive tabulations
help determine correlations of sample variables that are classified as “scale.” For the
purposes of this section, Table 3.13: Other Control Variables Descriptive Statistics
captures seven other control variables that are classified as “scale.” For each of these
control variables, a brief analysis of comparison of the sample that yielded these
statistics to the total population follows the table.
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Table 3.13: Other Control Variables Descriptive Statistics
Population

Bond Rating

High School

Median HH

(000)

Adj Scale

Graduates

Inc (000)

Density

Unemployment

Age15to24%

Rate

SurveyQuality of
Life

Mean
N
Std.
Deviation



86.81

1.1827

.8915

59.03

2378.68

.0784

.1566

.7556

238

238

238

238

238

238

238

238

156.589

.69472

.06234

21.716 1615.734

.02700

.09233

.15846

Population (000): Nationally, the mean population amongst all local governments
is 7,900 or amongst all local law enforcement organizations are 19,789. The
larger sample mean of 86,814 population is mainly attributable to the many small
cities and towns that would not meet thresholds to initiate a citizen’s survey as
previously noted. However, in converting this variable to a more comprehensible
variable in the statistical analysis, population is divided by 1000 which yields a
mean of 86.8.



Bond Rating Adjusted Scale: As previously noted in converting the bond rating
scale to a more representative interval between bond ratings (Table 3.6: Bond
Rating Scales of Three Primary Rating Agencies), an inverse transformation was
performed. The mean of this adjusted scale is 1.18 (which is slightly higher than
a bond rating of A (at 1.10) and further below that of the next higher rating of AA3
(at 1.39).



High School Graduates: Nationally, the mean high school graduate portion of the
population is 85.4% (US Census, 2012) which compares to the sample mean of
89.1% (shown in SPSS analysis as .891).
176



Median Household Income: Nationally, the median household income of $52,762
(US Census, 2012) compares to the sample mean of $59,026. However, in
converting this variable to a more comprehensible variable in the statistical
analysis, median household income is divided by 1000 which yields a mean of
59.0.



Density: Nationally, the mean density of the United States is 87 persons per
square mile (US Census, 2012) which compares to the sample mean of 2,378.
The disparate nature of this comparison is most likely the result of such large
land acreage and rural areas outside of traditional cities and towns; however,
additional statistical analysis relating to this variance in regards to this measure is
not readily available.



Unemployment Rate: Nationally, the mean unemployment rate is 9.9% (US
Census, 2012) which compares to the sample mean of 7.8% (shown in SPSS
analysis as .078). The differential between these two statistics may be
attributable to the sample not including the local governments where
unemployment characteristics were higher and volatile during the recessionary
times during the 2010 census. Another example may include larger cities, which
were adversely impacted during the recession and significantly influence the
national unemployment rate, but were not generally part of the sample. For
example, the top three cities in the sample population only ranked 9th, 11th and
27th amongst the top populated cities (US Census, 2012).
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Age 15-24%: Nationally, the % of the population between 15-24 years of age is
14.7% (Nationsencyclopedia.com, 2013) which compares to the sample mean of
15.7% (shown in SPSS analysis as .157).



Survey – Quality of Life: The mean result of the sample’s survey question in
regards to quality of life illustrated a mean 75.7% favorable rating (shown in
SPSS analysis as .757). As there is no overall quality of life survey question
measure amongst local governments, comparison to this statistic to national
indicators is not possible.

Based upon the preceding comparisons, it appears that the control variables in
the sample reflect well compared to the population’s similar variables; unless otherwise
noted. For those that had larger differentials between the sample median and the total
population’s

median

or

comparable

statistic

(e.g.,

population,

density

and

unemployment rate), additional information was provided to rationalize such differential.
Therefore, based upon the statistical information yielded in the preceding section’s
frequency tabulations and this section’s descriptives tabulation, it appears that the
sample size is a representative subgroup of the variable traits of the population. This
representativeness will further validate that the sample’s research in testing the null
hypothesis can be translated to the population regarding correlations, but as noted
previously, not causations. This also further illustrates the reliability and validity of the
sample data in performing such research.
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In addition, based upon the preceding analysis of all of the control variables (via
VIF analysis), it appears that there is no bias in the sample in regards to socioeconomic and related factors between the varying levels of workforce classification and
the underlying samples in each of these classifications.
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS
Background
The examination of correlation, if any, between law enforcement workforce
classification and performance, costs and associated HPRC was performed in Chapter
4 – Findings. Though SPSS linear regression, statistical analysis was performed for
each of the dependent variables compared to the independent and control variables.
The control variables were accumulated and analyzed in helping determine the
comparability of data amongst the three independent variable classifications (associated
with workforce classification): 1) Non-collective bargaining (what the following variables
of mediation and arbitration are being compared to); 2) Collective bargaining through
mediation (included in the model); and 3) Collective bargaining through mandatory
arbitration (included in the model).
The control variables were reviewed to determine the representativeness of the
sample to the entire population of local law enforcement organizations. This was
accomplished via two manners: Research design control and statistical control. For
research design control, a representative cross-section of many types of localities was
selected (as the entire data set of National Citizen Survey participants was utilized) so
that the results are more generalizable to the whole population of localities. For
statistical control, the various control variables were specifically selected (e.g.,
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population, bond ratings, density) and statistically analyzed to ensure that such
variables are not linked to the differences between results of the hypothesis being
tested (performance, cost, and high performance return on costs).
As the hypotheses are the basis from which this research is conducted and
findings are emulated, they are illustrated again below:


Law Enforcement Performance Hypotheses (1)
o Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when
compared to non-collective bargaining
o Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when
compared to non-collective bargaining



Law Enforcement Cost Hypotheses (2)
o Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to noncollective bargaining
o Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to noncollective bargaining



Law Enforcement Higher Performance Return on Costs Hypotheses (3)
o Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining
o Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining

As part of the findings, the results may be based upon the result of random
chance rather than an actual relationship between the variables; therefore the
hypothesis is neither proven nor rejected as part of this research. Because the research
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is focused on correlation (positive or negative relationship) and not causation, the
hypothesis cannot be confirmed as definitively true or false (SPSS, 2009). Rather, a null
hypothesis (no relationship) is formulated that will either be rejected or fail to be rejected
as that is the only manner of supporting a hypothesis – by refuting (nullifying) a null
hypothesis (McDonald, 2009). A deductive valid rejection of a null hypothesis may
occur, yet not achieve a deductively valid affirmation of it. The examination of how all of
these variables are possibly correlated or not is the goal of this research and possible
considerations of future research if certain correlations emerge. Therefore, the following
null hypotheses have been formulated:


Law Enforcement Performance Null Hypotheses (1)
o Null Hypothesis 1A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when
compared to non-collective bargaining
o Null Hypothesis 1B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when
compared to non-collective bargaining



Law Enforcement Cost Null Hypotheses (2)
o Null Hypothesis 2A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to noncollective bargaining
o Null Hypothesis 2B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to noncollective bargaining



Law Enforcement Higher Performance Return on Costs Null Hypotheses (3)
o Null Hypothesis 3A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining
o Null Hypothesis 3B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining
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Dependent Variables Mean and Standard Deviation
In order to gauge the impact of a unit change from the various independent and
control variables upon the effect of the three dependent variables, Table 4.1: Dependent
Variables Mean and Standard Deviation illustrates the mean for each of the dependent
variables. The performance composite measure mean is 46.7, law enforcement
expenses per capita mean is $236.32 and the high performance return on costs (HPRC)
mean is 27.3. For purposes of evaluating, performance composite measures higher
than the mean are higher measures (higher performance), law enforcement expenses
per capita below the mean are better measures (lower cost) and HPRC ratios higher
than mean are better measures (higher ratio). The standard deviations amongst all
three of the variables also illustrate a good variance amongst the data to be tested.

Table 4.1: Dependent Variables Mean and Standard Deviation

Report

Mean
N
Std. Deviation

PerformCompos

LE Exp per

ite

Capita

HPRC

46.4790

236.32

27.2854

238

238

238

13.24954

97.827

35.93457

The subsequent coefficient tables computed will illustrate the effect of a one unit
change (noted as B) in the variable leads to a “factor” variable change in the dependent
variable under review. This can also be illustrated in the sample equation y (dependent
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variable under review) = a (constant) + b1X1 (mediation independent variable) + b2X2
(arbitration independent variable). The t score = b/standard error and is correlated to the
significance with any scores <.05 viewed as a significant as it correlates to a 95%
confidence level. For significance factors > .05, no further analysis was performed as
any other calculated results are more probable to have occurred by chance and not by
correlation.
Each of the three hypotheses subject areas, each having two hypothesis
statements per subject area, will be addressed separately. As the first subject area set
of hypotheses focuses on performance and the second set focuses on cost, the third set
focus on the correlation between performance and cost via high performance return on
costs (HPRC). As each of the statistical tables are able to capture the A and B subject
areas of the hypothesis for each of the hypotheses subject areas, there is only one
statistical analysis needed per subject area as all of the non-independent variables can
be analyzed as part of one analysis. This is because the all of the data output statistics
for the non-independent variables result us the same numbers being generated.
However, the A and B independent variables of each hypothesis, arbitration (A) and
mediation (B), will each be analyzed via narrative analysis separately in testing of the
null hypothesis.
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Hypotheses 1A and 1B: Findings and Null Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification
of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to non-collective
bargaining


Null Hypothesis 1A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to
non-collective bargaining

Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification
of mediation and higher performance attributes when compared to non-collective
bargaining


Null Hypothesis 1B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when compared to
non-collective bargaining
As noted in Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology, the composite

performance measure (includes survey, crime rates (violent and property) and
accreditation factors) was calculated for each of the local governments in the sample.
This composite performance measure was then analyzed via SPSS linear regression.
Table 4.2: Composite Performance Measure illustrates the following:


Model Summary – r square: .603 which indicates on average the model’s
predictions are 60% better than guessing the mean. The small variance between
the r square (.603) and adjusted r square (.580) are also indicative of good model
of data producing results (adjusted r square is 3.8% less than r square).



ANOVA – F value: 26.223 and significance of .000 which indicates that the
overall model produces better results than simply guessing the mean.
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VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst
the variables. Low scores indicate that the independent variables are not heavily
inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.



Coefficients:
o Significant (<.05): Median household income, density, age, survey quality,
city, county and mediation all appear to be significant.
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-statistic (of those noted as
significant) are listed in the following order of greatest relationship:


Median household Income ($000) (beta .389 and t-statistic 5.985)
with an unstandardized coefficient B of .24 indicates that for every
unit change of $1000 in the median household income (mean 59.0
($000) or $59,000), there is a .24 increase in the composite
performance index (mean 46.5).



Survey Quality of Life (beta .363 and t-statistic 5.354) with an
unstandardized coefficient B of 30.363 indicates that for every unit
change of 1 in the survey – quality of life score (mean .76); there is
a 30.363 increase in the composite performance index (mean
46.5). A better way to illustrate is for every unit change of .1 (10%)
in survey quality of life score, there is a 3.0 increase to the
composite performance index.



Age (beta .170 and t-statistic 3.461) with an unstandardized
coefficient B of 24.5 indicates that for every unit change of 1 in age
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15-24% (mean .16); there is a 24.5 increase to the composite
performance index (mean 46.5). A better way to illustrate is for
every unit change of .1 (10%) in age 15-24%, there is a 2.5
increase to the composite performance index. This result may
appear to be counter-intuitive as it was previously noted a
correlation of this age bracket and higher probability for crimes
committed. However, other mitigating circumstances may lend
themselves to higher performance. Examples could include: 1)
Higher proportion in an older age bracket; or 2) More citizenfriendly survey responses for those in portion of age bracket (2125).


City (beta -.155 and t-statistic -3.036) with an unstandardized
coefficient B of -5.2 indicates that cities, on average, have a 5.2
lower composite performance index (mean 46.5) when compared to
towns.



Density (beta -.146 and t-statistic – 2.977) with an unstandardized
coefficient B of -.001 indicates that for every unit change of 1 in
density (mean 2378.7); there is a decrease to the composite
performance index (mean 46.5) of -.001. A better way to illustrate is
for every unit change of 100 in density there is a decrease to the
composite performance index of -.1.
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Mediation – Hypothesis 1B (beta -.126 and t-statistic -2.247) with
an unstandardized coefficient B of -3.49 indicates that mediation
localities, on average, have a 3.49 lower composite performance
index (mean 46.5) when compared to non-collective bargaining
localities and 4.98 lower composite index when compared to
arbitration and its 1.49 increased composite performance index.

As median household incomes, survey – quality of life scores or age 15-24% of
population increases, the composite performance score of law enforcement services
also increase. This means some combination of higher favorable rating on law
enforcement survey questions on how safe does a citizen feel, lower violent or property
crimes; or law enforcement national accreditation pursuit or attainment has occurred.
This may be due to overall abilities of higher income and quality of life attributes mitigate
crime from occurring and/or enable law enforcement to perform at a higher level
whereas the age factor may also represent a more family-friendly area in deterring
crime. The inverse relationship exists for density in that as population density increases,
the composite performance score of law enforcement decreases. This may be due to
the challenges of performance for higher density areas in the calls for service that may
result from citizens interacting in closer proximity. There also appears to be a contrast
between cities and counties with cities decreasing the composite measure score when
compared to towns. This may be due to how citizens are exposed to law enforcement
and its ability to deter crime at a greater rate in the towns than in the cities. However,
further research would need to be done in order to further isolate determining factors for
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why these relationships of variables to increased or decreased composite performance
measures exist.
In regards to workforce classification, mediation (Hypothesis 1B) has a
decreased composite performance measure. All of the other variables were not
significant enough to warrant any further analysis in regards to relationship to composite
performance measure. There may be some determining factor localities with a
mediation possess to warrant a decreased composite performance measure (e.g.,
workforce constraints to adopt low crime rate strategies; accreditation pursuit lacking;
and/or engaging and informing their citizens of safety-quality measures and related
survey question measures). As an example, law enforcement organizations with
mediation workforce classification may not have gained the confidence of their citizens
in addressing crime as well as non-collective bargaining or arbitration localities. This
may be because the general population of such localities does not share the same
workforce classification status as those in the law enforcement organization and
therefore, may not empathize as well in how such challenges are addressed. While it
may be a challenge to control these factors, surveys may gauge the sentiment of
citizens in mediation and non-mediation localities to determine what may be correlation
of mediation to lower composite performance index. Rational Choice Theory attributes
(e.g., employee motivation) may also be less present in mediation localities. However,
further research would need to be done in order to further isolate determining factors for
why this relationship of mediation to decreased composite performance measure exists.
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In addition, arbitration (Hypothesis 1A) is positive with its increased composite
performance measure, even though it was above the .05 significance threshold set for
further review. This means that arbitration is viewed more favorably than mediation and
non-collective bargaining, and while arbitration is not statistically different from noncollective bargaining, it does appear to be statistically different from mediation.
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Table 4.2: Composite Performance Measure

Model Summary
Model

R Square

R

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate

1

.777

a

.603

.580

8.58202

a. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County
Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt,
Unemployment Rate, Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates,
Median HH Inc (000)

a

ANOVA
Model

1

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

25107.560

13

1931.351

Residual

16497.835

224

73.651

Total

41605.395

237

F
26.223

Sig.
.000

a. Dependent Variable: Performance Composite
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj
Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, Unemployment Rate, Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High
School Graduates, Median HH Inc (000)
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b

Coefficients
Model

a

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B

Std.

t

Sig.

Beta

Collinearity Statistics

Tolerance

VIF

Error
(Constant)

12.558

10.898

1.152

.250

-.001

.004

-.015

-.300

.764

.758

1.320

Bond Rating Adj Scale

.602

.865

.032

.696

.487

.860

1.163

High School Graduates

2.828

13.427

.013

.211

.833

.443

2.255

.238

.040

.389

5.965

.000

.416

2.406

-.001

.000

-.146

-2.977

.003

.733

1.365

-27.107

27.396

-.055

-.989

.324

.568

1.760

Age15to24%

24.451

7.065

.170

3.461

.001

.730

1.369

Survey-Quality of Life

30.363

5.670

.363

5.354

.000

.385

2.598

-.957

1.504

-.036

-.636

.525

.551

1.816

-5.158

1.699

-.155

-3.036

.003

.677

1.478

County (v. Town)

5.272

3.066

.094

1.720

.087

.595

1.682

Med (v. NCB (b))

-3.485

1.551

-.126

-2.247

.026

.566

1.765

Arb (v. NCB (b))

1.486

1.801

.054

.825

.410

.411

2.431

Population (000)

Median HH Inc (000)
Density
Unemployment Rate
1

Non Right-to-Work
State
City (v. Town)

a.

Dependent Variable: Perform Composite

b.

NCB (Non-collective bargaining)

Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which illustrated a correlation of
mediation to a lower composite performance measure, it would appear that the null
hypothesis 1B can be rejected as there appears to be a relationship between law
enforcement workforce classification of mediation and higher (or lower) performance
attributes. Rejection of the null hypothesis does not confirm the hypothesis. For
hypothesis 1A, because there was no such statistically significant correlation as it
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pertains to arbitration and higher (or lower) performance attributes, the null hypothesis
1A cannot be rejected.
Hypotheses 2A and 2B: Findings and Null Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification
of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-collective bargaining


Null Hypothesis 2A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-collective
bargaining

Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification
of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-collective bargaining


Null Hypothesis 2B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-collective
bargaining
Whereas hypotheses 1 were capturing the correlation, if any, between the

classification of the workforce and a variety of performance measure attributes,
hypotheses 2 captures the correlation between classification of the workforce and law
enforcement costs per capita. Table 4.3: Law Enforcement Costs per Capita illustrates
the following via SPSS linear regression:


Model Summary - r square: .187 which indicates on average the model’s
predictions are 18% better than guessing the mean; which is considered a low
prediction rate (note Hypothesis 1 had a 60% rate). The variance between the r
square (.187) and adjusted r square (.139) is actually a large variance
(unfavorable), with adjusted r square 25.7% below r square (whereas Hypothesis
1 had a variance of 3.8%). This may be correlated to the number of insignificant
variables being examined as part of this analysis as the greater number of
193

variables added, the greater the chance of a larger spread between r-square and
adjusted r-square. Based upon this low r square and large variance, another
regression was conducted removing those insignificant variables that had a
significance factor > .250 in hopes that such significance variables were
impacting the adjusted r square. However, this resulted in only slightly improved
results - r square (.181) and adjusted r square (.152) with a high 16.0% variance.
Based upon this large variance, additional regression analyses were conducted
changing variables (e.g., lowering significance factor further to remove other
variables, changing composite of variables included in analysis) in hopes that
certain variables were impacting the results in producing a large variance
between r square and adjusted r square. However, there was an inability to make
improvements to the adjusted r square variance. Based upon these factors, the
model is not necessarily parsimonious from a statistical analysis (i.e., only slightly
better than guessing the mean). Therefore, the output for hypotheses 2 results
carry caveat of low r square and poor model and should not be overly relied upon
as part of a statistical analysis.


ANOVA – F value: 3.95 and significance of .000 which indicates that the overall
model produces better results than simply guessing the mean.



VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst
the variables. The low scores indicate that the independent variables are not
heavily inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.
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Coefficients:
o Significant (<.05): Non-right-to-work state, county and arbitration all
appear to be significant.
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-score (of those noted as significant)
are listed in the following order of greatest relationship:


Non-right-to-work state (beta .340 and t-statistic 4.190) with an
unstandardized coefficient B of 66.6 indicates that for non-right-towork states there is a $66.62 increased cost to the law enforcement
cost per capita (mean $236.30) when compared to right-to-work
states.



Arbitration – Hypothesis 2A (beta -.254 and t-statistic -2.701) with
an unstandardized coefficient B of -51.43 indicates that arbitration
localities, on average, have a $51.43 deceased cost to law
enforcement costs per capita (mean $236.30) when compared to
non-collective bargaining localities and $72.67 decreased cost
when compared to mediation and its $21.24 increased cost to law
enforcement costs.



County (beta -.189 and t-statistic -2.413) with an unstandardized
coefficient B of -78.24 indicates that counties have a $78.25
decreased cost to law enforcement costs per capita (mean
$236.30) when compared to towns.
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Therefore, for those localities with law enforcement arbitration when compared to
the other workforce classifications or are a county when compared to towns, there is a
relationship to either of those statuses and decreased law enforcement costs per capita.
For non-right-to-work states, there is a relationship to increased law enforcement costs.
All of the other variables were not significant enough to warrant any further analysis in
regards to relationship to law enforcement costs.
Reasons supporting a lower cost environment for arbitration could be attributable
to sensitivity to union-negotiated practices regarding compensation and benefits that
other facets of operations (e.g., vehicle replacements, equipment, training) may be
lower than other localities. There may also be practices existing in arbitration localities
that through their empowered union, they may not be as susceptible to political or other
distractions in provision of law enforcement services and its related costs (e.g., hiring
additional personnel). Rational Choice Theory attributes (e.g., efficiency in rational goal
attainment) may also be more present in arbitration localities. There may also be
reasons for non-right-to-work states that support a higher cost environment and
counties that support a lower cost environment (e.g., states with greater union-friendly
practices may have higher service costs whereas counties may be able to run more
efficiently without urban challenges). However, further research would need to be done
in order to further isolate determining factors for why this relationship of arbitration to
decreased law enforcement costs per capita exists as well as the relationships of nonright-to-work states and counties.
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Table 4.3: Law Enforcement Costs Per Capita
Model Summary
Model

R Square

R

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate

1

.432

a

.187

.139

90.755

a. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County
Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt,
Unemployment Rate, Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates,
Median HH Inc (000)

a

ANOVA
Model

Sum of

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Squares
Regression
1

423124.372

13

32548.029

Residual

1844989.359

224

8236.560

Total

2268113.731

237

3.952

.000

b

a. Dependent Variable: Law Enfor Exp per Capita
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County Local Govt,
Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, Unemployment Rate,
Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates, Median HH Inc (000)
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Coefficients
Model

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B
(Constant)

a

Std. Error

.571

.758

1.320

9.149

.098

1.503

.134

.860

1.163

36.611

141.990

.023

.258

.797

.443

2.255

-.220

.421

-.049

-.522

.602

.416

2.406

.005

.004

.080

1.142

.255

.733

1.365

352.208

289.719

.097

1.216

.225

.568

1.760

-100.713

74.717

-.095

-1.348

.179

.730

1.369

-2.213

59.966

-.004

-.037

.971

.385

2.598

66.629

15.902

.340

4.190

.000

.551

1.816

City (v. Town)

-24.269

17.963

-.099

-1.351

.178

.677

1.478

County (v. Town)

-78.245

32.424

-.189

-2.413

.017

.595

1.682

Med (v. NCB)

21.736

16.401

.106

1.325

.186

.566

1.765

Arb (V. NCB)

-51.435

19.044

-.254

-2.701

.007

.411

2.431

Median HH Inc (000)
Density
Unemployment Rate
Age15to24%
Survey-Quality of Life
Non Right-to-Work
State

13.747

VIF

-.568

Graduates

.043

Tolerance

-.039

High School

-.025

Beta

Collinearity Statistics

.119

Bond Rating Adj Scale

115.245

Sig.

1.564

Population (000)

180.222

t

a. Dependent Variable: LE Exp per Capita

Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which illustrated a correlation of
arbitration to decreased law enforcement costs per capita, it would appear that the null
hypothesis 2A can be rejected as there appears to be a relationship between an
element of law enforcement workforce classification (arbitration) and law enforcement
costs per capita (does not confirm the hypothesis). Because of the inability of the
statistical tests to illustrate a correlation of mediation to increased (or decreased) law

198

enforcement costs per capita, it would appear that the null hypothesis 2B cannot be
rejected.
As noted, because of the low r square and large variance to adjusted r square,
the variability amongst the data has given rise to a model that may be only slightly
better than guessing the mean; even after removing low significance variables from data
output analysis in attempting to lower the variance between r square and adjusted r
square. Therefore, the results appropriately disclose this challenge to the model and
would require further research to best ascertain other variables, if any, that may
produce a more parsimonious model. However, such low r squares may also be
indicative of a null hypothesis that may fail to be rejected on the underlying data.

Hypotheses 3A and 3B: Findings and Null Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification
of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite measure when
compared to non-collective bargaining


Null Hypothesis 3A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining

Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification
of mediation and higher performance return on costs composite measure when
compared to non-collective bargaining


Null Hypothesis 3B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs composite
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining
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The goal of the hypothesis 3 is to calculate and then analyze a high performance
return on costs (HPRC) from the data variables in the two previous hypotheses. From
the HPRC quantified factor for each locality (composite performance measure/law
enforcement costs per capita), a statistical analysis can be performed of this factor and
the classification factor of the workforce.
In performing the statistical analysis initially using the same control variables in
the prior hypothesis tests, many of these variables resulted in high “significance” results
which indicate high correlations of inapplicability of such variables amongst the data set.
This may have also given rise to large variance between adjusted r square and r square
(81.8%). Appendix H – Hypotheses 3 Full Variable Result Table provides the result of
such initial statistical analysis. In trying to negate the effects of such irrelevant variables,
the statistical analysis for hypotheses 3 was refined to include those control variables
with a lower rate of risk on the analysis. A threshold of significance use for a revised set
of control variables, included in this section’s analysis, included only those below a
significance of .250 (high school graduates, median household incomes, non-right-towork states and county government).
Table 4.4: High Performance Return on Costs illustrates the following via SPSS
linear regression:


Model Summary - r square: .056 which indicates on average the model’s
predictions are 5% better than guessing the mean. This a very low percentage
which reflects that there is not much difference between predictions and
guessing the mean. The variance between the r square (.056) and adjusted r
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square (.031) is actually a large variance (unfavorable), with adjusted r square
44.6% below r square (whereas Hypotheses 1 had a variance of 3.8%, but an
improvement from the initial Hypotheses 3 variance of 81.8% as noted in
Appendix H). This may be correlated to the number of variables being examined
as part of this analysis as the greater number of variables added, the greater the
chance of a larger spread between r-square and adjusted r-square. Based upon
this large variance, additional regression analyses were conducted by changing
variables (e.g., lowering significance factor further to remove other variables,
changing composite of variables included) in hopes that certain variables were
impacting the results in producing a large variances between r square and
adjusted r square. However, there was an inability to make improvements to the r
square and adjusted r square variance. Based upon these factors, the model is
not necessarily good from a statistical analysis (i.e., only slightly better than
guessing the mean). Therefore, the output for hypothesis 3 results carry caveat
of low r square and high variance with adjusted r square; which results in a
model that is not robust and should not be overly relied upon as part of a
statistical analysis.


ANOVA – F value: 2.268 and significance of .038 which indicates that the overall
model produces better results than simply guessing the mean.



VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst
the variables. The low scores indicate that the independent variables are not
heavily inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.
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Coefficients:
o Significant (<.05): Median household income and county appears to be
significant.
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-score (of those noted as significant)
are listed in the following order of greatest relationship:


Median Household Income ($000) (beta .190 and t-statistic 2.400)
with an unstandardized coefficient B of .314 indicates that for every
unit change of $1000 in the median household income (mean 59.0
($000) or $59,000), there is a .314 increase in the HPRC index
(mean 27.28).



County (beta .159 and t-statistic 2.426) with an unstandardized
coefficient B of 24.156 indicates that counties have a 24.156
increase in the HPRC index (mean 27.28) when compared to
towns.

Therefore, as median household incomes increases, the HPRC index for law
enforcement services also increases. This may indicate that higher median household
income localities enable a lower costing law enforcement organization to also perform
better as there are less opportunities for crime to occur, more time dedicated to
accreditation and/or a higher survey satisfaction rate. This may also be the result that
higher median household incomes also may follow better practices of crime reduction
strategies (e.g., securing their households and vehicles better; contacting law
enforcement about suspicious activity or crime alert hotline tips; or be less positioned to
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commit crimes because of higher incomes). There is also a correlation of counties
having an increased HPRC index when compared to other (e.g., towns). This may be
the result of counties without the urban challenges faced in many cities or towns being
able to perform better at a lower cost. Further research would be necessary to
determine what, if any, of these potential underlying scenarios for median household
incomes and counties could yield HPRC. All of the other variables were not significant
enough to warrant any further analysis in regards to relationship to HPRC.

Table 4.4: High Performance Return on Costs

Model Summary
Model

1

R

R Square

.236

a

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate

.056

.031

35.37148

a. Predictors: (Constant), Arb, Median HH Inc (000), County Local
Govt, High School Graduates, Med, Non Right-to-Work State
a

ANOVA
Model

Sum of Squares
Regression

1

df

Mean Square

17022.663

6

2837.110

Residual

289013.787

231

1251.142

Total

306036.450

237

F
2.268

Sig.
.038

a. Dependent Variable: HPRC
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arb, Median HH Inc (000), County Local Govt, High School Graduates,
Med, Non Right-to-Work State
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b

Coefficients
Model

a

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B

Std.

t

Sig.

Beta

Collinearity Statistics

Tolerance

VIF

Error
(Constant)

1.687

.093

-.102

-1.314

.190

.674

1.483

.131

.190

2.400

.017

.652

1.533

-7.748

6.046

-.108

-1.282

.201

.579

1.728

24.156

9.957

.159

2.426

.016

.958

1.044

Med (v. NCB)

.354

6.094

.005

.058

.954

.623

1.604

Arb (v. NCB)

5.356

7.294

.072

.734

.464

.426

2.347

High School Graduates
Median HH Inc (000)
1 Non Right-to-Work State
County (v. Town)

61.968

36.739

-58.975

44.875

.314

a. Dependent Variable: HPRC

Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which did not illustrate a correlation of
workforce classification to change in HPRC index, it would appear that the null
hypotheses 3 (both 3A and 3B) cannot be rejected.
As noted, because of the low r square and large variance to adjusted r square,
the variability amongst the data has given rise to a model that may be only slightly
better than guessing the mean; even after removing high significance variables from
data output analysis in trying to lower the variance between r square and adjusted r
square. Therefore, the results appropriately disclose this challenge to the model and
would require further research to best ascertain other variables, if any, which may
produce a better and more robust model. However, a low r-square indicates a weak
model overall therefore it is difficult to draw strong conclusions even if the null
hypothesis could be rejected, it would be with caution.
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Hypothesis Results Summarized
Based upon the preceding statistical results, findings for each of the hypotheses
can be stated.


Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to
non-collective bargaining
o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential
relationships identified in this research).
o For control variables, potential relationships exist with median household
income (positive), density (negative), age (positive), survey quality
(positive) and city (negative). This applies to hypothesis 1B also.



Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when compared to
non-collective bargaining

o The null hypothesis of no relationship was rejected (mediation (negative))
when compared amongst non-collective bargaining as results indicate
potential relationship.



Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-collective
bargaining
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o The null hypothesis of no relationship was rejected (arbitration (negative))
when compared amongst non-collective bargaining as results indicate
potential relationship.
o For control variables, potential relationships exist with non-right-to-work
state (positive) and county (negative). This applies to hypothesis 2B also.
o However, because of low r squares and large variance between r square
and adjusted r square, the model’s output is only slightly better than
guessing the mean. Even after removing variables with high significance
or other traits in a variety of analysis, the variance between r square and
adjusted r square were not improved. Therefore, because of the model’s
limitations in not being parsimonious, the preceding results may not be as
valid as data output and analysis that yielded a higher r square and a
lower variance to adjusted r square. This applies to hypothesis 2B also.



Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-collective
bargaining

o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential
relationships identified in this research).


.
Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining
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o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential
relationships identified in this research).
o For control variables, potential relationships exist with median household
income (positive) and counties (positive). This also applies to hypothesis
3B.
o However, because of low r squares and large variance between r square
and adjusted r square, the model’s output is only slightly better than
guessing the mean. Even after removing variables with high significance
or other traits in a variety of analysis, the variance between r square and
adjusted r square were not improved. Therefore, because of the model’s
limitations in not being parsimonious, the preceding results may not be as
valid as data output and analysis that yielded a higher r square and a
lower variance to adjusted r square. This also applies to hypothesis 3B.



Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs composite
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining

o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential
relationships identified in this research).
While two of the six null hypotheses were rejected, there are observations of
these research findings worthy of further discussion. As indicated in Chapter 1 –
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Introduction, the advocacy groups with strong opinions about the high costs of unions
and low performance results is contrasted by those advocacy groups that attribute
unions as an inherent trait needed to meet a worker’s needs and provide for a safe and
productive workplace towards a high performing organization. These sentiments and
related research helped give rise to the problem statement, research question and
hypothesis development. Because the null hypothesis was rejected two out of six times,
there appears to be a possible correlation from this research between workforce
classification and a law enforcement organization’s ability to perform better and at a
lower cost, but no correlation in regards to higher performance return on costs (HPRC).

Summary - Validity and Reliability of Data Variables
As the data results were accumulated, further efforts were made to re-address
validity and reliability of data variables. Validity and reliability were initially addressed in
Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology, as validity determines whether the
data is measuring what was intended to be measured and reliability determines how
accurately the measuring is without the effects of potential bias. As the data variables
were subjected to statistical tests in this chapter, additional data verification techniques
were performed.
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Validity
Construct validity, through use of independent authoritative sources of
performance indicators (FBI data, budget documents, NCS citizen surveys), appears to
be the proper measures. In addition, through the use of descriptive statistics (including
frequency and descriptive tabulations), the sample appears to be representative of the
population.
Internal validity properly demonstrates the causal relationship between two
variables. With workforce classification as the independent variable and dependent
variables of performance, cost and HPRC, through linear regression analysis and
significance of the t test, correlations were confirmed to be either positive, negative or
neither. Additional validity aspects accounted for: 1) Maturation via aligned time
horizons so similar environmental conditions existed during measurement period
(controlled with survey results, census and other data sources all within a 8-year period
(concentrated within a 3-year period) to mitigate variances that may be associated with
longer time periods of data collection); 2) Instrumental (and measurement effect)
changes as measurement tools replicated throughout the study (controlled with the
same manner in collecting and coding data amongst all sample localities); 3) Selection
bias mitigated through consistent demographic (control variable) classification and
bivariate correlation analysis performed on such variables (controlled through reliance
on objective data sources and standard statistical tests of such data); and 4)
Experimental mortality factors are mitigated by the relative non-transition nature of local
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governments and collective bargaining agreements (controlled with continuity of local
government and workforce classification statuses).
For external validity, statistical data was computed for the sample and the
population in illustrating the sample’s representation through the use of many control
variables. For control variables in which the population of all local governments was not
easily determined to be correlated, additional analysis was performed to illustrate that
the sample was actually representative of local governments that have a certain size
and scope to have a fully functioning law enforcement organization. In addition,
because selection of the sample was not volunteers, those external validity concerns
are negated. In addition, the ability to segment similar demographic and socio-economic
local governments helps mitigate relative external validity concerns. Confounded
treatment effects were mitigated by focusing on the incremental changes between the
dependent variable based upon the independent variable mitigating the risk of
generalization of very low or high performance to an entire population of local
governments. Situational effects were mitigated as the subjects are local governments
and their citizens, all subject to the same scope and duration of study. Effects due to
differential mortality were mitigated in a similar manner as noted under internal validity.

Reliability
Reliability is different than validity, in that reliability helps determine that what
data being measured is consistently being done, whereas validity addresses the
210

relevance and accuracy of the data being measured. What was measured amongst the
entire sample and across all of their variables were measured consistently without
regard to any other factors to best address reliability. Consistency examples include the
same set of survey questions (NCS) and data sources accessed (e.g., FBI, CALEA,
Census) to ensure that a consistent manner to compile the data was performed
throughout the data gathering and analysis process. For example, since the survey
questions used were the same survey questions used amongst all of those localities
sampled, there is a high degree of reliability that the response of the survey question is
a measure off of the same worded question. In addition, for crime rates, the FBI has a
standard process for all local governments in defining violent and non-violent crimes;
therefore, there is a high degree of reliability that the data reported amongst the
localities is reliable and reported in a consistent manner.

Comparison of Findings with Other Research
As the findings achieved in this research may be unique in reference to the
assortment of independent, dependent and control variables, other research was
examined for elements of these variables and their related outcomes. There were no
expectations with regards to any of the results, although from an initial review of the
literature and related research, there were attributes of higher personnel costs
associated with collective bargaining and higher performance measures associated with
more educated and higher median income areas. As you can ascertain from the
previous studies noted, there is variability in the results and not one study merited all of
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the traits and hypotheses that were undertaken as part of this research. Extensive
searches were done to try and locate similar studies, but the combination of an array of
performance measures (surveys, costs, crime indices, and accreditation) while also
comparing it to levels of workforce classification were not able to be detected.
However, the following studies are a representation of other research with certain
traits that are similar to enable a comparison to the findings in this research:


Freeman and Ichinowski (1988) compared teacher unions with greater and
lesser unionization with result that collective bargaining correlated higher
teacher salaries and generally higher educational performance.



Eberts and Stone (1986) used test scores to determine that union school
districts have 7% higher test scores.



Feuille, Delaney and Hendricks (1985) determined law enforcement union
contracts over time favors the local law enforcement union as it becomes
more empowered and influential (not a trait correlated to HPO).



Xu (2008) indicated no significant relationship between organizationalincentives structure and high performance attributes.



Doellgast, Holtgrewe and Deery (2009) study of private sector call centers
determined that unionized call centers and in-house call centers (compared to
outsourced) were associated with significantly higher measures of job quality.



Kim and Bae (2005) examined two different Korean companies determining
that there was a correlation between being unionized and innovation.
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Koper, Maguire and Moore (2001) and Valletta (1989) determined that large
law enforcement organizations over time retain employees longer than
smaller organizations and larger organizations also tend to be more
associated with collective bargaining.



Rees (1991) concluded that collective bargaining’s “strong voice” to an
employee is considered a primary factor for lower turnover rates than noncollective bargaining law enforcement organizations.



Kelling (1975) determined that no correlation existed between preventive
patrol increases and citizen perception of law enforcement presence or
personal safety, or reported crimes.



Department of Labor (2004) indicated that local government union employees
are paid 32% more than non-union local government employees.



Wagner (2008) concluded that compensation and benefits of the union worker
are better.



Putchinisky (2007) provided evidence that unions do influence law
enforcement expenditures to a substantial degree.



Victor (1977) determined differential of union law enforcement officers and
firefighters were paid 8 – 12% over their non-union counterparts.



Zhao and Lovrich (1997) illustrated that large law enforcement organizations
with collective bargaining have additional salary benefits.



Zax (1988) cities with collective bargaining in a study have higher salaries.
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For those studies (example: Freeman and Ichinowski (1988)) that compared nonlaw enforcement organization’s (e.g., teacher unions, private sector call centers), in
which attributes of unionization and/or high performance were noted, there was no such
correlation in the research performed for this project. Comparison of different types of
workers with different training and related needs to perform their job function is
challenging and would be subject to validity concerns. However, additional research
may be needed across professions to see if there are any similar outcomes of workforce
classification and HPRC and if so, are there traits of that profession that contribute to
such similarity.
For those studies in which law enforcement was the research topic, the studies
(example: Feuille, Delaney and Hendricks (1985)) that illustrated a correlation between
a collective bargaining atmosphere and greater workforce influence, it appears that
such measures in these studies do not necessarily reference high performance
organization or HPRC traits, but rather other matters of workforce influence (e.g., higher
pay and benefits, job protection, workplace environment conditions). This research
project did not correlate workforce classification to the array of workplace topics
deemed to be “influential” as its focus was on HPRC.
For those studies (examples: Koper, Maguire and Moore (2001) and Valletta
(1989)), that showed a correlation between larger law enforcement organizations and
collective bargaining which also was correlated to lower turnover rates, such analysis
was not able to be replicated in this research. The correlations for the control variable
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population and law enforcement costs per capita did not appear to be correlated to any
threshold of workforce classification nor did this study consider any population density.
In addition, lower turnover rates on their own merit are not necessarily of a high
performance organization as the organization may be retaining underperforming
workers and be labeled as “low turnover.” Whereas another organization with a higher
turnover rate may be better positioning its higher performing workforce to succeed
better through the dismissal of lower performing employees.
For those studies (example: Zhao and Lovrich (1997)) that determined higher
compensation and benefits to the law enforcement worker with collective bargaining
abilities, no such correlation was determined as part of this research. As the law
enforcement costs for this research used the total costs of the law enforcement
organization, it was not possible to determine the salaries and benefit costs that could
be better compared to other research in this area. Perhaps if other studies indicate
positive correlations of salaries and benefits to a certain level of workforce classification
and the researched performed as part of this study indicate higher overall (salaries,
benefits, operating and capital) law enforcement costs per capita for non-collective
bargaining and mediation, but lesser costs per capita for arbitration, then perhaps
variances exist between the non-salaries and benefits expenses to offset the higher
salaries and benefits. Note that mediation did illustrate higher costs per capita, so
further research may be needed to determine variations between these two forms of
workforce classification.
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For those studies (example: Kelling (1975)), that illustrated the effects, if any, of a
law enforcement service increase on the effects it would have upon citizen survey
responses regarding quality of service or performance results in the reduction of crime,
no such correlation was determined as part of this research. Because these studies
required the introduction of a variable (change in service) to be introduced and then
measured by other manners (e.g., surveys, crime rate) after a period of time, this
research project was focused on not changing a key variable in order for the sample
data to be better examined for correlation.

Limitations of Findings
As noted previously, all research was conducted from the perspective of
performance measurement data, cost efficiencies and citizen effectiveness satisfaction
results. No data or information was obtained from the perspective of the employee
which would identify variances between collective and non-collective bargaining
localities in the manners of satisfaction of compensation, benefits and work
environment. Separate research on this topic could be substantive and serve to
compliment the results of this research in yielding further conclusions on this issue and
further validate or challenge outcomes of the hypotheses tested as part of this research.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY
In this final chapter, a summary will bring closure to this research project, but
hopefully position this subject area for future research as workforce classification and its
role in the public sector will continue to be debated. The primary focus of this research
was law enforcement organizations and their performance and costs in subjecting a
high performance return on costs dependent variable to the independent variable of
workforce classification. Law enforcement organizations are those charged with the
responsibility of law and order in their locality and represented primarily by city and town
police departments, but also may include county sheriff or other law enforcement
offices. Workforce classification as described throughout this research is the differential
of law enforcement’s ability to collectively bargain (or not), and if so, whether the
employees have the ability to resolve impasses in negotiation through mediation
(employer-preferred if there is collective bargaining) or the more employee-favored
mandatory arbitration.
This summary is divided into many sections that are representative of the
preceding four chapters. A Background illustrates the environment that has given rise to
the development of a problem statement and research question. Theoretical Framework
provides the Rational Choice Theory lens that was used throughout this research in
developing the six hypothesis statements (two statements in each of the three subject
areas), selecting the appropriate variables, correlating the review of literature and
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interpreting the results. Research Design and Methodology provides an overview of the
independent (workforce classification), dependent (performance, cost and high
performance return on costs (HPRC) measures) and control (socio-economic and
demographic) variables. In addition, the manner in how the data was subject to a proper
statistical testing process and how the threats to validity and reliability were mitigated
are summarized. Findings will provide the results of the statistical analysis for each of
the null hypothesis tested in determining what correlation, not causation, exists between
the independent and dependent variables. A Comparison of Results to Other Studies
helps put into perspective this research compared to other similar research studies in
this area. Further Research in Workforce Classification and High Performance
Organization will provide a pathway for others to consider in this subject area that would
benefit the profession, local government law enforcement organizations and the citizens
they serve. Finally, the Conclusion will be the closing commentary on this research
project.

Background
One variance between organizations is the ability of employees to access and
use collective bargaining in negotiated contracts for salaries, benefits and workplace
conditions. These employees are generally represented by an empowered union to act
on behalf of the employees. For local governments, such workforce classification is
governed through their respective state laws to either avail or not avail collective
bargaining rights to certain classes of workers amongst its local government workforce;
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including law enforcement employees (Salerno, 1981). For law enforcement
organizations, three distinct categories of workforce classification exist via collective
bargaining: 1) None; 2) Impasse resolution via mediation; and 3) Impasse resolution via
mandatory arbitration. A fourth classification - work stoppages (strikes) - exist for other
professions, but not for law enforcement organizations (except in Montana, but Montana
requires many pre-qualifying conditions in order for strikes to occur).

Problem Statement, Research Question and Hypothesis
From the initial environmental scan in Chapter 1 – Introduction, the repeated
debates on the merits of public sector unions in the 21st century ranged from those with
opinions about high union costs to those that associate unions with providing an
environment where the worker, and therefore the locality, can operate at a higher
performance level over the long-term. From these various opinions and additional
research performed, the following problem statement was formulated:


Local government law enforcement collective bargaining practices
appear to create advocacy groups in support and against such
practices; however, these emotional debates seem to focus on just
salary and benefit costs and not on any high performance law
enforcement organization factors; especially when total law
enforcement costs and demographic factors are considered in
determining high performance return on costs.

Understanding what, if any, relationship exists between workforce classification
and the high performing organization (HPO) can help address the problem. The
research was designed to remove the emotional and advocacy-related elements that
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are often associated with collective bargaining with emphasis on theoretical inspired
data analysis. In order to not be too broad, the focused local government service
subject to this question is law enforcement. Accounting for the costs amongst the
various local government law enforcement organizations was important to the research
question’s focus on the relationship between workforce classification and HPO. Based
upon these research goals, the following research question was formulated:


Is there a relationship between a local government law enforcement
collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining workforce and a high
performance law enforcement organization when cost and demographic
factors are considered in determining high performance return on
costs?

In order to position a research project for statistical analysis, hypotheses are
developed from which independent, dependent and control variables can then be
gathered and tested via statistical software (e.g., SPSS). Based upon the problem
statement and research question, and related literature review, the following hypotheses
and related null hypotheses to be subjected to statistical analysis) were derived to try
and capture results on performance and costs individually and then collectively through
a composite measure developed – High Performance Return on Costs (HPRC). Each of
the subject areas (arbitration (A) and mediation (B)) of the hypotheses statements was
captured as separate hypothesis statements in order to isolate the subject area subject
to the statistical test. HPRC can be used to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of
taxpayers’ costs for law enforcement.
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Law Enforcement Performance Hypotheses (1)
o Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationships between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when
compared to non-collective bargaining
o Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationships between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when
compared to non-collective bargaining



Law Enforcement Cost Hypotheses (2)
o Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to noncollective bargaining
o Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to noncollective bargaining



Law Enforcement Higher Performance Return on Costs Hypotheses (3)
o Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining
o Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining

Independent Variable – Workforce Classification
In categorizing the independent variable of workforce classification, the United
States is fairly evenly divided amongst the three categories of workforce classification:
1) Thirty-two states permit collective bargaining for its law enforcement organizations
and are segmented through their impasse resolution process with fifteen states (30.0%
of total) via mediation and seventeen states (34.0% of total) via mandatory arbitration;
and 2) Eighteen states (36.0% of total states) that do not permit collective bargaining.
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Dependent Variable – Performance
Dependent variables, as they pertain to law enforcement HPO measures, were
focused upon four primary high performance statistics or traits: 1) Survey Results - the
perception a citizen has about the law enforcement services provided in their locality
and how safe and secure they feel in factors that are key to high quality of life; 2) Crime
Index (separately captured for violent and property crimes) - data from actual crimes
committed; and 3) National Accreditation – recognition of a professionally managed law
enforcement organization. These statistics were selected because they appear to be
representative and an appropriate gauge for performance from both an internal (staff,
elected official) and external (citizen, business, media) perspective. Clearance rates for
crimes committed was not used as a performance measure because of the variability in
this measure defined amongst local governments and the timing difference between
numerator and denominator (crime A cleared in the numerator may not be part of the
crimes tabulated in the denominator if the crime occurred in the prior year).
For the survey results, a highly regarded survey company, National Citizens
Survey (NCS), provided detailed local government professionally stratified sample
survey responses for 238 local governments across the country. This included a
comprehensive questionnaire for representative sample of citizens to complete
regarding all aspects of their local government, its services and their quality of life.
These same 238 local governments were also the basis for the entire sample.
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Three different parts of the survey were used for this research. The first two parts
were used as separate statistics in gauging how safe the citizen felt and the quality of
their law enforcement organization. For the “how safe do you feel” section, results from
the following six questions were utilized: 1) Violent crimes (e.g., rape, assault, robbery);
2) Property crimes (e.g., burglary, theft); 3) In their neighborhood during the day; 4) In
their neighborhood after dark; 5) In shopping areas during the day; and 6) In shopping
areas after dark. All of the results of these responses were averaged together to form a
“how safe do you feel” performance composite measure.
Another section of the NCS survey asked the following question - “please rate
the quality of law enforcement services” (NRC, 2012). A third section of the survey
utilized for this research asked about overall quality of life, not related directly to law
enforcement, and this result was utilized as a control variable in determining if there is
any correlation between performance (and other dependent variables of cost and
HPRC) and overall quality of life.
A second set of statistics focused on a local government’s crime index for violent
and property crimes. The FBI collects such information from every law enforcement
organization (called UCR Part I Crimes). Violent crimes include aggravated assault,
forcible rape, murder and robbery whereas property crimes include arson, burglary,
larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft (USDOJ, 2012). The crime indices for property and
violent crimes were calculated by taking the total respective crimes for each of the
indices and dividing them by population (demand trait). Other demand factors that may
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influence the ability of a local government to provide service and correlating crimes that
may arise include businesses (and their employees and business guests) and other
visitors (e.g., tourists). However, these demand factors are not accumulated in any
consistent manner amongst local governments and were not subject to this research. In
order to classify crime rates for statistical analysis as part of a composite performance
score on a 100 point scale, the crime rates were incrementally scaled with those with
the highest crime rates (lowest performance indicator) getting a 0 scaled to those with
the lowest crime rates (highest performance indicator) assigned a 100 factor score.
The third set of statistics gathered was the national accreditation of a local
government’s law enforcement organization. The pursuit and attainment of national
accreditation for local government law enforcement is recognized as a HPO trait in
ensuring compliance to generally accepted standards of the profession. The
Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA) was formed
in 1987 by four major national law enforcement associations. CALEA has published a
standards manual containing professional standards that address nine major law
enforcement areas: 1) Role, responsibilities, and relationships; 2) Organization,
management, and administration; 3) Personnel structure; 4) Personnel process; 5)
Operations; 6) Operation support; 7) Traffic operations; 8) Detainee and court-related
activities; and 9) Auxiliary and technical services (CALEA, 2012). In quantifying the
factor for statistical analysis, a score of 100 was given to localities with accreditation, 50
for those localities in self-assessment category in pursuit of accreditation and 0 for
those localities that do not have accreditation nor are pursuing such accreditation.
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The performance dependent variable was a compilation of the preceding
performance statistics with a weighted average applied amongst the statistics to best
represent one consistently applied performance measure for the statistical analysis. The
weighted average formula is as follows: Composite Performance Measure = (Safe
survey questions * 25%) + (law enforcement quality survey question *25%) + (violent
crime rate *20%) + (property crime rate * 20%) + (accreditation factor *10%).

Dependent Variable – Cost per Capita
For the law enforcement costs per capita dependent variable, the costs to
provide law enforcement services were comprised of personal services (salaries and
fringe benefits), operating (e.g., supplies, fuel, training, contractual services) and capital
(e.g., vehicles). These costs were attained through third party sources (ICMA’s
Performance Measurement Survey (ICMA, 2011)) or directly from the respective local
government’s audit or budget documents that illustrated actual costs for law
enforcement. The cost of services and operations for law enforcement are often highly
debated during a locality’s budget process with expectations of high correlations of
service performance to costs. Compensation and benefits is also the highest portion of
an organization’s budget; therefore inclusion of this cost measure and its correlation to
workforce classification is warranted as a dependent variable. In determining the per
capita costs factor, the total law enforcement costs were divided by the population. As
noted under crime index, additional considerations were given to other demand factors
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for the denominator, but also as noted previously, these factors were not consistently
calculated or available amongst local governments.

Dependent Variable – High Performance Return on Costs (HPRC)
A final dependent variable was a composite calculation from the preceding
dependent variables in illustrating a HPRC through a weighted criteria formula to best
represent the dependent variables of performance as a factor (numerator) from the
costs invested into the service (denominator). The attempt to create HPRC was to
better compare and contrast an overall HPRC measure as there can be higher
performance traits that take an inordinately higher cost to attain or even lower
performance traits that may be associated with an inordinately lower cost. The formula
for HPRC is Performance Composite Measure / Law Enforcement Costs per Capita.

Control Variables
The control variables utilized were designed to accomplish two objectives: 1)
Provide validity that the sample selected is representative of the population of local
governments through comparisons to US Census and other sources; and 2) There are
no anomalies of sample local governments (e.g., performance) that would cause the
independent variables to not be comparable. For example, if all the high survey result
communities in one category of workforce classification were the result of higher socio226

economic factors compared to a lower survey result in another category of workforce
classification from lower socioeconomic factors, then the differential may be attributable
to underlying socio-economic factors and not because of workforce classification. For
each of the following control variables selected, they were selected because of possible
correlation between the survey respondents of that local government, the perception of
service and the ability of that local government to provide a high performing service at
an appropriate cost (Unless otherwise noted, control variable sources were the US
Department of Census (US Census, 2012)):


Municipal bond ratings (uninsured): Provided a good overall indicator of a local
government’s economic health as the higher the bond rating, the lower the risk of
default. Moody’s Investors Services was the data source and they base their
ratings on four factors – economic, debt, administrative and financial (Moody’s,
2012). Uninsured is an important qualifier as many local governments that are
unrated or have a lower bond rating, may be able to purchase bond insurance to
warrant a AAA-bond rated deal. Therefore, the bond ratings utilized for this
analysis have removed such insured transactions in order to ensure accurate
comparability.



Population: This is the demand statistic for a local government’s law enforcement
services. The size of the population in prior research has been correlated to
higher crime statistics from a per capita and related demand statistic perspective
(Ellis, Beaver and Wright, 2009). This is attributable to higher populated localities
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may have a wider scope of citizens with needs to warrant services or citizens
who may be associated with criminal activity; also requiring additional law
enforcement services.


Density: This represents population per square miles and can affect services that
are more associated with density. This includes noise complaints as neighbors
are closer to each other.



Form of Government: There are three primary types of local government
structures: City, County and Towns (which includes districts and other locally
defined governmental units).



Survey-Quality of Life: Being able to segment the sample population’s overall
perception of quality of life may provide analytical results showing variances
amongst local governments, independent variables and dependent variables.



Right-to-Work States: While the independent variable properly distinguishes
between unionized and non-unionized law enforcement unions, some of these
unions are permitted in right-to-work states and in some non-right-to-work states,
there may not be a law enforcement union.



Other Control Variables: Additional variables were used that are common in
classifying a local government’s socio-economic and demographic environment
and its relative ability to perform to the varying demands its citizens may place
upon it because of such environment. These other factors included median
household income, high school graduation rates, percentage of population aged
15-25, and unemployment rate.
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As an example of such variance in demand for service is an increase in the
educational level significantly reduces subsequent violent and property crimes with
numerous other positive impacts upon the community (Lochner, 2008). Another
example is that the age group of 15-25 can place far higher demands upon law
enforcement than any other age group tier. After age 25, a steep drop in criminal activity
occurs as people take-on new roles and the possibility of jail time becomes a relatively
more-serious matter because of the impact it will have on the perpetrator’s life and
responsibilities (Sociology.org, 2012).
Workforce Classification

Citizens often aspire for their local government services to recognize their needs
and adapt to changes in a timely manner. This HPO trait may be further realized with or
without collective bargaining. The environment exists that certain unions are under
further scrutiny and pressures to justify their existence without regard to performance
outcomes. This scrutiny has become more prevalent during the recession resulting in
certain states debating changes to their collective bargaining laws. This scrutiny is
further fueled by: 1) Declining investment return rate impacts upon public sector defined
benefit pension plans that create material unfunded pension liabilities; and 2) Collective
bargaining agreements that stipulate defined salary increases and employer payments
towards health insurance during employees’ tenure and retirement. These factors, in
addition to general recession factors of less taxable bases (property, income and sales
tax) constrain local government budgets and have resulted in some combination of tax
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rate increases or service reductions; both of which are generally opposed by the
citizens.

If general tenets of fair and equitable workplace practices, including
compensation and benefits, could be defined, then objectively determining whether
there exists additional motivation and performance of a unionized worker versus a nonunionized worker can be fairly debated. However, the realization is that there is an
inherent challenge and employee skepticism about any objective process based upon
the history and plight of the worker under duress from management; both in the public
and private sector.
Private sector employees and their unions in the United States were formally
recognized and empowered with the passage of the 1935 National Labor Relations Act
– Wagner Act (LaborUnionReport.com, 2012). The impetus for the Wagner Act was
focused on the private sector as public sector applicability was not envisioned (Code of
Federal Regulations, 1935). President Franklin Roosevelt, a private-sector union
advocate, cautioned that collective bargaining was not meant to be transplanted to the
public sector (DiSalvo, 2010).
It was not until 1958, when New York City Mayor Wagner (son of Senator
Wagner from Wagner Act) issued an executive order enabling certain local public
workers the ability to unionize. Soon thereafter, many other states, starting with
Wisconsin in 1959 (LaborUnionReport.com, 2012), and local governments provided
such access for defined segments of their workforce. In 1962, President John Kennedy
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enabled certain federal workers the right to unionize for the first time through Executive
Order 10988 (American Presidency Project, 2012). This executive order was reinforced
by Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (Dilts and Walsh, 1988).

Law Enforcement Organizations
Law enforcement officers and firefighters have over 36% of their employees
nationwide part of a union; which is second only to teachers for all occupational
categories, private or public (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
2004). This percentage increases substantially when it is just large law enforcement
organizations; with over 70% of organizations with greater than 100 sworn officers
engaging in collective bargaining (Zhao and Lovrich, 1997). Therefore, the importance
of determining what is a high performance organization for law enforcement and
whether there are or are not correlations to workforce classification has far greater
applicability for many law enforcement workers, their employer and the citizens they
serve. However, in order to have a rational discussion and interpret research rationally,
the fragmentation between employer and worker and between citizen and their
government needs to be overcome.
This fragmentation between employer and employee has been around prior to
unions and was the impetus for the creation of unions. As it pertains to law
enforcement, this fragmentation was evident in the early actions of the Boston Police
Social Club. When the Boston law enforcement chief in 1919 refused to recognize this
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social club as having union status, a majority of the law enforcement officers “walked off
the job” for four days which resulted in “widespread looting, hundreds of injuries and
seven deaths” with order restored only upon National Guard arrival (DeLord, Burpo,
Shannon, and Spearing, 2008, p. 227).
As citizens and their government try to address this issue rationally, it is
becoming more common to measure law enforcement effectiveness by focusing on
“victimization data and citizens’ satisfaction with law enforcement service” (ICMA, 1991,
p. 381). The accounts from the victim’s perspective and the community at-large on how
well law enforcement is performing in a variety of manners may help better frame the
strengths and weaknesses of the law enforcement organization for which the
community may want further action plans initiated in reducing any weaknesses.

High Performance Organizations (HPOs)
HPOs are defined in many ways, but generally address the ability of the
organization to leverage its collective resources to achieve the highest production value
of products and services produced. Citizens often aspire for their local government
services to recognize their needs and adapt to changes in a timely manner. This high
performance organization trait may be further realized with or without collective
bargaining. The environment exists that certain unions are under further scrutiny and
pressures to justify their existence without regard to performance outcomes. Law
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enforcement unions are facing a “global trend of policing reform driven by underlying
social and economic factors (e.g., public demand for safety and security services that
may not be met through traditional sworn officers)” (DeLord, Burpo, Shannon, and
Spearing, 2008, p. 299). It is from these and similar HPO traits and environmental
challenges that a privatization movement of HPO arose which has raised the
expectation for HPO standards in the public sector (Wooldridge, Amagoh and Menefee,
2002).
Pursuing national accreditation is an HPO trait and achieving such accreditation
can be viewed as a requirement for a HPO. For law enforcement, CALEA accreditation
standards are not an “assessment in how well a local law enforcement organization has
controlled crime or disorder, but rather how the organization has complied with
guidelines that CALEA believes are associated with “good administrative practices” and
“if these practices produce better performance, the law enforcement leader may claim
that their organization is a higher performer as a result of such practices” (ICMA, 1991,
p. 391). In leveraging CALEA-type standards into an operational mode, the productivity
of law enforcement can be increased through: “1) Improving current policies and
practices to the highest level; 2) Allocating resources most efficiently to the varied law
enforcement services; 3) Increasing the probability of goal accomplishment; and 4)
Leveraging the workforce talents to their full potential” (More, 1979, p. 326).
All of the previous measures and attributes for the HPO need to also be done in
a continuous improvement environment, and in the most efficient manner, in order for
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HPO attainment and continuum of HPO status. Employees and organizations should
develop together the appropriate tools and proactive strategies in adapting to the
changing workplace in pursuit of and maintenance of HPO traits. “Managers with an
appreciation of the problems of individuals and groups at work and an understanding of
possible solutions can utilize their knowledge to facilitate organizational effectiveness”
(Steers, 1984, p. 540). In addition, “performance measures can measure the output
produced by the organization or the outcomes created in the community which results
from organizational output” (Wooldridge, 2007, p. 47). A HPO-type performance
measurement strategy can position the law enforcement organization to be proactive in
dealing with issues as they arise, rather than reactive strategies hurriedly put together to
appease politicians or the public.

Theoretical Framework – Rational Choice Theory
The theoretical basis utilized to best help answer the research question for this
dissertation was Rational Choice Theory (RCT). Rational Choice Theory is a subset of
the neo-classical theories (employee marginal utility and employer profit maximization)
whereby individuals through “explanation and prediction” enable a rational choice
process to ensue even with the likelihood of “high uncertainty and imperfect information”
(Harmon and Mayer, 1986, p. 404). The underlying primary value of Rational Choice
Theory is its efficiency in rational goal attainment (Harmon and Mayer, 1986). As the
research question is based upon HPO attributes which are dependent upon employee
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performance, Rational Choice Theory’s approach to employee motivation is a critical
factor to high performance.
The degree of organizational reality attempts to gauge the ability of the manager
to “optimize instead of maximize on the quality of their decision” based upon the
changing environment around them (Steers, 1984, p71). It is through rational choice
process of optimization that viable alternatives emerge and that the selected alternative
is appropriate to meet environmental demands (Steers, 1984). It is recognized that an
individual’s self-interest goal is to maximize utility; which is correlated to the concept of
“ends” previously addressed and positions the individual to make choices to best serve
the individual. “Choosing rationality becomes equivalent to maximizing utility” which
seeks the “greatest fulfillment of pre-existing passions” (Allingham, 1999, p. 1).
Rational Choice Theory also “maximizes the satisfaction of preferences” by
“individual actors” (Hindess, 1988, p. 1). “Narrow rationality” is where individual actions
are motivated by “self-interest”; however, that does not necessarily translate to the
actions of a group as acting rationally (Hardin, 1982, p. 9). From this perspective, noncollective bargaining traits appear to be more self-interest targeted for narrow rationality
to excel. Perhaps a key connection to narrow rationality’s success in law enforcement is
whether such employees perform better in a self-interest capacity than in larger groups
most traditionally associated with law enforcement unions.
It is perhaps from these rational responses that an environment was created for
private sector unions to initially materialize from an idea to a legal standing via the
Wagner Act to having the public sector employee also interpret such societal benefits
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and higher quality of life for themselves in their advocacy of creating organized public
sector unions. Until the ability to form unions existed, individuals may not have had any
defined pathway towards coordination. An “absence of assurance and coordination
among individuals can make second-best choices rational to all” because a “joint
outcome of such choices is a rationally inferior product from the point of view of the
participating individuals” (Frohock, 1987, p. 131).
This perhaps sets the possibility that there is neither an absolute social norm that
may exist for collective bargaining or non-collective bargaining as these choices, while
clear and distinct, may each have a rational basis from an individual’s perspective that
is reinforced if that individual is surrounded by similar collective thoughts of other
individuals. This also appears to not constrain a HPO (or existing organization seeking
HPO status) in developing multiple, but finite courses of action to best position the
employee, customer and organization for continuum of HPO success. The result for law
enforcement officers is that they will be “happier in their work and more productive when
the decisions they are allowed to make for themselves are maximized and the decisions
others make for them are minimized” (Maddox, 1975, p. 25).
Future issues in the workplace and organizational behavior can evolve from trend
changes in “socio-normative, demographic, economic or technological” and the manner
in which leaders (and workers) address these changes and their inherent challenges will
determine how HPO traits can be achieved and maintained (Steers, 1984, p. 537).
Collective bargaining trends can be influenced by any of these changes. While
economic changes may cause more immediate constraints on collective bargaining
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during periods of recession, it may be socio-normative changes that impact the
workplace for more sustained periods of time. Socio-normative changes could include
“work ethic, aspiration levels, attitudes towards authority and trust in organization” that
can also be external forces “influencing the nature of the work environment which, in
turn, influences how people behave and feel on the job” (Steers, 1984, p. 537).
Perhaps greater awareness of the dynamics in which performance attributes can
be enhanced through metrics as noted in this research ultimately will motivate the law
enforcement officers further towards a high performance environment. Just as Henry A.
Landsberger in Hawthorne Revisited (Landsberger, 1958) identified correlations
between worker productivity improvement and the greater interest in them as workers
from management, perhaps this heightened interest in the law enforcement officer from
not just management, but from the community, with their support, can also be that same
interest mechanism to yield a higher performing organization.

Research Design and Methodology
Through an exploratory cross-sectional study utilizing SPSS, the data collection
was a compilation of information generally available for local governments that can be
further analyzed. The sample population is derived by using all participants in the
National Citizen Survey (NCS). Additional information regarding the sample population
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and variables utilized (independent, dependent and control) were previously addressed
in this Summary’s Background section.
All data categories were entered into statistical software (e.g., Statistical Package
for Social Services (SPSS)) from which applicable statistical data analysis could be
performed. The primary manners in which data was analyzed were as follows:


Linear Regression Analysis: In order to determine the t- score, significance of the
t test, variance inflation factor (VIF), standardized coefficient and related output
from linear regression, correlations can be used to determine if two variables are
linearly related to each other (SPSS, 2009).



Descriptive Statistics: In order to ensure that the sample is representative of the
population, descriptive statistics (frequency tabulations for variables comprising
ordinal or nominal traits and descriptive tabulations for variables comprising scale
traits) were statistically performed.

Validity and Reliability of Sample and Data Variables
As the data results were accumulated, further efforts were made to re-address
validity and reliability of data variables. Validity determines whether the data is
measuring what was intended to be measured and reliability determines how accurately
the measuring is without the effects of potential bias. Construct validity, through use of
independent authoritative sources of performance indicators, appears to be the proper
measures. In addition, through the use of descriptive statistics, the sample appears to
be representative of the population. Internal validity properly demonstrates the causal
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relationship between two variables. With workforce classification as the independent
variable and dependent variables of performance, cost and HPRC, through linear
regression analysis, the t score and significance of the t test, linear correlations were
confirmed to be either positive, negative or neither.
Additional validity aspects accounted for: 1) Maturation via aligned time horizons
so similar environmental conditions existed during measurement period; 2) Instrumental
(and measurement effect) changes as measurement tools replicated throughout the
study; 3) Selection bias mitigated through consistent demographic (control variable)
classification and linear regression analysis performed on such variables; and 4)
Experimental mortality factors are mitigated by the relative non-transition nature of local
governments and collective bargaining agreements.
For external validity, statistical data was computed for the sample and the
population in illustrating the sample’s representation through the use of many control
variables. For control variables in which the population of all local governments wasn’t
easily determined to be correlated, additional analysis was performed to illustrate that
the sample was actually representative of local governments that have a certain size
and scope to have fully functioning law enforcement organizations. In addition, because
the selection of the sample was not volunteers, those external validity concerns are
negated.
In addition, the ability to segment similar demographic and socio-economic local
governments helps mitigate relative external validity concerns. Confounded treatment
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effects were mitigated by focusing on the incremental changes between the dependent
variable based upon the independent variable mitigating the risk of generalization of
very low or high performance to an entire population of local governments. Situational
effects were mitigated as the subjects are local governments and their citizens, all
subject to the same scope and duration of study. Effects due to differential mortality
were mitigated in a similar manner as noted under internal validity.
Reliability concerns were addressed as what was measured amongst the entire
sample and across all of their variables was measured consistently without regard to
any other factors. Consistency examples include the same set of survey questions and
data sources accessed to ensure that a consistent manner to compile the data was
performed throughout the data gathering and analysis process.
The examination of correlation, if any, between law enforcement workforce
classification and performance, costs and associated HPRC was performed in Chapter
4 – Findings. Through SPSS linear regression, statistical analysis was performed for
each of the dependent variables compared to the independent and control variables.
The control variables were accumulated and analyzed in helping determine the
comparability of data amongst the three independent variable classifications (associated
with workforce classification): 1) Non-collective bargaining (what the following variables
of mediation and arbitration are being compared to); 2) Collective bargaining through
mediation (included in the model); and 3) Collective bargaining through mandatory
arbitration (included in the model).
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The control variables were reviewed to determine the representativeness of the
sample to the entire population of local law enforcement organizations. This was
accomplished via two manners: Research design control and statistical control. For
research design control, a representative cross-section of many types of localities was
selected (as the entire data set of National Citizen Survey participants was utilized) so
that the results are more generalizable to the whole population of localities. For
statistical control, the various control variables were specifically selected (e.g.,
population, bond ratings, density) and statistically analyzed to ensure that such
variables are not linked to the differences between results of the hypothesis being
tested (performance, cost, and high performance return on costs).
As the hypotheses are the basis from which this research is conducted and
findings are emulated, they are illustrated again below:


Law Enforcement Performance Hypotheses (1)
o Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when
compared to non-collective bargaining
o Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when
compared to non-collective bargaining



Law Enforcement Cost Hypotheses (2)
o Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to noncollective bargaining
o Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to noncollective bargaining



Law Enforcement Higher Performance Return on Costs Hypotheses (3)
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o Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining
o Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining

As part of the findings, the results may be based upon the result of random
chance rather than an actual relationship between the variables; therefore the
hypothesis is neither proven nor rejected as part of this research. Because the research
is focused on correlation (positive or negative relationship) and not causation, the
hypothesis cannot be confirmed as definitively true or false (SPSS, 2009). Rather, a null
hypothesis (no relationship) is formulated that will either be rejected or fail to be rejected
as that is the only manner of supporting a hypothesis – by refuting (nullifying) a null
hypothesis (McDonald, 2009). A deductive valid rejection of a null hypothesis may
occur, yet not achieve a deductively valid affirmation of it. The examination of how all of
these variables are possibly correlated or not is the goal of this research and possible
considerations of future research if certain correlations emerge. Therefore, the following
null hypotheses have been formulated:


Law Enforcement Performance Null Hypotheses (1)
o Null Hypothesis 1A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when
compared to non-collective bargaining
o Null Hypothesis 1B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when
compared to non-collective bargaining



Law Enforcement Cost Null Hypotheses (2)
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o Null Hypothesis 2A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to noncollective bargaining
o Null Hypothesis 2B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to noncollective bargaining


Law Enforcement Higher Performance Return on Costs Null Hypotheses (3)
o Null Hypothesis 3A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining
o Null Hypothesis 3B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to non-collective bargaining

Hypothesis 1A and 1B: Findings and Null Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification
of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to non-collective
bargaining


Null Hypothesis 1A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to
non-collective bargaining

Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification
of mediation and higher performance attributes when compared to non-collective
bargaining


Null Hypothesis 1B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when compared to
non-collective bargaining
As noted in Chapter 3 – Research Design and Methodology, the composite

performance measure (includes survey, crime rates (violent and property) and
accreditation factors) was calculated for each of the local governments in the sample.
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This composite performance measure was then analyzed via SPSS linear regression.
Table 5.1: Composite Performance Measure illustrates the following:


Model Summary – r square: .603 which indicates on average the model’s
predictions are 60% better than guessing the mean. The small variance between
the r square (.603) and adjusted r square (.580) are also indicative of good model
of data producing results (adjusted r square is 3.8% less than r square).



ANOVA – F value: 26.223 and significance of .000 which indicates that the
overall model produces better results than simply guessing the mean.



VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst
the variables. Low scores indicate that the independent variables are not heavily
inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.



Coefficients:
o Significant (<.05): Median household income, density, age, survey quality,
city and mediation all appear to be significant.
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-statistic (of those noted as
significant) are listed in the following order of greatest relationship:


Median household Income ($000) (beta .389 and t-statistic 5.985)
with an unstandardized coefficient B of .24 indicates that for every
unit change of $1000 in the median household income (mean 59.0
($000) or $59,000), there is a .24 increase in the composite
performance index (mean 46.5).

244



Survey Quality of Life (beta .363 and t-statistic 5.354) with an
unstandardized coefficient B of 30.363 indicates that for every unit
change of 1 in the survey – quality of life score (mean .76); there is
a 30.363 increase in the composite performance index (mean
46.5). A better way to illustrate is for every unit change of .1 (10%)
in survey quality of life score, there is a 3.0 increase to the
composite performance index.



Age (beta .170 and t-statistic 3.461) with an unstandardized
coefficient B of 24.5 indicates that for every unit change of 1 in age
15-24% (mean .16); there is a 24.5 increase to the composite
performance index (mean 46.5). A better way to illustrate is for
every unit change of .1 (10%) in age 15-24%, there is a 2.5
increase to the composite performance index. This result may
appear to be counter-intuitive as it was previously noted a
correlation of this age bracket and higher probability for crimes
committed. However, other mitigating circumstances may lend
themselves to higher performance. Examples could include: 1)
Higher proportion in an older age bracket; or 2) More citizenfriendly survey responses for those in portion of age bracket (2125).



City (beta -.155 and t-statistic -3.036) with an unstandardized
coefficient B of -5.2 indicates that cities, on average, have a 5.2
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lower composite performance index (mean 46.5) when compared to
towns.


Density (beta -.146 and t-statistic – 2.977) with an unstandardized
coefficient B of -.001 indicates that for every unit change of 1 in
density (mean 2378.7); there is a decrease to the composite
performance index (mean 46.5) of -.001. A better way to illustrate is
for every unit change of 100 in density there is a decrease to the
composite performance index of -.1.



Mediation – Hypothesis 1B (beta -.126 and t-statistic -2.247) with
an unstandardized coefficient B of -3.49 indicates that mediation
localities, on average, have a 3.49 lower composite performance
index (mean 46.5) when compared to non-collective bargaining
localities and 4.98 lower composite index when compared to
arbitration and its 1.49 increased composite performance index.

As median household incomes, survey – quality of life scores or age 15-24% of
population increases, the composite performance score of law enforcement services
also increase. This means some combination of higher favorable rating on law
enforcement survey questions on how safe does a citizen feel, lower violent or property
crimes; or law enforcement national accreditation pursuit or attainment has occurred.
This may be due to overall abilities of higher income and quality of life attributes mitigate
crime from occurring and/or enable law enforcement to perform at a higher level
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whereas the age factor may also represent a more family-friendly area in deterring
crime. The inverse relationship exists for density in that as population density increases,
the composite performance score of law enforcement decreases. This may be due to
the challenges of performance for higher density areas in the calls for service that may
result from citizens interacting in closer proximity. There also appears to be a contrast
between cities and counties with cities decreasing the composite measure score when
compared to towns. This may be due to how citizens are exposed to law enforcement
and its ability to deter crime at a greater rate in the towns than in the cities. However,
further research would need to be done in order to further isolate determining factors for
why these relationships of variables to increased or decreased composite performance
measures exist.
In regards to workforce classification, mediation (Hypothesis 1B) has a
decreased composite performance measure. All of the other variables were not
significant enough to warrant any further analysis in regards to relationship to composite
performance measure. There may be some determining factor localities with a
mediation possess to warrant a decreased composite performance measure (e.g.,
workforce constraints to adopt low crime rate strategies; accreditation pursuit lacking;
and/or engaging and informing their citizens of safety-quality measures and related
survey question measures). As an example, law enforcement organizations with
mediation workforce classification may not have gained the confidence of their citizens
in addressing crime as well as non-collective bargaining or arbitration localities. This
may be because the general population of such localities does not share the same
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workforce classification status as those in the law enforcement organization and
therefore, may not empathize as well in how such challenges are addressed. While it
may be a challenge to control these factors, surveys may gauge the sentiment of
citizens in mediation and non-mediation localities to determine what may be correlation
of mediation to lower composite performance index. Rational Choice Theory attributes
(e.g., employee motivation) may also be less present in mediation localities. However,
further research would need to be done in order to further isolate determining factors for
why this relationship of mediation to decreased composite performance measure exists.
In addition, arbitration (Hypothesis 1A) is positive with its increased composite
performance measure, even though it was above the .05 significance threshold set for
further review. This means that arbitration is viewed more favorably than mediation and
non-collective bargaining, and while arbitration is not statistically different from noncollective bargaining, it does appear to be statistically different from mediation.
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Table 5.1: Composite Performance Measure

Model Summary
Model

R Square

R

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate

1

.777

a

.603

.580

8.58202

a. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County
Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt,
Unemployment Rate, Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates,
Median HH Inc (000)

a

ANOVA
Model

1

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

25107.560

13

1931.351

Residual

16497.835

224

73.651

Total

41605.395
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F
26.223

Sig.
.000

a. Dependent Variable: Performance Composite
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj
Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, Unemployment Rate, Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High
School Graduates, Median HH Inc (000)
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b

Coefficients
Model

a

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B

Std.

t

Sig.

Beta

Collinearity Statistics

Tolerance

VIF

Error
(Constant)

12.558

10.898

1.152

.250

-.001

.004

-.015

-.300

.764

.758

1.320

Bond Rating Adj Scale

.602

.865

.032

.696

.487

.860

1.163

High School Graduates

2.828

13.427

.013

.211

.833

.443

2.255

.238

.040

.389

5.965

.000

.416

2.406

-.001

.000

-.146

-2.977

.003

.733

1.365

-27.107

27.396

-.055

-.989

.324

.568

1.760

Age15to24%

24.451

7.065

.170

3.461

.001

.730

1.369

Survey-Quality of Life

30.363

5.670

.363

5.354

.000

.385

2.598

-.957

1.504

-.036

-.636

.525

.551

1.816

-5.158

1.699

-.155

-3.036

.003

.677

1.478

County (v. Town)

5.272

3.066

.094

1.720

.087

.595

1.682

Med (v. NCB (b))

-3.485

1.551

-.126

-2.247

.026

.566

1.765

Arb (v. NCB (b))

1.486

1.801

.054

.825

.410

.411

2.431

Population (000)

Median HH Inc (000)
Density
Unemployment Rate
1

Non Right-to-Work
State
City (v. Town)

c.

Dependent Variable: Perform Composite

d.

NCB (Non-collective bargaining)

Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which illustrated a correlation of
mediation to a lower composite performance measure, it would appear that the null
hypothesis 1B can be rejected as there appears to be a relationship between law
enforcement workforce classification of mediation and higher (or lower) performance
attributes. Rejection of the null hypothesis does not confirm the hypothesis. For
hypothesis 1A, because there was no such statistically significant correlation as it
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pertains to arbitration and higher (or lower) performance attributes, the null hypothesis
1A cannot be rejected.
Hypotheses 2A and 2B: Findings and Null Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification
of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-collective bargaining


Null Hypothesis 2A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-collective
bargaining

Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification
of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-collective bargaining


Null Hypothesis 2B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-collective
bargaining
Whereas hypotheses 1 were capturing the correlation, if any, between the

classification of the workforce and a variety of performance measure attributes,
hypotheses 2 captures the correlation between classification of the workforce and law
enforcement costs per capita. Table 5.2: Law Enforcement Costs per Capita illustrates
the following via SPSS linear regression:


Model Summary - r square: .187 which indicates on average the model’s
predictions are 18% better than guessing the mean; which is considered a low
prediction rate (note Hypothesis 1 had a 60% rate). The variance between the r
square (.187) and adjusted r square (.139) is actually a large variance
(unfavorable), with adjusted r square 25.7% below r square (whereas Hypothesis
1 had a variance of 3.8%). This may be correlated to the number of insignificant
variables being examined as part of this analysis as the greater number of
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variables added, the greater the chance of a larger spread between r-square and
adjusted r-square. Based upon this low r square and large variance, another
regression was conducted removing those insignificant variables that had a
significance factor > .250 in hopes that such significance variables were
impacting the adjusted r square. However, this resulted in only slightly improved
results - r square (.181) and adjusted r square (.152) with a high 16.0% variance.
Based upon this large variance, additional regression analyses were conducted
changing variables (e.g., lowering significance factor further to remove other
variables, changing composite of variables included in analysis) in hopes that
certain variables were impacting the results in producing a large variance
between r square and adjusted r square. However, there was an inability to make
improvements to the adjusted r square variance. Based upon these factors, the
model is not necessarily parsimonious from a statistical analysis (i.e., only slightly
better than guessing the mean). Therefore, the output for hypotheses 2 results
carry caveat of low r square and poor model and should not be overly relied upon
as part of a statistical analysis.


ANOVA – F value: 3.95 and significance of .000 which indicates that the overall
model produces better results than simply guessing the mean.



VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst
the variables. The low scores indicate that the independent variables are not
heavily inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.
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Coefficients:
o Significant (<.05): Non-right-to-work state, county and arbitration all
appear to be significant.
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-score (of those noted as significant)
are listed in the following order of greatest relationship:


Non-right-to-work state (beta .340 and t-statistic 4.190) with an
unstandardized coefficient B of 66.6 indicates that for non-right-towork states there is a $66.62 increased cost to the law enforcement
cost per capita (mean $236.30) when compared to right-to-work
states.



Arbitration – Hypothesis 2A (beta -.254 and t-statistic -2.701) with
an unstandardized coefficient B of -51.43 indicates that arbitration
localities, on average, have a $51.43 deceased cost to law
enforcement costs per capita (mean $236.30) when compared to
non-collective bargaining localities and $72.67 decreased cost
when compared to mediation and its $21.24 increased cost to law
enforcement costs.



County (beta -.189 and t-statistic -2.413) with an unstandardized
coefficient B of -78.24 indicates that counties have a $78.25
decreased cost to law enforcement costs per capita (mean
$236.30) when compared to towns.

253

Therefore, for localities that have arbitration for law enforcement when compared
to the other workforce classifications or are a county when compared to towns, there is
a relationship to either of those statuses and decreased law enforcement costs per
capita. For non-right-to-work states, there is a relationship to increased law enforcement
costs. All of the other variables were not significant enough to warrant any further
analysis in regards to relationship to law enforcement costs.
Reasons supporting a lower cost environment for arbitration could be attributable
to sensitivity to union-negotiated practices regarding compensation and benefits that
other facets of operations (e.g., vehicle replacements, equipment, training) may be
lower than other localities. There may also be practices existing in arbitration localities
that through their empowered union, they may not be as susceptible to political or other
distractions in provision of law enforcement services and its related costs (e.g., hiring
additional personnel). Rational Choice Theory attributes (e.g., efficiency in rational goal
attainment) may also be more present in arbitration localities. There may also be
reasons for non-right-to-work states that support a higher cost environment and
counties that support a lower cost environment (e.g., states with greater union-friendly
practices may have higher service costs whereas counties may be able to run more
efficiently without urban challenges). However, further research would need to be done
in order to further isolate determining factors for why this relationship of arbitration to
decreased law enforcement costs per capita exists as well as the relationships of nonright-to-work states and counties.
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Table 5.2: Law Enforcement Costs Per Capita
Model Summary
Model

R Square

R

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the
Estimate

1

.432

a

.187

.139

90.755

a. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County
Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt,
Unemployment Rate, Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates,
Median HH Inc (000)

a

ANOVA
Model

Sum of

df

Mean Square

F

Sig.

Squares
Regression
1

423124.372

13

32548.029

Residual

1844989.359

224

8236.560

Total

2268113.731

237

3.952

.000

b

a. Dependent Variable: Law Enfor Exp per Capita
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arbitration, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County Local Govt,
Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt, Unemployment Rate,
Meditation, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates, Median HH Inc (000)
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Coefficients
Model

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B
(Constant)

a

Std. Error

.571

.758

1.320

9.149

.098

1.503

.134

.860

1.163

36.611

141.990

.023

.258

.797

.443

2.255

-.220

.421

-.049

-.522

.602

.416

2.406

.005

.004

.080

1.142

.255

.733

1.365

352.208

289.719

.097

1.216

.225

.568

1.760

-100.713

74.717

-.095

-1.348

.179

.730

1.369

-2.213

59.966

-.004

-.037

.971

.385

2.598

66.629

15.902

.340

4.190

.000

.551

1.816

City (v. Town)

-24.269

17.963

-.099

-1.351

.178

.677

1.478

County (v. Town)

-78.245

32.424

-.189

-2.413

.017

.595

1.682

Med (v. NCB)

21.736

16.401

.106

1.325

.186

.566

1.765

Arb (V. NCB)

-51.435

19.044

-.254

-2.701

.007

.411

2.431

Median HH Inc (000)
Density
Unemployment Rate
Age15to24%
Survey-Quality of Life
Non Right-to-Work
State

13.747

VIF

-.568

Graduates

.043

Tolerance

-.039

High School

-.025

Beta

Collinearity Statistics

.119

Bond Rating Adj Scale

115.245

Sig.

1.564

Population (000)

180.222

t

a. Dependent Variable: LE Exp per Capita

Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which illustrated a correlation of
arbitration to decreased law enforcement costs per capita, it would appear that the null
hypothesis 2A can be rejected as there appears to be a relationship between an
element of law enforcement workforce classification (arbitration) and law enforcement
costs per capita (does not confirm the hypothesis). Because of the inability of the
statistical tests to illustrate a correlation of mediation to increased (or decreased) law
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enforcement costs per capita, it would appear that the null hypothesis 2B cannot be
rejected.
As noted, because of the low r square and large variance to adjusted r square,
the variability amongst the data has given rise to a model that may be only slightly
better than guessing the mean; even after removing low significance variables from data
output analysis in attempting to lower the variance between r square and adjusted r
square. Therefore, the results appropriately disclose this challenge to the model and
would require further research to best ascertain other variables, if any, that may
produce a more parsimonious model. However, such low r squares may also be
indicative of a null hypothesis that may fail to be rejected on the underlying data.

Hypotheses 3A and 3B: Findings and Null Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification
of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite measure when
compared to non-collective bargaining


Null Hypothesis 3A: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining

Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce classification
of mediation and higher performance return on costs composite measure when
compared to non-collective bargaining


Null Hypothesis 3B: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs composite
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining
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The goal of the hypothesis 3 is to calculate and then analyze a high performance
return on costs (HPRC) from the data variables in the two previous hypotheses. From
the HPRC quantified factor for each locality (composite performance measure/law
enforcement costs per capita), a statistical analysis can be performed of this factor and
the classification factor of the workforce.
In performing the statistical analysis initially using the same control variables in
the prior hypothesis tests, many of these variables resulted in high “significance” results
which indicate high correlations of inapplicability of such variables amongst the data set.
This may have also given rise to large variance between adjusted r square and r square
(81.8%). Appendix H – Hypotheses 3 Full Variable Result Table provides the result of
such initial statistical analysis. In trying to negate the effects of such irrelevant variables,
the statistical analysis for hypotheses 3 was refined to include those control variables
with a lower rate of risk on the analysis. A threshold of significance use for a revised set
of control variables, included in this section’s analysis, included only those below a
significance of .250 (high school graduates, median household incomes, non-right-towork states and county government).
Table 5.3: High Performance Return on Costs illustrates the following via SPSS
linear regression:


Model Summary - r square: .056 which indicates on average the model’s
predictions are 5% better than guessing the mean. This a very low percentage
which reflects that there is not much difference between predictions and
guessing the mean. The variance between the r square (.056) and adjusted r
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square (.031) is actually a large variance (unfavorable), with adjusted r square
44.6% below r square (whereas Hypotheses 1 had a variance of 3.8%, but an
improvement from the initial Hypotheses 3 variance of 81.8% as noted in
Appendix H). This may be correlated to the number of variables being examined
as part of this analysis as the greater number of variables added, the greater the
chance of a larger spread between r-square and adjusted r-square. Based upon
this large variance, additional regression analyses were conducted by changing
variables (e.g., lowering significance factor further to remove other variables,
changing composite of variables included) in hopes that certain variables were
impacting the results in producing a large variances between r square and
adjusted r square. However, there was an inability to make improvements to the r
square and adjusted r square variance. Based upon these factors, the model is
not necessarily good from a statistical analysis (i.e., only slightly better than
guessing the mean). Therefore, the output for hypothesis 3 results carry caveat
of low r square and high variance with adjusted r square; which results in a
model that is not robust and should not be overly relied upon as part of a
statistical analysis.


ANOVA – F value: 2.268 and significance of .038 which indicates that the overall
model produces better results than simply guessing the mean.



VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst
the variables. The low scores indicate that the independent variables are not
heavily inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.
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Coefficients:
o Significant (<.05): Median household income and county appears to be
significant.
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-score (of those noted as significant)
are listed in the following order of greatest relationship:


Median Household Income ($000) (beta .190 and t-statistic 2.400)
with an unstandardized coefficient B of .314 indicates that for every
unit change of $1000 in the median household income (mean 59.0
($000) or $59,000), there is a .314 increase in the HPRC index
(mean 27.28).



County (beta .159 and t-statistic 2.426) with an unstandardized
coefficient B of 24.156 indicates that counties have a 24.156
increase in the HPRC index (mean 27.28) when compared to
towns.

Therefore, as median household incomes increases, the HPRC index for law
enforcement services also increases. This may indicate that higher median household
income localities enable a lower costing law enforcement organization to also perform
better as there are less opportunities for crime to occur, more time dedicated to
accreditation and/or a higher survey satisfaction rate. This may also be the result that
higher median household incomes also may follow better practices of crime reduction
strategies (e.g., securing their households and vehicles better; contacting law
enforcement about suspicious activity or crime alert hotline tips; or be less positioned to
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commit crimes because of higher incomes). There is also a correlation of counties
having an increased HPRC index when compared to other (e.g., towns). This may be
the result of counties without the urban challenges faced in many cities or towns being
able to perform better at a lower cost. Further research would be necessary to
determine what, if any, of these potential underlying scenarios for median household
incomes and counties could yield HPRC. All of the other variables were not significant
enough to warrant any further analysis in regards to relationship to HPRC.

Table 5.3: High Performance Return on Costs

Model Summary
Model

1

R

R Square

.236

a

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate

.056

.031

35.37148

a. Predictors: (Constant), Arb, Median HH Inc (000), County Local
Govt, High School Graduates, Med, Non Right-to-Work State
a

ANOVA
Model

Sum of Squares
Regression

1

df

Mean Square

17022.663

6

2837.110

Residual

289013.787

231

1251.142

Total

306036.450

237

F
2.268

Sig.
.038

a. Dependent Variable: HPRC
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arb, Median HH Inc (000), County Local Govt, High School Graduates,
Med, Non Right-to-Work State
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b

Coefficients
Model

a

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B

Std.

t

Sig.

Beta

Collinearity Statistics

Tolerance

VIF

Error
(Constant)

1.687

.093

-.102

-1.314

.190

.674

1.483

.131

.190

2.400

.017

.652

1.533

-7.748

6.046

-.108

-1.282

.201

.579

1.728

24.156

9.957

.159

2.426

.016

.958

1.044

Med

.354

6.094

.005

.058

.954

.623

1.604

Arb

5.356

7.294

.072

.734

.464

.426

2.347

High School Graduates
Median HH Inc (000)
1 Non Right-to-Work State
County Local Govt

61.968

36.739

-58.975

44.875

.314

a. Dependent Variable: HPRC

Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which did not illustrate a correlation of
workforce classification to change in HPRC index, it would appear that the null
hypotheses 3 (both 3A and 3B) cannot be rejected.
As noted, because of the low r square and large variance to adjusted r square,
the variability amongst the data has given rise to a model that may be only slightly
better than guessing the mean; even after removing high significance variables from
data output analysis in trying to lower the variance between r square and adjusted r
square. Therefore, the results appropriately disclose this challenge to the model and
would require further research to best ascertain other variables, if any, which may
produce a better and more robust model. However, a low r-square indicates a weak
model overall therefore it is difficult to draw strong conclusions even if the null
hypothesis could be rejected, it would be with caution.
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Hypothesis Results Summarized
Based upon the preceding statistical results, findings for each of the hypothesis
can be stated (also summarized in Table 5.4: Null Hypotheses Findings).


Hypothesis 1A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to
non-collective bargaining
o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential
relationships identified in this research).
o For control variables, potential relationships exist with median household
income (positive), density (negative), age (positive), survey quality
(positive) and city (negative). This applies to hypothesis 1B also.



Hypothesis 1B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance attributes when compared to
non-collective bargaining

o The null hypothesis of no relationship was rejected (mediation (negative))
when compared amongst non-collective bargaining as results indicate
potential relationship.
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Hypothesis 2A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to non-collective
bargaining

o The null hypothesis of no relationship was rejected (arbitration (negative))
when compared amongst non-collective bargaining as results indicate
potential relationship.
o For control variables, potential relationships exist with non-right-to-work
state (positive) and county (negative). This applies to hypothesis 2B also.
o However, because of low r squares and large variance between r square
and adjusted r square, the model’s output is only slightly better than
guessing the mean. Even after removing variables with high significance
or other traits in a variety of analysis, the variance between r square and
adjusted r square were not improved. Therefore, because of the model’s
limitations in not being parsimonious, the preceding results may not be as
valid as data output and analysis that yielded a higher r square and a
lower variance to adjusted r square. This applies to hypothesis 2B also.



Hypothesis 2B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher costs when compared to non-collective
bargaining

o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential
relationships identified in this research).
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.
Hypothesis 3A: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining

o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential
relationships identified in this research).
o For control variables, potential relationships exist with median household
income (positive) and counties (positive). This also applies to hypothesis
3B.
o However, because of low r squares and large variance between r square
and adjusted r square, the model’s output is only slightly better than
guessing the mean. Even after removing variables with high significance
or other traits in a variety of analysis, the variance between r square and
adjusted r square were not improved. Therefore, because of the model’s
limitations in not being parsimonious, the preceding results may not be as
valid as data output and analysis that yielded a higher r square and a
lower variance to adjusted r square. This also applies to hypothesis 3B.



Hypothesis 3B: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of mediation and higher performance return on costs composite
measure when compared to non-collective bargaining

o The null hypothesis of no relationship failed to be rejected (no potential
relationships identified in this research).
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While two of the six null hypotheses were rejected, there are observations of
these research findings worthy of further discussion. As indicated in Chapter 1 –
Introduction, the advocacy groups with strong opinions about the high costs of unions
and low performance results is contrasted by those advocacy groups that attribute
unions as an inherent trait needed to meet a worker’s needs and provide for a safe and
productive workplace towards a high performing organization. These sentiments and
related research helped give rise to the problem statement, research question and
hypothesis development. Because the null hypothesis was rejected two out of six times,
there appears to be a possible correlation from this research between workforce
classification and a law enforcement organization’s ability to perform better and at a
lower cost, but no correlation in regards to higher performance return on costs (HPRC).

266

Table 5.4: Null Hypotheses Findings

Comparison of Results to Other Studies
Chapter 4 – Findings provided a summary of other studies in high performance
organizations and related HPRC, collective bargaining and law enforcement services.
There were no expectations with regards to any of the results, although from an initial
review of the literature and related research, there were attributes of higher personnel
costs associated with collective bargaining and higher performance measures
associated with more educated and higher median income areas. While there was no
one research study found to cover all three subject areas, Freeman and Ichinowski
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(1988) compared teacher unions with greater and lesser unionization with the result that
collective bargaining correlated to higher teacher salaries and generally higher
educational performance. Comparison of different types of workers (teacher vs. police
officer) with different training and related needs to perform their job function is
challenging and would be subject to validity concerns. However, additional research
may be needed across professions to see if there are any similar outcomes of workforce
classification and HPRC and if so, are there traits between professions that contribute to
such similarity.
For those studies in which law enforcement was the research topic, the studies
(example: Feuille, Delaney and Hendricks (1985)) that illustrated a correlation between
a collective bargaining atmosphere and greater workforce influence, it appears that
such measures in these studies do not necessarily reference high performance
organization or HPRC traits, but rather other matters of workforce influence (e.g., higher
pay and benefits, job protection, workplace environment conditions). This research
project did not correlate workforce classification to the array of workplace topics
deemed to be “influential” as its focus was on HPRC.
For those studies (example: Zhao and Lovrich (1997)) that determined higher
compensation and benefits to the law enforcement worker with collective bargaining
abilities, no such correlation was determined as part of this research. As the law
enforcement costs for this research used the total costs of the law enforcement
organization, it was not possible to determine the salaries and benefit costs that could
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be better compared to other research in this area. Perhaps if other studies indicate
positive correlations of salaries and benefits to levels of workforce classification and the
researched performed as part of this study indicate higher overall (salaries, benefits,
operating and capital) law enforcement costs per capita for non-collective bargaining
and mediation, but lesser costs per capita for arbitration, then perhaps variances exist
between the non-salaries and benefits expenses to offset the higher salaries and
benefits. Note that mediation did illustrate higher costs per capita, so further research
may be needed to determine variations between these two forms of workforce
classification.

Further Research in Workforce Classification and HPOs
Further research on this problem statement should incorporate some aspect of
longitudinal studies to determine the effect of trends and data over time and if the same
correlations (or lack of correlations) result. A significant contribution of this study is that
it seeks to not focus on just costs, but to put any costs in context with performance for
local government law enforcement services. The ability to know whether there is a result
or not of collective bargaining as it pertains to a law enforcement HPO can help to
include that variable in future discussions; and if there is no correlation, then it is
appropriate to not include that variable in future discussions. The introduction of a new
composite measure, high performance return on costs (HPRC), also adds to the
significance of the study as such calculation can potentially correlate costs to
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performance and enable such calculations to be uniformly compiled, compared and
contrasted.
Additional manners in how HPRC could be calculated and assigning different
weight to the criteria and its outcome on the HPRC score would also benefit from
research. Eventually each organization, public and private, should develop some metric
in knowing how well it is performing. Comparison of similarly designed and data
captured metrics amongst peers further illustrates how well one organization is doing
when compared to another and to industry benchmarks. Because some organizations
may have a variety of professions that are motivated in maximizing the utility (rational
choice theory) via different manners, the development of universal metrics is
challenging in any organization. Perhaps multiple metric development and research of
varying metrics and their outcomes in motivating the workforce to perform at HPO level
would also benefit the profession.
Additional research will also be need to be performed with clearance rates that
localities submit to the FBI, but are not captured in a manner that appears to be
consistent to the underlying crimes cleared nor shared in a public manner to lend itself
to developing comparative peer calculations or industry standards based upon socioeconomic profile of the local government. The compilation of peer local governments
with similar socio-economic and demand factors would greatly benefit research.
As an example of other demand factors besides population that are worthy of
further consideration in determining proper indices (e.g., crime rate) of the demands
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placed upon law enforcement would include tourism and business activities. These
activities may not correlate to a local government’s population proportionally, therefore
making comparative crime indices that much more challenging. Unfortunately, data
availability for such factors (e.g., number of hotel rooms, number of employees) by local
government are not readily available and in many cases, not publicly shared.
Current implications for practice and policy as a result of this research could
focus upon the following:
•

Positioning the local government for a higher performance return on costs (e.g.,
developing strategies to improve the median household incomes) based upon
variables with high correlation between increasing in value and positively
impacting the HPRC ratio.

•

Local government participation in national citizen surveys with comparable
benchmarks can help determine performance attributes (e.g., “how safe do you
feel”).

•

National law enforcement accreditation practices should be researched by more
local governments with pursuit of accreditation considered.
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Conclusion
The research addressed in this analysis is an example to not merely focus on the
results of performance and costs; but also recognize that there are internationally
established rights of workers that need to be respected so that any short-term
accomplishments (lower costs) do not result in lower performance. Conversely,
increased costs without an improvement to performance need to also be gauged to
ensure that the tax burden is leveraging the best relative array of services in a high
performing manner.
The importance of this issue is justified from the perspective that public sector
collective bargaining is a topic that continues to be raised as to what the return on
taxpayer investment (performance) accrues for the benefits bestowed on protected
employees. As local governments are becoming further scrutinized by taxpayers to
have an appropriate array of high performing services in both effective and efficient
manners, workforce classification (via collective or non-collective bargaining) can be
isolated as an independent variable to determine if it has any impacts or effect upon
high performing results. In addition, while effectiveness measures (output, outcome) of
performance are one attribute of correlation to performance, the comparison and
contrast to the relative cost (efficiency measures) is another key attribute of
performance. Together these effectiveness and efficiency measures need to both excel
for a HPO.
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The importance of this issue from a citizen’s perspective is that the more safe
and secure their community is, the higher their quality of life in relation to a variety of
factors (CNBC, 2012). For example, higher crime areas may adversely affect property
values as evidenced by a decrease in home property values of 10% for areas with a
higher crime rate of one standard deviation (Gibbons, 2004). This is where HPOs in the
public sector distinguish themselves from the private sector. For the private sector, the
HPO may garner a more secure customer base and yield greater profits; however, for
the public sector entity, the HPO factors translate into positive quality of life attributes for
citizens and productive environment for businesses; all with a reasonable tax burden
that maximizes the potential of return on investment of such tax burden.
If additional costs can yield higher performance, then it would be appropriate to
best gauge the high performance return on costs of such additional cost and the
incremental marginal utility rewards. From an economic perspective, there will be a
point at which such marginal utility is diminished to the point that such additional cost
investment does not provide a return on such investment (Hicks, 1935); or in this case a
higher performance return on costs. From a public sector perspective, this point may be
debated as there can be subjective determinants as to what is defined as “return” as
there may exist more qualitative factors in the public sector than private sector.
However, if agreed-upon objective measures of performance can be assembled
together with a consistent cost basis by which such services are performed, then
correlations of costs to higher performance can possibly be calculated, analyzed and
further discussed.
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As certain variables illustrated relationships to performance, costs and HPRC,
many variables exhibited no relationship. Median household incomes and counties
provided the only relationship to HPRC. For median household incomes, this may
illustrate the wealth factor that provides the means to demand less upon their law
enforcement services while yielding high survey results, for which the costs provided for
such service are low enough to generate a high HPRC. For counties, this may illustrate
the abilities of counties to have an environment more conducive to higher performance
and lower costs that may not exist in more urban areas. The findings rejected the null
hypothesis in two of the six separate tests in determining whether or not there was a
correlation between workforce classification (independent variable) and 1) Performance
(mediation was lower performance); 2) Costs (arbitration was lower costs) and 3) High
performance return on costs (no rejection of null). There may be underlying factors that
determined these correlations to arise in performance and cost; including some of the
motivation factors addressed in Rational Choice Theory. These findings should only
serve those with strong advocacy opinions on either side of this political debate that
further research is needed in this area and less rhetoric.
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APPENDIX A - RESEARCH IDENTITY MEMO
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES:
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND COST IN
COLLECTIVE AND NON-COLLCTIVE BARGAINING WORKFORCES
Joseph P. Casey

March 21, 2012

There have been prior experiences I have had that are relevant to this topic or
setting. I was raised in a household with a very pro-union parent who leveraged the
power of her teacher’s union to keep pace with other collective bargaining professions
which were perceived to be of less educational or technical demand (e.g., solid waste
collection). In my own career, I work for a local government in Virginia where non-union
forces have resulted in a workforce that is perceived to be of equal merit and receives
equal compensation increases and benefits.
Beginning in 2008, I closely monitored Federal legislative proposals that would
mandate collective bargaining to all public safety workers in every state. The names of
these proposals were titled “Employee Free Choice Act” and Public Safety EmployerEmployee Cooperation Act.” While this legislation did not prevail, it was heavily
scrutinized from a local government management perspective as the Federal
government’s intrusion into a state’s existing “right-to-work” laws. In addition, such
legislation, if passed, would have changed the scope of my job as a component of the
job would be devoted to collective bargaining agreements and potential for higher
wages and benefits being negotiated for public safety workers that would be greater
than the rest of the local government workforce.
There are certain assumptions that have resulted from these experiences. One
assumption is that it should be the decision of local government officials and the
community whether the merits of a union would result in better services at a reasonable
cost. Secondly, although I have not been in a union, I have had experience with
“mandatory dues” and other practices that coerce the worker into actions that they
otherwise would not take on their own free will.
There are also goals that have emerged from these experiences, some of which
have become important. An overarching goal is to have an unbiased perspective in
determining if there is a differentiation between performance, cost and collective
bargaining. Also, it is important to respect that the evolution of certain unions was the
direct result of poor working conditions, adverse actions on the rights of employees and
below market compensation and benefits. Finally, through leveraging various contacts
to gather information and potentially observe and interview both organizations is critical
in collecting background information that can better frame the data population to be
analyzed.
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The experiences and assumptions mentioned previously and goal to address this
topic in an unbiased perspective helped shape my decision to choose this topic. It is
important to me to determining if there is a cause-effect between unions and
performance and cost.. The potential advantages in this study would include a balanced
background and experiences which will enable the gathering of accurate information to
be analyzed impartially. A potential disadvantage is that many audiences to such
information and results have their own bias and assumptions that traditionally are hard
to overcome; even when presented with fresh information prepared in non-biased
manner.
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APPENDIX B – NATIONAL CITIZENS SURVEY
LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES QUESTIONS
Please rate how safe or unsafe you feel from the following in ABC:
 Violent crime (e.g., rape, assault, robbery)
 Property crimes (e.g., burglary, theft)
 Environmental hazards, including toxic waste
Please rate how safe or unsafe you feel:
 In your neighborhood during the day
 In your neighborhood after dark
 In ABC's downtown area during the day
 In ABC's downtown area after dark
During the past twelve months, were you or anyone in your household the victim of any
crime?
If yes, was this crime (these crimes) reported to the police?
Please rate the quality of each of the following services in ABC:
 Police services
 Crime prevention
 Traffic enforcement
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APPENDIX C – ICMA COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE
MEASUREMENT PROGRAM
The ICMA Comparative Performance Measurement Program includes several
hundred indicators and descriptors, but for the purpose of this research, the law
enforcement indicators were selected as a population of potential performance
measures to consider in dependent and control variables (ICMA, 2011). The indicators
utilized in this research are noted with “UTILIZED.” Refer to Chapter 3 - Research
Methodology and Design for the descriptions and process for selecting final indicators
used for performance and the control variables that best represent comparability
amongst local law enforcement organizations. Indicators and descriptors not selected
for variables to compile were due to the strength and representativeness of variables
selected or the limited data available amongst localities in the sample population (e.g.,
information not recorded by locality, survey constraints of time, effort and
responsiveness to gather such information). In addition, There were additional
variables utilized for this research that were not part of ICMA’s Comparative
Performance Measurement Program. Refer to Chapter 3 – Research Methodology
and Design for a complete list of such variables utilized.
Performance Measures (Dependent Variable Consideration)
Deterrence/Patrol Indicators










Number of crimes per 1000 population - UCR Part 1 Crime Rate (UTILIZED)
Number of crimes per 1000 population - Property Crime Rate (UTILIZED)
Number of police calls per patrol officer
Calls handled by means other than dispatch
Total calls to 911 police
Percent of commissioned personnel dedicated to patrol services (actual)
Average patrol time utilization per officer
Response time to emergency calls
Juvenile arrest rate

Service Provider Descriptors





Actual annual operating expenditures (UTILIZED)
Staff by type
Department cost
Specialized units (e.g., search and rescue)
 Provided by department
 Provided by other
 Dedicated unit
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Total Cost by unit

Apprehension/Investigation Indicators










Crimes cleared - UCR Part I Crimes reported
Crimes cleared - Violent crimes
Crimes cleared - Property crimes
Investigative personnel
Total department cost per arrest made
Total cost per crime cleared
Crimes against persons per investigator
Crimes against property per investigator
Investigation cost

Community Policing Descriptors




Do you have a community policing definition?
What constitutes your community policing?
Do you have dedicated community policing teams?

Miscellaneous Indicators


Number of Injury-producing traffic accidents per 1000 population

Control Variable Consideration
Service Area Descriptors









Population served (UTILIZED)
Square miles served (UTILIZED)
Median household income (UTILIZED)
Percentage below poverty level
Median age of population (UTILIZED, modified slightly to % age 15-24)
Juvenile population
Unemployment rate (UTILIZED)
Number of households
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APPENDIX D: PROPOSAL COMMON QUESTIONS AND PRELIMINARY ANSWERS














What contribution does your study make to the literature on this topic?
o Enables a perspective to focus on performance and not solely on costs as
many studies do in regards to collective bargaining.
What are the practical policy implications from this study?
o If there are correlations between performance and collective bargaining,
then future policy changes can be considered in regards to the benefits or
detriments of collective bargaining on performance.
How does this study contribute to our understanding of policy (or policy-making or
policy implementation) in this area?
o With focus on narrow field of law enforcement, policy implications can also
be narrowly focused with considerations of additional fields of collective
bargaining and their correlations to performance.
What are the limitations of your study design for answering your research question?
o Other variables extrinsic to the workplace will not be measured (e.g.,
quality of life attributes for workers, workers satisfaction rating with
workplace) or general gauge of support or non-support of unions by the
local residents being served.
What alternative research designs might you use to address those limitations?
o Determine if statistics are available to measure citizen composition of
unionized workers (via census possibly) or worker satisfaction (e.g.,
turnover ratios); although even turnover ratios may be difficult to compare
if the collective bargaining localities pay higher wages and/or make it more
difficult to leave one local government for a similar position in another local
government.
What are the next studies you would recommend to learn more about your research
question?
o Compare other collective bargaining positions in local government using
similar methodology and varying methodology to determine if replications
of results occur.
How do you explain …this pattern…in your findings? What alternative explanations
might exist to explain these findings?
o Question can be answered upon compilation of results.
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APPENDIX E – LAW ENFORCEMENT PERFORMANCE – ARBITRATION
COMPARED TO MEDIATION
In order to account for the independent variable amongst all the possibilities of
comparisons, Table 4.2: Composite Performance Measure was subject to a second
iteration. The one differential in how the data was analyzed was to compare arbitration
directly to mediation. Other variables subject to the analysis in Chapter 4 were not
repeated in this appendix because the underlying data and results for these other
variables is the same as the underlying data and results subject to this additional
statistical analysis. The hypothesis by which the comparison of arbitration to mediation
would be framed to be tested and the related null hypothesis tested would be stated as
follows:


Hypothesis: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when compared to
mediation
o Null Hypothesis: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance attributes when
compared to mediation

Based upon the results in the following table, the null hypothesis result is as
follows: The null hypothesis of no relationship was rejected (arbitration (positive)) when
compared to mediation as results indicate potential relationship.



Significance <.05: Arbitration appears to be significant
Arbitration Standardized Coefficient beta .181 and t-statistic 3.083 with an
unstandardized coefficient B of 4.97 indicates that arbitration localities, on
average, have a 4.97 higher composite performance index (mean 46.5) when
compared to mediation.

In regards to workforce classification, arbitration has an increased composite
performance measure when compared to mediation. There may be some determining
factors localities with arbitration possess to warrant an increased composite
performance measure (e.g., less workforce constraints to adopt low crime rate
strategies; accreditation pursuit encouraged; and/or engaging and informing their
citizens of safety-quality measures and related survey question measures). However,
further research would need to be done in order to further isolate determining factors for
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why this relationship of arbitration to increased composite performance measure exists
when compared to mediation.

Coefficients
Model

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B

Std. Error

(Constant)

9.073

10.949

Population (000)

-.001

.004

Bond Rating Adj

.602

a

T

Sig.

Beta

Collinearity Statistics

Tolerance

VIF

.829

.408

-.015

-.300

.764

.758

1.320

.865

.032

.696

.487

.860

1.163

2.828

13.427

.013

.211

.833

.443

2.255

.238

.040

.389

5.965

.000

.416

2.406

-.001

.000

-.146

-2.977

.003

.733

1.365

-27.107

27.396

-.055

-.989

.324

.568

1.760

Age15to24%

24.451

7.065

.170

3.461

.001

.730

1.369

Survey-Quality of

30.363

5.670

.363

5.354

.000

.385

2.598

-.957

1.504

-.036

-.636

.525

.551

1.816

-5.158

1.699

-.155

-3.036

.003

.677

1.478

County Local Govt

5.272

3.066

.094

1.720

.087

.595

1.682

Arb (v. Med)

4.971

1.612

.181

3.083

.002

.513

1.949

Non-Col Bargain

3.485

1.551

.119

2.247

.026

.630

1.586

Scale
High School
Graduates
Median HH Inc
(000)
Density
Unemployment
1 Rate

Life
Non Right-to-Work
State
City Local Govt

(v. Med)
a. Dependent Variable: PerformComposite
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APPENDIX F - LAW ENFORCEMENT COSTS – ARBITRATION COMPARED
TO MEDIATION
In order to account for the independent variable amongst all the possibilities of
comparisons, Table 4.3: Law Enforcement Costs per Capita was subject to a second
iteration. The one differential in how the data was analyzed was to compare arbitration
directly to mediation. Other variables subject to the analysis in Chapter 4 were not
repeated in this appendix because the underlying data and results for these other
variables is the same as the underlying data and results subject to this additional
statistical analysis. The hypothesis by which the comparison of arbitration to mediation
would be framed to be tested and the related null hypothesis tested would be stated as
follows:


Hypothesis: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to mediation
o Null Hypothesis: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher costs when compared to mediation

Based upon the results in the following table, the null hypothesis result is as
follows: The null hypothesis of no relationship was rejected (arbitration (negative)) when
compared to mediation as results indicate potential relationship.



Significance <.05: Arbitration appears to be significant
Arbitration Standardized Coefficient beta -.361 and t-statistic -4.291 with an
unstandardized coefficient B of -73.17 indicates that arbitration localities, on
average, have a $73.17 deceased cost to law enforcement costs per capita
(mean $236.30) when compared to mediation localities.

In regards to workforce classification, arbitration has a lower cost per capita than
mediation. There may be some determining factors localities with arbitration possess to
warrant a lower cost per capita (e.g., sensitivity to union-negotiated practices regarding
compensation and benefits that other facets of operations (e.g., vehicle replacements,
equipment, training) may be lower than other localities, not as susceptible to political or
other distractions in provision of law enforcement services and its related costs).
However, further research would need to be done in order to further isolate determining
factors for why this relationship of arbitration to decreased law enforcement costs per
capita exists.
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Coefficients
Model

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B
(Constant)

Std. Error

201.958

115.790

-.025

.043

Bond Rating Adj Scale

13.747

High School Graduates

a

t

Sig.

Beta

Collinearity Statistics

Tolerance

VIF

1.744

.082

-.039

-.568

.571

.758

1.320

9.149

.098

1.503

.134

.860

1.163

36.611

141.990

.023

.258

.797

.443

2.255

-.220

.421

-.049

-.522

.602

.416

2.406

.005

.004

.080

1.142

.255

.733

1.365

352.208

289.719

.097

1.216

.225

.568

1.760

-100.713

74.717

-.095

-1.348

.179

.730

1.369

Survey-Quality of Life

-2.213

59.966

-.004

-.037

.971

.385

2.598

Non Right-to-Work State

66.629

15.902

.340

4.190

.000

.551

1.816

City Local Govt

-24.269

17.963

-.099

-1.351

.178

.677

1.478

County Local Govt

-78.245

32.424

-.189

-2.413

.017

.595

1.682

Arb (v. Med)

-73.171

17.052

-.361

-4.291

.000

.513

1.949

Non-Col Bargain (v.

-21.736

16.401

-.101

-1.325

.186

.630

1.586

Population (000)

Median HH Inc (000)
Density
Unemployment Rate
1 Age15to24%

Med)
a. Dependent Variable: LE Exp per Capita
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APPENDIX G - LAW ENFORCEMENT HIGH PERFORMANCE RETURN ON
COSTS – ARBITRATION COMPARED TO MEDIATION
In order to account for the independent variable amongst all the possibilities of
comparisons, Table 4.4: High Performance Return on Costs was subject to a second
iteration. The one differential in how the data was analyzed was to compare arbitration
directly to mediation. Other variables subject to the analysis in Chapter 4 were not
repeated in this appendix because the underlying data and results for these other
variables is the same as the underlying data and results subject to this additional
statistical analysis. The hypothesis by which the comparison of arbitration to mediation
would be framed to be tested and the related null hypothesis tested would be stated as
follows:


Hypothesis: Positive relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs composite
measure when compared to mediation
o Null Hypothesis: No relationship between law enforcement workforce
classification of arbitration and higher performance return on costs
composite measure when compared to mediation

Based upon the results in the following tables, the null hypothesis result is as
follows: The null hypothesis of no relationship was not rejected when compared to
mediation as results do not indicate potential relationship.


Significance <.05: Arbitration does not appears to be significant
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Coefficients
Model

Unstandardized

Standardized

Coefficients

Coefficients

B
(Constant)

Std. Error

62.322

36.173

-58.975

44.875

.314

Non Right-to-Work State
County Local Govt

t

Sig.

Beta

Collinearity Statistics

Tolerance

VIF

1.723

.086

-.102

-1.314

.190

.674

1.483

.131

.190

2.400

.017

.652

1.533

-7.748

6.046

-.108

-1.282

.201

.579

1.728

24.156

9.957

.159

2.426

.016

.958

1.044

Arb (v. Med)

5.001

6.331

.067

.790

.430

.565

1.769

Non-Col Bargain (v. Med)

-.354

6.094

-.004

-.058

.954

.694

1.442

High School Graduates
Median HH Inc (000)
1

a

a. Dependent Variable: HPRC
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APPENDIX H: HYOTHESES 3 FULL VARIABLE RESULT TABLE
As identified in Chapter 4 – Findings, the initial statistical output for all variables
resulted in many variables having a very high significance factor which increased the
risk that the output results could not be evaluated as well. Therefore, a second analysis
was performed for refined control variables that were below a significance of .250 with
such results available in Chapter 4 – Findings for the Hypotheses 3. The following is the
initial statistical output performed, of which, the initial observations are also included.
High Performance Return on Costs illustrates the following via SPSS linear
regression:
 Model Summary - r square: .066 which indicates on average the model’s
predictions are 6% better than guessing the mean; essentially the model is no
better than guessing the mean. The large variance between the r square (.066)
and adjusted r square (.012) are also indicative of poor model of data producing
results.
 ANOVA – F value: 1.219 and significance of .266 which indicates that the overall
model produces better results than simply guessing the mean.
 VIF: The variance inflation factor examines the underlying relationship amongst
the variables. The low scores indicate that the independent variables are not
heavily inter-correlated. High inter-correlation can impact the standard errors.
 Coefficients:
o Significant (<.05): Median household income appears to be significant
o Standardized coefficient – Beta and t-score:
 Median household income ($000) (beta .217 and t-statistic 2.17)
with an unstandardized coefficient B of .36 that for every unit
change of $1000 in the median household income (mean 59.0
($000) or $59,000), there is a .36 increase in the high performance
return on costs composite performance index (mean 27.3)
Therefore, as median household incomes increases, the high performance return
on costs scores for law enforcement services also increase. All of the other variables
were not significant enough to warrant any further analysis in regards to relationship to
HPRC.
Based upon the preceding statistical tests, which illustrated no relationship basis
for non-collective bargaining, mediation or arbitration, it would appear that the null
hypotheses 3A and 3B cannot be rejected as there appears to be no relationship
between these elements of law enforcement workforce classification and high
performance return on costs for law enforcement services.
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Model Summary
Model

1

R Square

R

.257

a

Adjusted R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate

.066

.012

35.72022

a. Predictors: (Constant), Arb, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%,
County Local Govt, Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000),
City Local Govt, Unemployment Rate, Med, Right-to-Work State, High
School Graduates, Median HH Inc (000)

a

ANOVA
Model

Sum of

df

Mean

Squares
Regression
1

F

Sig.

Square

20227.254

13

1555.943

Residual

285809.196

224

1275.934

Total

306036.450

237

1.219

.266

a, Dependent Variable: HPRC
b. Predictors: (Constant), Arb, Survey-Quality of Life, Age15to24%, County Local
Govt, Bond Rating Adj Scale, Density, Population (000), City Local Govt,
Unemployment Rate, Med, Right-to-Work State, High School Graduates, Median
HH Inc (000)
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b

Coefficients
Model

a

Unstandardized

Standardiz

Coefficients

ed

t

Sig.

Collinearity
Statistics

Coefficient
s
B

Std.

Beta

Tolerance

VIF

Error
(Constant)

89.870 45.359

Population (000)

.017

-.030

-.408

.684

.758

1.320

.428

3.601

.008

.119

.905

.860

1.163

-78.492 55.886

-.136

-1.405

.162

.443

2.255

.166

.217

2.168

.031

.416

2.406

.002

.003

.038

.970

.733

1.365

-.062

-.723

.470

.568

1.760

Scale

Graduates
Median HH Inc (000)
Density

Unemployment Rate

.049

-.007

Bond Rating Adj

High School

1.981

.359
6.415E005
-82.492

114.03
0

Age15to24%

27.284 29.408

.070

.928

.355

.730

1.369

Survey-Quality of Life

-8.157 23.602

-.036

-.346

.730

.385

2.598

-8.554

6.259

-.119

-1.367

.173

.551

1.816

City Local Govt

-5.986

7.070

-.066

-.847

.398

.677

1.478

County Local Govt

19.734 12.761

.129

1.546

.123

.595

1.682

Non Right-to-Work
State

Med (v. NCB)

2.173

6.455

.029

.337

.737

.566

1.765

Arb (v. NCB)

5.392

7.496

.072

.719

.473

.411

2.431

a. Dependent Variable: HPRC
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